Controversial Scientology detox program to be tried by alleged Agent Orange victims in Vietnam

HANOI, Vietnam — Alleged victims of Agent Orange in Vietnam are set to receive a controversial "detoxification" treatment developed by the Church of Scientology.

Scientologists use the "Hubbard Method" — which involves saunas and vitamins — to try to cure drug addiction and alcoholism. The church set up a center in New York after the 9/11 attacks offering a similar service for first responders who may have been exposed to toxins.

Many researchers have criticized the method as pseudoscientific and useless.

A hospital official and state-controlled media said 24 people were at a Hanoi hospital on Thursday waiting for the program. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the media.

The U.S. military dumped some 20 million gallons of Agent Orange and other herbicides on about a quarter of former South Vietnam between 1962 and 1971, decimating about 5 million acres of forest — roughly the size of Massachusetts.

Dioxins in it have since been linked to birth defects, though the United States maintains there is no evidence of any link between Agent Orange and health problems among Vietnamese.

"I hope my wife and I will fully recover completely and will not suffer after-effects to pass on to my descendants," prospective patient Nguyen Xuan Anh was quoted as saying in the Viet Nam News daily.

U.S. Embassy spokesperson Christopher Hodges said Washington was not funding the program and said, "We are not aware of any safe, effective detoxification treatment for people with dioxin in body tissues."

Last month, the U.S. began a landmark project cleaning up toxins from the site of a former air base in Danang, in central Vietnam. Part of the former base consists of a dry field where U.S. troops once stored and mixed the defoliant before it was loaded onto planes.

Washington has been quibbling for years over the need for more scientific research to show that the herbicide caused health problems among Vietnamese. It has given about $60 million for environmental restoration and social services in Vietnam since 2007, but the Danang project is its first direct involvement in cleaning up dioxin, which has seeped into Vietnam's soil and watersheds for generations.

The "Hubbard Method" is named after Scientology's founder, L. Ron Hubbard.

Associated Press

Race Against Time to Find U.S. MIAs in Vietnam

In a remote valley in Vietnam, US investigators sift through piles of red soil. Despite recovering the remains of hundreds of fallen troops, the hunt goes on for many more still missing in a race against time.

With witnesses ageing, acidic soil eating into remains, and rapid development encroaching on areas where troops died during the Vietnam War, investigators warn there is little time left before all evidence is lost.

In May 1968, explosions shook the now-quiet valley in a battle around the Kham Duc Special Forces Camp in Quang Nam province -- an hour-long helicopter ride over green, terraced paddy fields from Danang airport, a former US base.

More than 40 years later a joint US-Vietnamese recovery team is hunting for the remains of those who were lost -- and must find them before all traces disappear.

"We most often find bits of metal fragments -- the area was heavily bombed. About 90 percent of what gets found (bone fragments and other remains) comes through the sieves," the team's anthropologist, Mindy Simonson, told AFP.

In Kham Duc, Vietnamese workers in a long line pass buckets of earth from a shallow pit neatly marked out with twine to the "evidence station" where it is sifted through dozens of large sieves.

Nearly 60,000 American soldiers died in the Cold War-era conflict, which also claimed the lives of up to three million Vietnamese civilians and soldiers before ending in 1975 with Vietnam's reunification.

When the guns fell silent, 1,971 Americans were left unaccounted for, according to figures from the US Joint Prisoners of War, Missing in Action Accounting Command (JPAC), which handles the search for MIAs.

Since then, 687 have been identified and repatriated and 586 are listed as "no further pursuit", meaning it is not possible to recover their remains. But JPAC is still hunting for about 700 missing individuals.

"It is no secret that the remains being recovered from most of the sites in Vietnam these days are fragmented and small," said JPAC's Ron Ward. "Remains are being lost to acidic soil, scavenging and land development."

The search is now a "race against time", he told AFP, but added there is "light at the end of the tunnel".

"We are relatively close to completing the majority of the excavations," Ward said.

At the Kham Duc dig, the team was guided by a younger, local witness who had stumbled upon the site while scavenging for scrap metal. "Witness" is the term used for people who know where the sites are.

Usually witnesses are elderly -- another factor JPAC is "racing against", said Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Keane. In many cases it is former soldiers who come forward with information.

"The Vietnamese witnesses are getting exceptionally old and we're losing those first hand witnesses. Once you lose a first hand witness, your ability to actually close a case... pretty much comes to an end," Keane told AFP.

Moreover, as Vietnam develops, more and more land is being turned into roads, hotels or coffee plantations.

"The third and fourth quarter of last year, every site we went to was in imminent danger" due to development, said Keane, the head of JPAC's operations in Vietnam.

The fact that remains are so fragmented and being eaten away by acidic soil makes it harder for JPAC scientists to do a positive DNA identification -- essential if a case is to be closed, he said.

When pressed on how long it would be until evidence disappeared, Keane said it was impossible to talk about exact timescales as there were many variables.

"There's no way to say 'well, in 6.2 years all the bones will be gone'. It's just we understand it is a concern, and it is something that we're racing against to ensure that we do find enough remains for the laboratory to be able to execute some sort of scientific (analysis)."

"The other factor that is important to us is we have mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, and children who are all waiting for word on their loved ones, and they're all getting older," he added.

Unidentified remains found on JPAC digs are placed in flag-draped coffins and flown to JPAC's labs in Hawaii where they are DNA-tested -- families are needed to provide samples.

After they have been identified, which can take some time depending on how quickly the DNA sequencing can obtain a positive identification, remains are flown to the mainland and returned to families for proper funerals.

According to JPAC's Ward, "the best-case scenario would be to reach a fullest possible accounting of (MIAs) within the lives of the immediate family members of the missing. There are very few parents left," he told AFP.

Bilateral cooperation has improved dramatically since the early days and the use of Vietnamese Recovery Teams -- local teams with a small American presence -- have speeded up the search.

"We want to pick up the pace so we can finish in time," said Colonel Dao Xuan Kinh, 61, who oversees the Vietnamese side of the dig effort for US remains.

The MIA issue was one of the first points of contact between the former enemies, which helped pave the way for the resumption of ties in 1995.

Vietnam also wants US help with finding its own missing soldiers, Kinh said.

Hanoi says about 300,000 North Vietnamese soldiers are still listed as missing from the war. The number of South Vietnamese MIAs remains unclear.

A key factor constraining the speed of the mission is cost -- JPAC estimates their Vietnam operation's annual operating budget, excluding field operations, at about $15 million.

This year, a funding boost has enabled the operation to field more recovery teams.

This has, Keane estimates, cut the estimated end date from 20 years to seven years -- if work continues at the current pace.

The Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (VFW) organisation says the hunt must continue whatever the cost.

"As long as there is one Vietnam veteran alive, this mission will continue," said VFW's Adjutant General Allen F. Kent.

"The American soldier was always told -- you go into combat and you defend your country and your country will make sure you come home properly to be buried on the ground that you were born in."

Agence France-Presse

The battle over the South Vietnamese soldier on the Capitol monument: Not over yet?

This image shows detail of the Vietnam veteran's monument planned for the Capitol grounds.

There was a Wednesday (Aug. 29, 2012) meeting "fairly confrontational at first," I'm told involving the folks who decided to take the South Vietnamese soldier off the planned Vietnam Veterans Monument at the Capitol and the folks who want it restored.

The bottom line, it seems, is that despite declarations that the decision is final, the people who want the Vietnamese soldier restored — including some potentially influential ones — are not giving up.

I've told you about the flak caused by the Texas Capitol Vietnam Veterans Monument Committee's decision to alter the original design by replacing a South Vietnamese Ranger with an Asian American U.S. soldier. Committee chair Robert Floyd said the change was made for diversity's sake on the statue that also includes U.S. soldiers of other ethnicities.

State Rep. Hubert Vo, D-Houston, and other Vietnamese Americans are upset about the decision, saying the Vietnamese soldier is a reminder that U.S. soldiers were there to help the local people, not as an invasionary force. Removing the Vietnamese soldier, Vo told Floyd in a letter, removed "an important symbolic element concerning the suffering of the Vietnamese, the kindness and heroism of the Texans who came to their aid and the friendship between these two great peoples."

In response to Vo — and in advance of the Wednesday meeting — Floyd said the change came in July 2011 when the committee voted unanimously "to change the focus of the monument from an emphasis on the Vietnam War to one that pays tribute to Texans who served in the fight for liberty and self-determination for the people of the Republic of Vietnam."

The change also came after some donors insisted on it.

Floyd also told Vo in a letter that the statue will include "Vietnamese dragons surrounding the Lone Star on the front panel and a panel depicting Vietnamese civilians."

"We have now actually begun the casting and final development process and with God's blessing we hope to be able to dedicate the monument in November 2013," Floyd told Vo.

Prior to Wednesday's meeting, Floyd told me, as he tells anyone who inquires, "The monument process is moving forward at the foundry, and we are not changing our decision."

Nevertheless, after the Wednesday meeting, Floyd said he'll bring the concerns of Vo and others to his full committee.

Vo didn't have much to say after the meeting, indicating it's an ongoing process and he remains in favor of restoring the South Vietnamese soldier.

"That's not only my wish, but a lot of people's wishes," Vo said.

Here's a twist I found interesting: Siding with Vo at the meeting was Jay Kimbrough, a longtime confidante of Gov. Rick Perry and a Vietnam veteran who is active in veterans' circles.

Kimbrough said he attended in that latter capacity, not representing Perry, with whom he has not discussed the matter. Kimbrough, interim director of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department, was invited by a Military Order of the Purple Heart official who also attended.

Kimbrough, who's grateful for the work Floyd and others have done on the project, wants the Vietnamese soldier restored "because that's who we fought for."

"We went over there for the South Vietnamese to help them and defend them, and I believe they should be a part of that monument," Kimbrough told me after the meeting.

That's his opinion, he said, "as a boots-on-the-ground machine-gunner."

Is the committee's decision to remove the Vietnamese soldier as final as Floyd has indicated?

"I have learned never to say never," Floyd said after the meeting, "but I think it's fair to say that those who were arguing for the return of the Vietnam Ranger seemed to have little interest in recognizing Asian Americans."

It'd be a shame if this comes down to one or the other. Can we include both the Vietnamese soldier (who in the original version was getting a transfusion from an American soldier) and the Asian American?

Stay tuned.

Ken Herman

Military Advisors Reflect on Vietnam War Experiences

WASHINGTON, Aug. 29, 2012 – Two former military advisors who served with Vietnamese units during the Vietnam War spoke about their experiences in the Pentagon yesterday and shared their thoughts on advisory programs and counterinsurgency operations.

Marine Corps Gen. Anthony Zinni 

Retired Marine Corps Gen. Anthony Zinni and retired Army Lt. Col. James Willbanks took part in a panel discussion on “Advisors in the Vietnam War,” along with Andrew Birtle, chief of the Military Operations Branch at the Army Center of Military History. The panel was part of the Historical Speakers Series sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office.

Birtle opened the program with an overview of the U.S. advisory effort in Vietnam. An expert on counterinsurgency operations doctrine who authored books on the subject, Birtle outlined the development of the military advisor program from the first U.S. advisors in 1950 until end of the war in the early 1970s.

“Perhaps the most common emotion advisors experienced in Vietnam was the frustration of being held responsible for something they could not control,” Birtle said. “Nothing was more frustrating than the feelings that one’s efforts were falling on fallow ground.”

Zinni spoke after Birtle, sharing his experiences as an advisor to a Vietnamese Marine unit in 1967. The general, who eventually rose through the ranks to lead U.S. Central Command, said his primary duties as an advisor in Vietnam were to help coordinate fire support, air capability and operations with U.S. units. Working, living and eating with the Vietnamese – and operating all over South Vietnam -- gave him an insight into the conflict that he said he wouldn’t have gotten otherwise.

“Those who saw that war from inside a U.S. unit – despite the fact that certainly they saw plenty of combat, as we did – they saw a different war than I did,” Zinni said.

“I saw the war through the eyes of the Vietnamese people. I saw the war through the eyes of villagers that I lived with. I saw the war through the eyes of Vietnamese soldiers and Marines there weren’t there on one-year tours, but were there for the duration,” he said. “I saw the war from the Delta to the DMZ. I saw the war from Cambodia to the coastal plains in the east. And it was a totally different perspective than I was hearing from my counterparts.”

Zinni said he saw the most benefits result from Vietnamese units that built relationships with U.S. units over time, in which U.S. and Vietnamese soldiers could get to know and trust each other over time. He said it worked well with relatively small Marine Corps units, as well as with Army airborne and Ranger units.

“One of the strengths of the advisor unit, besides the fact that we didn’t have advisory teams and we sort of immersed ourselves into their organization and culture, is that we connected to the Vietnamese Marines very closely,” Zinni said.

But Zinni said there was a price to pay for being that close to the local forces.

“The advisory effort, when you were totally immersed in the culture, took a toll on you. By the time my advisory tour was coming neat to its end… I had contracted malaria, mononucleosis, dysentery and hepatitis,” Zinni said. “I was down to 123 pounds.”

This was not an uncommon phenomenon for service members in advisory roles.

“Most of the advisors suffered health issues and very few advisors finished a whole tour without a significant health problem or eventually being evacuated because of a health problem,” Zinni said.

Despite the physical hardships,  Zinni said the experience gave him “a sense of what this war was all about” and made him realize that the U.S. was failing to give the South Vietnamese people a good enough reason to put their lives on the line.

“If we didn’t capture the hearts of the people, if we couldn’t give them something to fight for, if we weren’t willing to ensure that the government was responsible to people, and we weren’t willing to cut off a base of supply that was endless, we eventually could not win that conflict, despite all the victories on the battlefield,” he said.

Zinni said he felt military leaders did not pay enough attention to knowledge gained in Vietnam, as attention shifted elsewhere after the war ended.

“Vietnam was rich in the lessons we never learned,” he said.

“The enemy beat us strategically; they didn’t beat us tactically,” Zinni said. “They didn’t beat us in terms of what we were able to develop in military capability with the South Vietnamese, but they beat us psychologically, and they beat us strategically. That lesson was never carried over.”

Willbanks spoke after Zinni. Now the director of the Department of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Willbanks arrived in Vietnam as an advisor in 1971, when only four U.S. Army infantry battalions and a total of fewer than 125,000 U.S. troops were left in the country. He was assigned to an advisory team supporting an Army of the Republic of Vietnam, or ARVN, division.

“I was a captain with two and a half years in service, on my first combat tour,” Willbanks said. “I was being asked to advise a 40-year-old ARVN battalion commander, a lieutenant colonel who had been fighting most of his adult life. “

Because of his lower rank and relative inexperience, Willbanks said he sometimes had difficulty in getting the battalion commanders to listen to his advice. His duties during the early part of his tour involved assisting and training the Vietnamese in staff operations, acting as liaison to the remaining U.S. units in the area, helping with combat operations planning and accompanying the battalions on combat operations in the field.

Willbanks said everything changed when the North Vietnamese launched the “Easter Offensive” on March 31, 1972. He volunteered to replace a wounded advisor in provincial capital city of An Loc, where a battle raged day and night for the next two and a half months.

“At this point, the focus of my efforts shifted to coordinating U.S. combat support,” Willbanks said. “I spent all my time adjusting artillery – at least in the beginning, and pretty soon we had no artillery to adjust – air strikes, and also coordinating attack helicopters and fixed-wing gunships, calling for dustoff medical evacuation and coordinating aerial resupply.”

Willbanks said being in An Lac at that time was an experience different than anything he had ever conceived.

“It was a desperate battle that seesawed back and forth as the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese forces fought each other, sometimes house to house, block to block, room to room,” he said.

The South Vietnamese forces held out, and the battle began to die down as the summer wore on, but Willbanks was wounded for a second time and evacuated from the city. Once he was released from the hospital, he spent the rest of his time helping the ARVN recover from the Easter Offensive. He said he left the country at the end of his tour “feeling pretty good” about what he’d been able to accomplish in helping the South Vietnamese forces.

Speaking generally about advisory efforts, Willbanks said there was less of an emphasis on the advisory effort and a shift away from it once U.S. ground troops started arriving in Vietnam. This eventually meant that not all advisors had the right qualifications, training or ability for the job. The advisory tours were often less than 12 months, which created turbulence hampered the ability to form a bond between Vietnamese troops and their U.S. advisors.

Eventually, the emphasis began to shift back to the advisors, as combat troops left Vietnam, but Willbanks said he thought it was too late by that point.

“From a personal perspective, I found the advisory duty very difficult. The duty required decisiveness and aggressive pursuit of the mission, but it also called for patience and restraint – a conflicted mix, to say the least,” he said. “The reality on the ground often flew in the face of the need to report progress.”

Willbanks said advisors “walked a tightrope” when it came to their duties. They had to be involved and proactive without stifling the initiative of the Vietnamese commanders. They had to be empathetic to their counterparts and understand their culture while being honest about the units and their leaders.

Perhaps most importantly, Willbanks said, advisors had to find a way to build a relationship with their counterparts without making them too dependent on the advisor and on U.S. combat and service support.  This proved to be a problem when the U.S. withdrew and the Vietnamese were left on their own.

“I have to say, even with all the difficulties involved, and even knowing how it all turned out, I’m proud of what I did as an advisor in Vietnam, and I only wish we could have done more,” Willbanks said. “The South Vietnamese were good people, and they deserved better than they got.”

John Valceanu