Cooler Heads in the South China Sea

The United States is realizing that the escalating tensions in the Far East, especially between China and Japan, should no longer be viewed as an opportunity to contain China. Instead, our first priority should be to get everyone to calm down.

At issue are the territorial rights over some forty piles of rock, most uninhabited, some barely sticking out of the water. These conflicts already have led to large nationalist anti-Japanese demonstrations in China and similar anti-Chinese demonstrations in Japan; saber-rattling activists planting their nation’s flag on some of the islands; and clashes between vessels of several regional nations—all fueled by increasingly hot rhetoric by public leaders. These smaller clashes look increasingly like the type of incidents that can spin out of control and lead to more serious conflagrations.

The United States, which keeps veering between seeking to engage China and moves to “contain” it, had at first—at least indirectly—urged the nations of the area to band together and push back against Chinese claims to many of the islands at issue. However, most recently Secretary Panetta called on China and Japan “to move forward and not have this dispute get out of hand” and emphasized that all parties share a responsibility to resolve the conflicts peacefully. And—the ever industrious U.S. think tanks have taken off their shelves a whole host of proposals that could defuse the crisis.

Disputes over maritime territorial rights fall under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and should be settled in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). (The fact that the United States did not ratify the treaty involved seems immaterial because Washington typically operates as if it were committed to UNCLOS.) But such settlements take years.

In the short term, the think tankers are calling on China and Japan to establish a hotline so that their leaders will be better able to nip in the bud any unintended confrontations. Moreover, both nations are urged to declare unequivocally that “military force is not an option.” A more ambitious plan calls for a return to a derailed 2010 agreement for the joint development of gas fields in the South China Sea. The Economist suggests that the nations involved should do the environment a favor and turn the islands and surrounding seas into marine protected areas to combat overfishing, a problem that seriously threatens the economies and ecology of the region.

Douglas H. Paal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace points out that to combat overfishing, China, Vietnam and Taiwan have already “initiated fishing seasons, periodic bans, and limits on sizes of catches to support sustainable harvesting, but these are not harmonized and often conflict.” Hence Paal calls “greater control of the fishing fleets, with effective sanctions on misbehavior under rules agreed upon in common, [an] achievable and responsible goal.”

One must acknowledge that islands are not fought over simply as real estate but because they serve as markers for determining maritime rights. According to a widely followed reading of international law, a nation’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extends two hundred miles off its shores. Thus, if nations can populate and prove ownership over tiny islands in their near seas, they can expand their EEZ and gain access to the surrounding natural resources—not only fish but also coveted fuels and minerals that lie beneath the seabed. Hence, for nations such as China and Japan, whose economies are highly dependent on the secure access to and development of such resources, these islands are much more than “piles of rocks.”

In Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, Mark Valencia, Jon Van Dyke and Noel Ludwig suggest establishing “regional sovereignty” over the islands in the South China Sea among the six claimants, allowing them to collectively manage the islands, territorial seas and airspace. Of course, this would require an agreement among the parties as how to share the spoils.

Another option, put forward by Peter Dutton of the Naval War College, would emulate the resolution of the dispute over Svalbard, an island located between Norway and Greenland. The Treaty of Spitsbergen, signed in 1920, awarded primary sovereignty over Svarlbard to Norway but assigned resource-related rights to all signatories. Applying this model to the South and East China Seas likely would entail giving sovereignty to China while permitting other countries to benefit from the resources. Though, at least in the near term, such a solution is unlikely to be accepted by the other claimants.

Still others have suggested declaring a moratorium on any exploration until the tensions are defused and conflicts are worked out. And a troika of foreign ministers in the region, including nations not directly involved such as Indonesia and Australia, has been urged to help work out an evenhanded solution.

Those who hold that all these suggestions are naive should note that such settlements do take place. One case will have to stand for several others. In 2009, five years after the decades-old dispute was brought to court, the ICJ settled a dispute between Ukraine and Romania over the Black Sea, whose seabed holds an estimated ten million tons of oil. One key issue was whether the Serpent Island would be considered a cliff or an island. The Romanians claimed it was “a cliff” (hence irrelevant to territorial demarcation) while Ukraine held it was “an island” and thus that Ukraine’s maritime boundaries extended beyond Serpent Island’s shores. The ICJ ruled it a cliff and delivered a judgment that granted Romania about 80 percent of the disputed area (though the oil was more concentrated on the Ukrainian side). Both sides accepted the decision.

If cooler heads prevail and Washington continues to throw its weight in support of tensions reduction and conflict resolution by negotiation, some of these proposals or others like them may carry the day. All sides surely realize—given the fragile state of the global economy, the political transition in China, the rise of nationalism that threatens to spin out of control—that this is a particularly poor time to escalate tensions.

Resource allocation is a contentious issue, but raw materials have a virtue: they can be divided. Disputes over such assets do not have to be settled in a winner-takes-all fashion, allowing all the nations involved to gain some of the spoils and save face. In contrast, if the clashes spin out of control, the disputants and the bystanders will all be losers.

Amitai Etzioni 

China Mends Fences in Sea Dispute

It appears to be showing flexibility in efforts to devise a code of conduct for South China Sea claimants.

RFA

China’s territorial claim to the South China Sea includes two disputed island chains.

As Beijing flexes its muscles over its territorial dispute with Japan in the East China Sea, it is mending fences with Southeast Asian nations after a spate of tensions in the contested South China Sea.

Following much prodding and diplomacy, China appears to be showing some flexibility in its approach towards drawing up a code of conduct with the Southeast Asian nations aimed at avoiding clashes over competing territorial claims in the vast sea, diplomats in the region told RFA.

Although they are skeptical of any early breakthrough for a legally binding document between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to guide behavior in the sea, there is optimism that negotiations will occur on a sustained basis.

“We see some flexibility to discuss the COC with ASEAN,” one Southeast Asian diplomat said, referring to the elusive Code of Conduct or COC which ASEAN—comprising Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam—has been striving to devise with Beijing for a decade.

In an initial display of seriousness that it is prepared to come to the table, China sent its senior officials to Cambodia last week to informally discuss with their counterparts from ASEAN the prospects for drawing up a code, officials said.

This is the first meeting between the two sides specifically on the maritime dispute since ASEAN plunged into a crisis two months ago when foreign ministers of the 10-member bloc failed to issue their customary joint statement at the conclusion of their annual meeting hosted by Cambodia, China’s top ally in Southeast Asia.

Some ASEAN diplomats had charged that Cambodia had been influenced by China not to incorporate in the statement the views of ASEAN member states the Philippines and Vietnam, which had tiffs earlier this year with Beijing over islands and reefs in the South China Sea, causing an impasse at the meeting.

The ASEAN-China Senior Officials’ Informal Consultations on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, as last week’s meeting in Phnom Penh was officially called, was among a series of discussions in preparation for the ASEAN summit and the East Asia Summit in November.

“Compared to two months ago, when there was complete reluctance to come to the table, China appears willing to sit down and talk,” said one Southeast Asian official, who was briefed on the talks but spoke on condition of anonymity.

“Indirectly, they may be feeling the heat from the mounting criticism over what happened at the meeting in July which was a big blow to ASEAN,” the official said.

“But China has also asked the ASEAN states to do their part by reducing tensions and not conducting border incursions and creating a conducive environment for any future talks. They don’t want us to bring in third parties [the United States] over the conflict and want us to stick to the 2002 declaration,” the diplomat said.

Under a 2002 agreement for managing their overlapping territorial claims, ASEAN and China adopted a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, called DOC as a first step towards a binding code of conduct.

But in a reflection of the sensitivity over the issue, it was only last year—after 10 years—that they agreed on a set of guidelines to implement the declaration that was aimed at laying the groundwork for discussions on the regional code of conduct.

Ray of hope

The new ray of hope for achieving a COC comes after extensive diplomacy, including U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s trip to Southeast Asia and China, with a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao.

Chinese leaders told Clinton—who has often emphasized that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is a U.S. “national interest”—that they want to pursue the COC, U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke told a forum in Washington last week, saying the talks between the two sides were “very good.”

“I’ve also heard from many prominent Chinese academics that China would like somehow to return to the status quo, that they would like to lower the temperature,” Locke said.

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Yechi had also visited Indonesia as well as Malaysia and Brunei, giving reassurances that diplomacy was still on track.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, embarrassed by the failure by his country as 2012 ASEAN chairman to forge an agreement on the foreign ministers’ joint statement, also made a trip to China this month, meeting Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.

Hun Sen won assurances from Wen that Beijing will “closely work” to make the upcoming East Asia Summit which Cambodia will host a success,” Chinese media reported.

Southeast Asian diplomats said a key objective is to get an initial ASEAN-China accord on the COC before the November East Asia Summit, to be attended by leaders of ASEAN as well as China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, Russia and the United States.

Key elements of the COC have been agreed upon by ASEAN member states whose foreign ministers will meet to consider a full draft document on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York this coming week, the diplomats said.

“We are now in the process of spelling out the draft [of the code] and we hope to be able to share it with my ASEAN foreign minister colleagues when I meet them in New York,” Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said, according to the Jakarta Globe newspaper.

“The development of the South China Sea [issues] reminds us how we desperately need the code of conduct, [so] I’m trying to use the momentum,” Marty said, as Indonesia asserts a leadership role in ASEAN to deal with the South China Sea issue, Asia’s biggest potential military flashpoint.

Cambodia or Thailand, which is the ASEAN coordinator for China issues, could host another round of informal talks between senior officials from ASEAN and China on the COC before the East Asia Summit.

“Both sides might also issue a joint statement to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the DOC at Summit,” an official involved in the planning of the summit told RFA, referring to the declaration adopted in 2002 in Cambodia to set the stage for the regional code of conduct.

Beijing has maintained all this while that it wants to resolve the South China Sea territorial conflicts on a bilateral basis with ASEAN members Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, which have competing claims with China.

China claims sovereignty over nearly all of the resource-rich South China Sea, which is also home to important shipping lanes. It is also locked in a territorial tussle with Japan over disputed islands in the East China Sea.

Bloc

Southeast Asian officials say ASEAN would negotiate the COC with China as a bloc but not in the specific delineation or settlement of the claims between the claimant states.

ASEAN’s role “is not to deal with the claims themselves but in the broader setting up of the framework which would allow for a peaceful resolution of these claims,” Singapore Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam said, according to the island state’s media.

Beijing has stressed that ASEAN should have no role in negotiating on behalf of the four members who were claimant states.

“For China, the COC is only a tool to promote mutual trust over the South China Sea and not to resolve disputes. They stressed this again at the Phnom Penh meeting last week,” a Southeast Asian diplomat said.

Still, as the COC is being drafted, China has to grapple with various basic questions—which it has brushed off previously—over its claim to the South China Sea.

While officials have to first pin down the South China Sea area to be governed by the code, there is much uncertainty over the territory China claims—represented by the nine-dashed, U-shaped line encircling most of the sea on Chinese official maps.

The location of those dashes has never been pinpointed as China has not supplied the coordinates for them. The nature of the Chinese claim has also not been clearly defined.

In addition, there is the question of the Paracel islands’ inclusion in the code’s area of application. Vietnam still maintains its claim to the islands although China seized them from its fellow communist neighbor in 1974.

Uncertainty

Former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino said the uncertainty over where a “binding code of conduct” would apply was one of the factors cited for downgrading the 2002 ASEAN-China agreement from a legal code to a political declaration.

“Is the uncertainty of its area of application still a factor in and an obstacle to its adoption,” he asked.

“If these [outstanding] issues were fudged in the proposed document, as seems most likely to be the case at this time, how would the problem be overcome? What would the formulation be?”

Severino said one fundamental reason why the problems arising from the conflicting claims in the South China Sea are so difficult and intractable is not only the size and strategic location of that body of water but also that all the claimants feel that their footholds in the sea are essential to what they consider as their national interests.

“Therefore, the disputes in the South China Sea cannot be resolved any time soon, if at all. The most that can be done is to prevent those disputes from developing into armed conflict. This could be the overarching aim of any code of conduct that ASEAN and China might produce.”

Parameswaran Ponnudurai

Worry about Asia, Not Europe

Newspapers are now full of doom and gloom about Europe. A recent opinion piece in The New York Times even argued that “Europe”—the ideal of an integrated, prosperous, peaceable continent devoid of nationalism’s nasty variants—had failed outright.

Europe certainly has problems, among them massive unemployment, crushing debt, rising poverty, and resurgent xenophobic ideologies, parties and movements. But failure? Compared to what exactly?

Surely not the past. For five hundred years before 1945, Europe was the venue for horrific wars. World War I and II alone killed seventy million people. Extremist movements were ubiquitous. Noxious worldviews enabled horrors such as the Holocaust.

After World War II, thanks to the European Union (EU), Western Europe morphed into a community of democracy and peace. A common market emerged; later, labor and capital began to cross borders freely; then came the single currency. Joint decision making advanced on multiple fronts, with governments surrendering elements of sovereignty. And the EU has expanded eastward.

The prospect of Germany and France going to war, as they had in the past, soon became inconceivable and remains so. Ditto the revival of German militarism and imperialism; Germans embraced consensus-based multilateralism within the EU and NATO.

Europe’s welfare state was never perfect—what is?—and faces big challenges (especially given Europe’s aging population), but it bears no resemblance to the caricatures penned by some American pundits. It has provided millions a decent life and basic necessities. Taxes are high, but social services are extensive.

Is Europe a failure compared to other places? One way to answer this question is to look east—to the Far East, an economic dynamo.

The East’s Indelible Memories
This summer, Europe marked the end of World War II, as it always has, in unremarkable ways: with ceremonies, speeches honoring those who fought and lived and those who died fighting, visits to monuments, etc. The subtext of the commemoration continues to be: let’s recall the past so we never relive it.

In East Asia, by contrast, memories of the war still provoke anger and stoke regional animosities. Sixty-seven years after the end of World War II, the fury over “comfort women” (as the Japanese referred to South Korean females forcibly transported to Japan to provide sex to soldiers) and the 1937 Nanking Massacre persists. Bellicosity and indignant nationalism are omnipresent.

Consider what happened just last month. Two Japanese cabinet officials outraged China and South Korea by visiting the Yasukuni war memorial, a site that also holds the remains of men whom Chinese, Koreans and other East Asians consider war criminals. In China, attacked and brutally occupied by Japan from 1931–1945, and Korea, colonized by Japan from 1905–1945, the visit wasn’t considered an innocent pilgrimage, not least because it was not the first time Japanese officials had displayed bad timing in visiting Yasukuni. In a move that many in Japan saw as an insult, South Korea’s prime minister asked their emperor not to visit Seoul, observing that Japan had not apologized adequately for its misdeeds.

Japan’s “peace constitution” forsakes war, its defense budget hovers at a mere 1 percent of GDP, and its foreign policy reflects Japanese society’s pacifist, antimilitarist leanings. No matter. Japan remains suspect among its neighbors.

While no one in the region seriously anticipates another Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Imperial Japan’s euphemism for its empire in the 1940s, wounds from that period remain raw. That’s partly because Japan, unlike Germany, hasn’t fully confronted its past or shown what its neighbors consider sufficient and sincere contrition.

Another flashpoint in East Asia involves mini-archipelagos that fleck the Sea of Japan and the East and South China seas. In August, South Korea and Japan traded venom again over islands—basically a collection of rocks—in the Sea of Japan that the Koreans, who control them, call Dokdo, and the Japanese, who claim rightful ownership, know as Takeshima. When the South Korean president flew there on August 10, the Japanese were infuriated. Japan recalled its ambassador to South Korea and lodged a formal protest. South Korea sent back Japan’s written complaint.

China and Japan have their own quarrel over the Diaoyutai (in Chinese) or Senkaku Islands (in Japanese). When Japanese activists or politicians visit these East China Sea islets or Chinese trawlers play chicken with the Japanese Coast Guard, tempers flare on both sides. The blogosphere sizzles; sabers rattle; jingoistic banners flutter. There was a replay in August. Furious crowds in China vandalized Japanese cars and restaurants after Japan detained and deported a Chinese group that landed on one of the islands. The news broke this month that the Japanese government was moving to buy the islands from their owner. Beijing, already incensed by reports this spring that Tokyo’s ultranationalist governor, Shintaro Ishihara, was planning to mobilize funds to that the city could acquire them, warned that it would defend its sovereign rights in the face of an illegal act.

In the South China Sea, China, Taiwan and Vietnam each claim the Paracel Islands, and China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei claim the Spratly Islands. Chinese maps proclaimed ownership of both clusters via its “Nine-Dashed Line,” which, for good measure, encloses virtually the entire South China Sea. Beijing says it’s open to negotiations in principle, but it has spurned them in practice, dismissing rival claims and flaunting its naval power. Its message: might makes right.

Continental Differences
Ultimately, the tub-thumping over maritime rocks is less about sea-lanes, fishing grounds and energy deposits than about fear, anger and suspicion—and as it was once in Europe, all these anxieties are rooted in the past.

True, East Asia’s dense trade ties demonstrate the gains from win-win interactions, but the region lacks counterparts to the EU or NATO that can promote joint problem solving and shared security. And despite East Asia’s many achievements (China’s spectacular growth rates; South Korea’s emergence as a world-class economic power and a democracy; Japan’s military minimalism) the region has multiple sources of instability and conflict.

The claim that a narrow nationalism has reemerged in Europe is weak on at least two counts. First, it exaggerates the extent to which national sentiment had been transcended by a pan-European identity and also lacks a comparative context. The run-up to the big decisions the EU has taken (the admission of Britain, the design and later reform of the common agricultural policy, and the introduction of the euro, for instance) revealed national divisions. Second, the claim that nationalism has made a comeback in Europe is devoid of comparative perspective. Are European countries more nationalistic now than they were prior to the emergence of the EU? Certainly not. Comparing Europe with Asia—and Europe’s past with its present—provides perspective at a time when pessimism about Europe prevails. For all of its present problems, "Europe" hasn’t failed. Nor, if one uses a reasonable standard, is failure likely.

Rajan Menon

China reserves right to act on disputed islands

China's national defense minister warned Tuesday that Beijing reserves the right to take further action against Japan in the ongoing dispute over uninhabited islands in the East China Sea.

Standing next to U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, Gen. Liang Guanglie said Japan should bear full responsibility for the dispute, which has triggered violent protests in China against the Japanese. Panetta has been pressing both Liang and defense leaders in Japan to find ways to resolve the problem peacefully and diplomatically.

U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, left, stands at attention during the national anthem next to China's Defense Minister Liang Guanglie at the Bayi Building in Beijing, China Tuesday, Sept. 18, 2012. (AP Photo/Larry Downing, Pool)

Liang, however, made it clear during a press conference that while China still would like to see a negotiated solution, he hopes the Japanese government "will undo its mistakes and come back to the right track of negotiations." Tensions over the string of islands, called the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyu in China, spiked last week when the Japanese government said it was purchasing some of the islands from their private owner.

China's official Xinhua News Agency reported that during their private talks, Liang told Panetta that China was "resolutely opposed" to the islands' inclusion within the terms of the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty, the agreement signed in 1951 as the U.S. helped the island nation rebuild after World War II.

Liang said China hopes the U.S. will honor its commitment to maintain a neutral stance, Xinhua reported.

The island dispute has been a hot topic during Panetta's weeklong tour of the Asia-Pacific region. But his session with Liang also touched on a wide expanse of issues as the U.S. and China try to find a way to improve their military relationship.

U.S. relations with China have been rocky, especially over America's support of and arms sales to Taiwan, the self-governing island that Beijing claims as its own. The U.S. also has been critical of China for its lack of transparency regarding its massive military buildup.

"I've long believed that the United States-China relationship requires a long-term perspective," Panetta said during the press conference after a lengthy meeting Tuesday morning with Liang. "It is measured less by major breakthroughs than by slow, steady progress over time to build a relationship and to work on activities in areas of mutual interest."

In a move to enhance the relationship, Panetta announced that the U.S. will invite China to send a ship to participate in a major military maritime exercise in 2014.

Both Panetta and Liang said they talked about how their two nations can improve communications and work toward developing a greater mutual trust.

Speaking through an interpreter, Liang said the U.S. and China must work to gain a better understanding of each other so they can gradually reduce the ongoing suspicions that have plagued the relationship.

Their meeting came just days after the U.S. forged an agreement to put a second missile-defense radar system in Japan, a move China is likely to view as another effort by the U.S. to broaden its military power in the Asia-Pacific region.

This is Panetta's first trip to China as defense chief, and it is expected to include several historic visits, including a meeting Wednesday with the country's leader-in-waiting, Xi Jinping, just days after the ruler reappeared in public after a two-week absence.

Panetta's stay in China was extended in recent days so he could visit Qingdao, a key naval base where he will see a Chinese submarine and frigate.

China and the U.S. also faced off over trade issues this week. China filed a World Trade Organization case Monday challenging U.S. anti-dumping measures on billions of dollars of kitchen appliances, paper and other goods, adding to worsening trade strains as global demand weakens.

Beijing's move came shortly before the Obama administration filed its own WTO case accusing China of improperly subsidizing exports of automobiles and auto parts.

Associated Press

Japan businesses in China hit as protests rage

TOKYO (AP) — Scores of Japanese-owned factories and stores in China were shuttered Tuesday as anti-Japan demonstrations erupted in dozens of cities.

 In this Sept. 15, 2012 file photo, residents look at an over-turned Toyota car during an anti-Japan protest in Xi'an in northwest China's Shaanxi province. Scores of Japanese-owned factories and stores in China were shuttered Tuesday, Sept. 18 as anti-Japanese demonstrations raged in dozens of cities. At stake are billions of dollars in investments and far more in sales and trade between Japan and China, the world's third- and second-largest economies. The two are so closely entwined, though, that both would suffer from any long-term disruptions. (AP Photo/File)

At stake are billions of dollars in investments and far more in sales and trade between Japan and China, the world's third- and second-largest economies. The two are so closely entwined that both would suffer from any long-term disruptions.

While Chinese authorities appeared to be moving to clamp down on the protests, the Japanese government has been urging Beijing to do more to protect Japanese businesses from trespassing, looting and other damage, Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura told reporters.

"Japanese companies play an important role in the Chinese economy and employment. We believe we should be calm and make rational judgments from a broad perspective," Fujimura said. Some private and government-level meetings and events have been postponed or cancelled, he said.

Big name brands and retailers appeared to be suffering the brunt of the latest mass outburst of anti-Japanese sentiment, with companies in lower profile sectors less affected.

Many companies said they closed Tuesday as the 81st anniversary of a Japanese invasion brought a fresh wave of protests venting anger over the colonial past and a current dispute involving contested islands in the East China Sea.

Pain from the protests was being felt in Tokyo, too, where business has slowed for the many shopkeepers catering to Chinese tourists.

"It makes me wonder how Japan will emerge from this," 20-year-old Yui Watanabe said of the protests. "We just really need to be level-headed," she said.

In Shanghai, many of the Japanese-owned or oriented shops and restaurants in the western part of the city where the Japanese consulate is located had either closed or covered any Japan-brand signs.

Uniqlo, Asia's biggest clothing retailer, had closed some of its outlets but opened its huge flagship store on Shanghai's main Nanjing Rd. shopping street by the early afternoon. Amid calls for a boycott of Japanese products, the popular store was busy with shoppers.

Despite rancor over the territorial dispute, trade between the two countries has been thriving. Total trade rose 14 percent to $344.9 billion in 2011, setting a record, according to the Japan External Trade Organization, or JETRO. Japanese help run China's high-speed train lines and aid from Tokyo helped build much of the country's modern infrastructure, including its Pudong international airport in Shanghai.

Still, many employees of Japanese retailers, automakers and other companies were staying home Tuesday as thousands of anti-Japanese protesters marched in Beijing. The Japanese school in Beijing was closed on Monday, a Japanese public holiday, and on Tuesday. Staff said they were uncertain what would happen on Wednesday.

Many companies were wary of speaking in too much detail about the situation.

Toyota Motor Corp. would not reveal which or how many of its factories were closed, saying it was up to each affiliate or subsidiary to decide. Employee safety was the priority, it said in a company statement.

A Toyota dealership in Qingdao was burned and others had display models damaged, though there were no reports of injuries at the company's factories or dealerships.

Honda Motor Corp. said all five of its assembly plants in China were closed Tuesday and Wednesday, mainly to adjust production due to the impact of the anti-Japanese backlash on sales. Honda dealerships also have been damaged in recent protests, the company said.

Honda's China sales account for about one-fifth of its global total, with Toyota's accounting for about 10 percent and Nissan Motor Co.'s for over one-quarter. Until recently, all three were outperforming their domestic rivals, despite a cooling in demand over the past two years.

Kobe Steel shut four of its various steel, aluminum and construction machinery plants in China from yesterday or today, said spokesman Gary Tsuchida.

"As a precautionary measure, we decided it would be better to cool things," he said.

Sharp. Corp., which gets about a fifth of its sales from China, said its various factories are operating as usual, with no impact so far on their production. However, spokesman Yuta Oga said the company was taking precautions in having employees avoid unnecessary travel or excursions.

Kawasaki Heavy Industries, which has a big shipbuilding joint venture in the Yangtze River city of Nantong, near Shanghai, has likewise continued business as usual.

Sony Corp. said it had suspended production at two factories out of the seven it operates in China, to protect its employees.

Although Chinese manufacturers are upgrading their technology and equipment as they close the gap with their global rivals, many rely heavily on advanced robotic machinery and other Japanese technology, as well as state-of-the-art materials and components.

Halts to production caused by the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in northeastern Japan had an especially heavy impact on automakers. But the ripple effects of any major disruptions would be felt in many industries, from heavy manufacturing to clothing and cosmetics.

Associated Press

China-U.S. power play at core of East Asian island disputes

At first glance, it seems to make little sense that China and U.S. allies in the Western Pacific would dredge up old fights over uninhabitable islands, provoking nationalist protests, diplomatic rifts and a threat of violent confrontation in a strategic maritime corridor.

Chinese nationalists in Chengdu, in the southern province of Sichuan, protest last month against Japanese claims to disputed islands in the East China Sea. Rival claims to tiny constellations of islands from the cold North Pacific to the tropical South China Sea have stirred old tensions and resentments throughout East Asia. Credit: Associated Press

The South China Sea and coastal passages from Malaysia to Russia are of vital economic interest to all who ply the shipping lanes used to ferry more than $1.2 trillion in goods annually between the United States and its Far East trading partners.

But for the past decade the U.S. has been distracted with wars in faraway Iraq and Afghanistan, leaving allies like Japan, South Korea and the Philippines on their own to face an increasingly assertive China staking claims to the islands and the natural resources around them.

As the United States recalibrates its foreign policy to recover its standing in East Asia, analysts say Washington must execute a delicate balancing act to nurture relations with China while preventing it from bullying weaker countries.

In the South China Sea, Beijing last month deployed a military garrison and administrative staff to bolster its claim to Scarborough Reef, a triangular atoll framed by China, Vietnam and the Philippines. Vietnamese officials complain that China last year sabotaged its oil exploration by cutting undersea cables. In April, Manila accused Beijing of blockading a key fishing ground to prevent the arrest of Chinese poachers. Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei also assert sovereignty over some islets.

Since mid-August, Japan, China and South Korea have been ratcheting up tensions over less resource-rich islands in the East China Sea. All three nations are gearing up for elections and leadership changes this fall, encouraging politicians to posture as fierce defenders of national sovereignty.

The Japanese government said Monday that it will buy the privately owned islands it calls Senkaku, prompting China to send two patrol ships to safeguard the outcroppings known in China as Diaoyu. South Korea has also indulged in provocation, with President Lee Myung-bak staging a lightning visit to the islets in early August.

South Korea and Japan also dispute sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks in the Sea of Japan, and Tokyo has a long-running conflict with Russia over two islands of the Kuril chain.

While the rock piles themselves are of little value, any nation that can establish sovereignty has exclusive rights to the resources within a 200-mile radius, notes Bonnie Glaser, senior fellow for China studies at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Glaser sees the main risks to regional security coming from "accident and miscalculation," like the 2010 ramming of two Japanese coast guard vessels by a drunken Chinese fishing boat captain that set off the most tense standoff between the Asian rivals in years. She also pointed to China's attempts to intimidate smaller neighbors by frustrating trade, as when Beijing cut off exports of rare earths to Japan two years ago and quarantined Philippine fruit imports.

"With the challenges facing the United States and the rise of China, there is a sense that some new system is emerging," said Jamie Metzl, a senior fellow at the Asia Society think tank. "Many of these conflicts that had been on ice are defrosting, and countries are pushing claims to test and explore the contours of the new power structure. When China challenges Japan, it is also challenging the U.S.-Japan alliance."

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta have said during recent visits to East Asia that Washington won't take sides in territorial spats between longtime allies and the economic powerhouse of China. Instead, U.S. officials have urged the nations to work through Asian diplomatic alliances or the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. There have also been calls for plans for mutually exploring, extracting and protecting the coveted resources.

"The fishing reserves grow more valuable as other fish stocks along the coast are depleted. There's plenty of reason to have a region-wide regime" for coordinating fishing seasons and sharing in the take, said Douglas Paal, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The United States can play an important role in helping the parties with technical assistance in resource management, but Washington is unlikely to be accepted as an impartial mediator because of statements by officials that appear to put the United States "on the side of everybody but China," Paal said.

He envisions a multilateral forum emerging under the guidance of a government far removed from the disputes, perhaps Australia or Norway, with expertise in good management of natural resources.

"The best that can be hoped for is a temporary solution," Paal said. "Nobody's going to be happy with that, but no agreements on sovereignty are going to be reached in such a turbulent era."

Los Angeles Times

South Korea’s Irresponsible Diplomacy With Japan

The Olympics is a time to lay aside political grievances and honor sportsmanship. Yet, when midfielder Park Jong-Woo displayed a sign reading “Dokdo is our land” after South Korea’s victory over Japan in the bronze medal soccer match, he gained the dishonorable distinction of being the only athlete at this Olympics to break this cherished tradition (and Olympic rules forbidding athletes from making political statements). He was subsequently barred from the medal ceremony.

The soccer match itself encapsulates Seoul’s recent approach with Tokyo. It was a fast-paced game in which, according to NBC announcers, South Korea came out extraordinarily aggressive, garnering three yellow cards in the first half. Soon thereafter South Korean President Lee Myung-bak earned himself a diplomatic yellow card by taking the unprecedented step of visiting islands controlled by Seoul but claimed by Tokyo (Dokdo in Korean, Takeshima in Japanese) and issued a number of demands on Japan. This has arguably brought bilateral ties to their worst nadir since Japan’s Junichiro Koizumi administration, and while subsequent Japanese governments worked to repair relations in that case, do not expect this from Tokyo this time around. Lee’s diplomacy was irresponsible and the consequences will be long lasting.

On August 10, Lee became the first South Korean president to visit the disputed islands. While it demonstrated Seoul’s continued control over the islands, it was an overreaction to simmering strains. Japan’s latest Defense White Paper included its claim to the islands. This was nothing new, as Japan has made this claim numerous times, but it brought the territorial dispute back as the central bilateral issue. Seoul escalated the situation by announcing it would stage regular military exercises near the islands. At this critical juncture, instead of finding a way to de-escalate tensions, Lee visited the islands. The visit poured fuel on the already volatile situation, igniting a diplomatic firestorm. Lee defended his actions by telling the press that it was intended to push Tokyo to settle colonial-era grievances, which he claimed Japan has repeatedly failed to resolve. He subsequently demanded a “heartfelt” apology from Emperor Akihito for Japan’s colonial occupation and said that Tokyo should sincerely apologize for its role in recruiting comfort women. Tokyo has taken umbrage to all of these.

This is not because Tokyo refuses to acknowledge its history, but because it has already done these things. The often unrecognized fact is that Japanese government and society have made concerted efforts to understand, reconcile, and apologize for Japan’s wartime aggression. This includes teaching about Japan’s imperial expansion and aggression (i.e. Nanjing, comfort women, forced labor) in textbooks that, according to a recent Stanford study by Daniel Sneider and Shin Gi-Wook, presents an unpatriotic account of Japan’s role (i.e. not inculcating patriotism or glorifying the war). It also includes the establishment of the quasi-public Asian Women’s Fund to compensate comfort women, which dispersed a handwritten apology by the sitting premier to those receiving compensation.

Importantly, since the 1990s, there has been a flurry of apologies for Japan’s wartime aggression. This includes the 1995 Murayama Statement, which stands as Japan’s official apology. It was preceded and followed by dozens of other apologies and statements of remorse by premiers and the current Emperor. The list is large and includes statements issued directly to South Korea, such as when premiers Toshiki Kaifu and Kiichi Miyazawa apologized to President Roh Tae-Woo in May 1990 and January 1992, respectively, for Japan’s actions against the Korean people, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s comfort women apology in June 1996 to President Kim Young-Sam, and Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s December 2010 apology for the colonization of Korea, which included the return of some 1,200 volumes of Korean royal documents looted during Japan’s annexation. 

Despite this, the actions of individual Japanese politicians that counter these official efforts receive the majority of attention. This includes statements that contradict official apologies or politicians visiting Yasukuni Shrine, where 2.5 million war dead are honored, including 14 Class-A war criminals enshrined in 1978.  Although these actions represent the personal views of a minority, they are often treated as representation of the dominant sentiment in Japan. In turn, they negate any positive forward-momentum gained by official government efforts.

These are markedly different, however, from statements made by a head of state like Lee, which have a claim of authority. Yet, in this case, Lee’s demands demonstrate a paucity of knowledge or an unwillingness to acknowledge Tokyo’s previous efforts. Or worse, they appear purely political. Lee’s popularity is lagging due to corruption scandals implicating his brother and close aides and his administration’s attempt to sign an information sharing agreement with Tokyo. Although constitutionally prohibited from running for re-election, Lee may be attempting to raise his party’s popularity before December’s election. At the very least, Lee’s actions tap into the country’s national pride.

Yet, from a diplomatic perspective, Lee’s behavior lacks logic as it unnecessarily escalates tensions. Although Lee’s visit was meant to press Japan to settle historical issues, it is unclear how provoking Tokyo will do this. Instead, it strains bilateral ties as continued calls for apologies produce a backlash in Japan, strengthening the hand of those who oppose conciliatory approaches. Tokyo summoned Seoul’s Ambassador to Japan to protest Lee’s visit and temporarily recalled its own Ambassador to South Korea.

Worse, Seoul and Tokyo face shared threats: the modernization of China’s military, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and the strengthening of Russia’s Far Eastern presence. As allies of the U.S., they are also responsible for helping ensure Washington’s rebalance to the region has substance. Lee’s move widens the gap between Tokyo and Seoul at a crucial time they should be finding ways to cooperate.    

The long-term consequences have the potential to be severe because Lee’s actions have put Tokyo in a position where it can no longer show flexibility with Seoul. Already Japan is considering how to internationalize the territorial issue, including bringing the case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It has not entertained this idea since 1962 out of consideration of bilateral ties. While a case cannot be heard unless all parties agree, it nevertheless has the potential of playing into Tokyo’s hand if Seoul refuses to engage, thereby “ceding the floor” to Japan on the international stage. Worse, bilateral ties could rapidly devolve. Tokyo is considering suspending all summits with Seoul, including an expected meeting on APEC’s sidelines this month and an expected visit to South Korea by Japan’s premier. The worst outcome is the possibility that China or North Korea may take advantage of the dissonance to leverage gains elsewhere. Japanese and North Korean Red Cross organizations met in August for the first time since 2002, where they discussed the repatriation of Japanese remains left behind after Japan’s occupation of the Peninsula. With their discussions concluding government involvement as necessary, both governmentsheld a meeting for the first time in four years based on the principle of settling historical issues and restoring normal relations. They also plan to hold another one in the near future. Given that 2002 Red Cross Organizations’ discussions on Japanese abductees helped assist other efforts that led to the surprise September 2002 Pyongyang Declaration, it is possible Pyongyang could strike a separate diplomatic agreement with Tokyo on important issues like normalization.   

In the past, calls for Japan to face up its past resonated because, apart from reparations, the government was largely silent on acknowledging its past role. Not so today. As noted above, Japanese government and society have made numerous efforts to acknowledge and atone for past wrongdoings. A 1998 joint declaration with South Korea even articulated President Kim Dae-Jung’s acceptance of Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s apology and expressed a need to overcome history and build a “future-oriented” relationship. When ambiguous demands like Lee’s recent ones for Japan to “face its past” or “sincerely apologize” are thrown at Tokyo now, it appears nothing more than a populist attempt to play the history card for purely political purposes.

Like the bronze medal soccer match, Seoul’s recent diplomatic behavior has been aggressive and demands a yellow card. While Lee’s Dokdo visit may have scored political points, the resulting bilateral damage demonstrates irresponsibility. Additionally, ambiguous calls for apologies or settling historical grievances need to be better articulated if Seoul hopes to achieve any positive effect. Although there is no agreement in South Korea on what constitutes an acceptable apology, Seoul should clarify how the Murayama Statement and the Asian Women’s Fund, and all other apologies, are wholly insufficient efforts by Japan to face its past. Maybe Seoul could explain why Tokyo’s word choice for apology (詫びる: wabiru) is linguistically inferior. Or, if South Korea is certain in its Dokdo claim, it should up the ante on Japan to take the dispute to the ICJ. In short, Seoul needs to proactively articulate what it wants instead of taking provocative actions and issuing ambiguous demands. Until it does so, actions like those recently taken by Seoul will only empower those within Japan who are tired of the history card being played for political purposes.

Jeffrey W. Hornung is an Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI and an Adjunct Fellow  with the Office of the Japan Chair at the Center for  Strategic and International  Studies in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are solely his.