Cooler Heads in the South China Sea

The United States is realizing that the escalating tensions in the Far East, especially between China and Japan, should no longer be viewed as an opportunity to contain China. Instead, our first priority should be to get everyone to calm down.

At issue are the territorial rights over some forty piles of rock, most uninhabited, some barely sticking out of the water. These conflicts already have led to large nationalist anti-Japanese demonstrations in China and similar anti-Chinese demonstrations in Japan; saber-rattling activists planting their nation’s flag on some of the islands; and clashes between vessels of several regional nations—all fueled by increasingly hot rhetoric by public leaders. These smaller clashes look increasingly like the type of incidents that can spin out of control and lead to more serious conflagrations.

The United States, which keeps veering between seeking to engage China and moves to “contain” it, had at first—at least indirectly—urged the nations of the area to band together and push back against Chinese claims to many of the islands at issue. However, most recently Secretary Panetta called on China and Japan “to move forward and not have this dispute get out of hand” and emphasized that all parties share a responsibility to resolve the conflicts peacefully. And—the ever industrious U.S. think tanks have taken off their shelves a whole host of proposals that could defuse the crisis.

Disputes over maritime territorial rights fall under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and should be settled in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). (The fact that the United States did not ratify the treaty involved seems immaterial because Washington typically operates as if it were committed to UNCLOS.) But such settlements take years.

In the short term, the think tankers are calling on China and Japan to establish a hotline so that their leaders will be better able to nip in the bud any unintended confrontations. Moreover, both nations are urged to declare unequivocally that “military force is not an option.” A more ambitious plan calls for a return to a derailed 2010 agreement for the joint development of gas fields in the South China Sea. The Economist suggests that the nations involved should do the environment a favor and turn the islands and surrounding seas into marine protected areas to combat overfishing, a problem that seriously threatens the economies and ecology of the region.

Douglas H. Paal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace points out that to combat overfishing, China, Vietnam and Taiwan have already “initiated fishing seasons, periodic bans, and limits on sizes of catches to support sustainable harvesting, but these are not harmonized and often conflict.” Hence Paal calls “greater control of the fishing fleets, with effective sanctions on misbehavior under rules agreed upon in common, [an] achievable and responsible goal.”

One must acknowledge that islands are not fought over simply as real estate but because they serve as markers for determining maritime rights. According to a widely followed reading of international law, a nation’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extends two hundred miles off its shores. Thus, if nations can populate and prove ownership over tiny islands in their near seas, they can expand their EEZ and gain access to the surrounding natural resources—not only fish but also coveted fuels and minerals that lie beneath the seabed. Hence, for nations such as China and Japan, whose economies are highly dependent on the secure access to and development of such resources, these islands are much more than “piles of rocks.”

In Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, Mark Valencia, Jon Van Dyke and Noel Ludwig suggest establishing “regional sovereignty” over the islands in the South China Sea among the six claimants, allowing them to collectively manage the islands, territorial seas and airspace. Of course, this would require an agreement among the parties as how to share the spoils.

Another option, put forward by Peter Dutton of the Naval War College, would emulate the resolution of the dispute over Svalbard, an island located between Norway and Greenland. The Treaty of Spitsbergen, signed in 1920, awarded primary sovereignty over Svarlbard to Norway but assigned resource-related rights to all signatories. Applying this model to the South and East China Seas likely would entail giving sovereignty to China while permitting other countries to benefit from the resources. Though, at least in the near term, such a solution is unlikely to be accepted by the other claimants.

Still others have suggested declaring a moratorium on any exploration until the tensions are defused and conflicts are worked out. And a troika of foreign ministers in the region, including nations not directly involved such as Indonesia and Australia, has been urged to help work out an evenhanded solution.

Those who hold that all these suggestions are naive should note that such settlements do take place. One case will have to stand for several others. In 2009, five years after the decades-old dispute was brought to court, the ICJ settled a dispute between Ukraine and Romania over the Black Sea, whose seabed holds an estimated ten million tons of oil. One key issue was whether the Serpent Island would be considered a cliff or an island. The Romanians claimed it was “a cliff” (hence irrelevant to territorial demarcation) while Ukraine held it was “an island” and thus that Ukraine’s maritime boundaries extended beyond Serpent Island’s shores. The ICJ ruled it a cliff and delivered a judgment that granted Romania about 80 percent of the disputed area (though the oil was more concentrated on the Ukrainian side). Both sides accepted the decision.

If cooler heads prevail and Washington continues to throw its weight in support of tensions reduction and conflict resolution by negotiation, some of these proposals or others like them may carry the day. All sides surely realize—given the fragile state of the global economy, the political transition in China, the rise of nationalism that threatens to spin out of control—that this is a particularly poor time to escalate tensions.

Resource allocation is a contentious issue, but raw materials have a virtue: they can be divided. Disputes over such assets do not have to be settled in a winner-takes-all fashion, allowing all the nations involved to gain some of the spoils and save face. In contrast, if the clashes spin out of control, the disputants and the bystanders will all be losers.

Amitai Etzioni 

China Mends Fences in Sea Dispute

It appears to be showing flexibility in efforts to devise a code of conduct for South China Sea claimants.

RFA

China’s territorial claim to the South China Sea includes two disputed island chains.

As Beijing flexes its muscles over its territorial dispute with Japan in the East China Sea, it is mending fences with Southeast Asian nations after a spate of tensions in the contested South China Sea.

Following much prodding and diplomacy, China appears to be showing some flexibility in its approach towards drawing up a code of conduct with the Southeast Asian nations aimed at avoiding clashes over competing territorial claims in the vast sea, diplomats in the region told RFA.

Although they are skeptical of any early breakthrough for a legally binding document between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to guide behavior in the sea, there is optimism that negotiations will occur on a sustained basis.

“We see some flexibility to discuss the COC with ASEAN,” one Southeast Asian diplomat said, referring to the elusive Code of Conduct or COC which ASEAN—comprising Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam—has been striving to devise with Beijing for a decade.

In an initial display of seriousness that it is prepared to come to the table, China sent its senior officials to Cambodia last week to informally discuss with their counterparts from ASEAN the prospects for drawing up a code, officials said.

This is the first meeting between the two sides specifically on the maritime dispute since ASEAN plunged into a crisis two months ago when foreign ministers of the 10-member bloc failed to issue their customary joint statement at the conclusion of their annual meeting hosted by Cambodia, China’s top ally in Southeast Asia.

Some ASEAN diplomats had charged that Cambodia had been influenced by China not to incorporate in the statement the views of ASEAN member states the Philippines and Vietnam, which had tiffs earlier this year with Beijing over islands and reefs in the South China Sea, causing an impasse at the meeting.

The ASEAN-China Senior Officials’ Informal Consultations on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, as last week’s meeting in Phnom Penh was officially called, was among a series of discussions in preparation for the ASEAN summit and the East Asia Summit in November.

“Compared to two months ago, when there was complete reluctance to come to the table, China appears willing to sit down and talk,” said one Southeast Asian official, who was briefed on the talks but spoke on condition of anonymity.

“Indirectly, they may be feeling the heat from the mounting criticism over what happened at the meeting in July which was a big blow to ASEAN,” the official said.

“But China has also asked the ASEAN states to do their part by reducing tensions and not conducting border incursions and creating a conducive environment for any future talks. They don’t want us to bring in third parties [the United States] over the conflict and want us to stick to the 2002 declaration,” the diplomat said.

Under a 2002 agreement for managing their overlapping territorial claims, ASEAN and China adopted a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, called DOC as a first step towards a binding code of conduct.

But in a reflection of the sensitivity over the issue, it was only last year—after 10 years—that they agreed on a set of guidelines to implement the declaration that was aimed at laying the groundwork for discussions on the regional code of conduct.

Ray of hope

The new ray of hope for achieving a COC comes after extensive diplomacy, including U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s trip to Southeast Asia and China, with a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao.

Chinese leaders told Clinton—who has often emphasized that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is a U.S. “national interest”—that they want to pursue the COC, U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke told a forum in Washington last week, saying the talks between the two sides were “very good.”

“I’ve also heard from many prominent Chinese academics that China would like somehow to return to the status quo, that they would like to lower the temperature,” Locke said.

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Yechi had also visited Indonesia as well as Malaysia and Brunei, giving reassurances that diplomacy was still on track.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, embarrassed by the failure by his country as 2012 ASEAN chairman to forge an agreement on the foreign ministers’ joint statement, also made a trip to China this month, meeting Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.

Hun Sen won assurances from Wen that Beijing will “closely work” to make the upcoming East Asia Summit which Cambodia will host a success,” Chinese media reported.

Southeast Asian diplomats said a key objective is to get an initial ASEAN-China accord on the COC before the November East Asia Summit, to be attended by leaders of ASEAN as well as China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, Russia and the United States.

Key elements of the COC have been agreed upon by ASEAN member states whose foreign ministers will meet to consider a full draft document on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York this coming week, the diplomats said.

“We are now in the process of spelling out the draft [of the code] and we hope to be able to share it with my ASEAN foreign minister colleagues when I meet them in New York,” Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said, according to the Jakarta Globe newspaper.

“The development of the South China Sea [issues] reminds us how we desperately need the code of conduct, [so] I’m trying to use the momentum,” Marty said, as Indonesia asserts a leadership role in ASEAN to deal with the South China Sea issue, Asia’s biggest potential military flashpoint.

Cambodia or Thailand, which is the ASEAN coordinator for China issues, could host another round of informal talks between senior officials from ASEAN and China on the COC before the East Asia Summit.

“Both sides might also issue a joint statement to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the DOC at Summit,” an official involved in the planning of the summit told RFA, referring to the declaration adopted in 2002 in Cambodia to set the stage for the regional code of conduct.

Beijing has maintained all this while that it wants to resolve the South China Sea territorial conflicts on a bilateral basis with ASEAN members Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, which have competing claims with China.

China claims sovereignty over nearly all of the resource-rich South China Sea, which is also home to important shipping lanes. It is also locked in a territorial tussle with Japan over disputed islands in the East China Sea.

Bloc

Southeast Asian officials say ASEAN would negotiate the COC with China as a bloc but not in the specific delineation or settlement of the claims between the claimant states.

ASEAN’s role “is not to deal with the claims themselves but in the broader setting up of the framework which would allow for a peaceful resolution of these claims,” Singapore Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam said, according to the island state’s media.

Beijing has stressed that ASEAN should have no role in negotiating on behalf of the four members who were claimant states.

“For China, the COC is only a tool to promote mutual trust over the South China Sea and not to resolve disputes. They stressed this again at the Phnom Penh meeting last week,” a Southeast Asian diplomat said.

Still, as the COC is being drafted, China has to grapple with various basic questions—which it has brushed off previously—over its claim to the South China Sea.

While officials have to first pin down the South China Sea area to be governed by the code, there is much uncertainty over the territory China claims—represented by the nine-dashed, U-shaped line encircling most of the sea on Chinese official maps.

The location of those dashes has never been pinpointed as China has not supplied the coordinates for them. The nature of the Chinese claim has also not been clearly defined.

In addition, there is the question of the Paracel islands’ inclusion in the code’s area of application. Vietnam still maintains its claim to the islands although China seized them from its fellow communist neighbor in 1974.

Uncertainty

Former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino said the uncertainty over where a “binding code of conduct” would apply was one of the factors cited for downgrading the 2002 ASEAN-China agreement from a legal code to a political declaration.

“Is the uncertainty of its area of application still a factor in and an obstacle to its adoption,” he asked.

“If these [outstanding] issues were fudged in the proposed document, as seems most likely to be the case at this time, how would the problem be overcome? What would the formulation be?”

Severino said one fundamental reason why the problems arising from the conflicting claims in the South China Sea are so difficult and intractable is not only the size and strategic location of that body of water but also that all the claimants feel that their footholds in the sea are essential to what they consider as their national interests.

“Therefore, the disputes in the South China Sea cannot be resolved any time soon, if at all. The most that can be done is to prevent those disputes from developing into armed conflict. This could be the overarching aim of any code of conduct that ASEAN and China might produce.”

Parameswaran Ponnudurai

War By Other Means: China’s Political Uses of Seapower

China’s development and use of naval and non-naval, non-military sea power has become a cause for concern – one that could alter the regional balance.

China’s recent assertiveness in the South China Seas is a harbinger of things to come.  Beijing’s seapower project and the enormous resources it has enjoyed have opened up new strategic vistas for Chinese leaders and military commanders.  With larger and more capable seagoing forces at its disposal, Beijing is well positioned to fashion sophisticated strategies that will be more effective and equally difficult to counter.  While such strategies do not—yet—portend the fundamental reordering of maritime Southeast Asia, they will likely yield incremental dividends that advance China’s larger aims at sea.

Comprehensive Chinese Seapower

China’s naval and maritime buildup is providing Beijing with the wherewithal to pursue its ambitions.  The rate and scale of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) modernization process have defied many predictions in the West, reversing sanguine and even condescending conclusions about China’s aptitude at sea.  But, seapower is more than just the navy.  Rather, it is a continuum that gives Beijing a range of options.  Non-naval and non-military platforms and systems account for a significant portion of Chinese seapower.

Long-range, precision-strike weaponry deployed on the mainland can influence events, perhaps decisively, at sea.  The anti-ship ballistic missile—a maneuverable ballistic missile capable of hitting moving targets at sea—is just one member of a large family of missiles in China’s arsenal that could perform maritime-strike missions.  Indeed, the PLA boasts large numbers of shore-based fighters, bombers, and cruise missile units that can launch salvos of anti-ship missiles.

The growth of China’s maritime surveillance and law-enforcement services has been equally impressive.  The civilian arm of Chinese seapower has enabled Beijing to dispatch nonmilitary ships to confront the Philippines in the South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea.  Even civilian vessels could form maritime militias to serve China’s nautical aims.  In short, Beijing possesses diverse elements of seapower to defend its prerogatives in the nautical domain.

Political Uses of Military and Non-Military Forces

Beijing’s burgeoning seapower has positioned it to employ strategies that involve the political uses of military and non-military implements of seapower against weaker opponents in the South China Sea.  These strategies deftly combine warfighting capabilities with calibrated shows of force.  They enhance China’s leverage in protracted politico-military struggles by chipping away at the will of the opponent.

In the event of peacetime maritime crises between China and relatively weak Southeast Asian powers, innovative combinations of PLA forces could be used to compel the will of Beijing’s southern neighbors.  Consider the aforementioned anti-ship ballistic missile.  If it performs as advertised, the missile would help compensate for current shortcomings in China’s maritime inventory.  The reach of such shore fire support over the entire South China Sea would ease the burdens on the Chinese fleet while applying constant pressure on challengers to Beijing’s interests in peacetime.

Under the protective umbrella of anti-ship ballistic missiles, even lesser warships would be ideal for intimating weaker parties.  For example, small flotillas of missile-armed fast-attack craft operating in the Spratlys under missile cover could hold most Southeast Asian surface fleets at bay.  Occasional sorties of such units would signal Chinese resolve, compelling opponents to back down or acquiesce to Beijing’s wishes.  This type of gunboat diplomacy with Chinese characteristics is conceivable in future crises.

China’s ability to exercise the non-military elements of its seapower was on full display at Scarborough Shoal this past spring.  The standoff with the Philippines involved coast-guard-like noncombat vessels under the control of China Marine Surveillance (CMS), an agency entrusted with protecting Beijing’s exclusive economic zones.  In an unprecedented demonstration of resolve, CMS vessels entered Japanese territorial waters near the Senkakus following Tokyo’s decision to nationalize the disputed islands in September 2012.

Employing non-navy assets in clashes over territory reveals a sophisticated, methodical strategy for securing China’s maritime claims.  The use of non-military means eschews escalation while ensuring that disputes remain localized.  Specifically, it deprives the United States and other outside powers the rationales to step in on behalf of embattled capitals in the region.

At the same time, noncombat ships empower Beijing to exert low-grade but unremitting pressure on rival claimants to South China Sea islands and waters. Constant patrols can probe weaknesses in coastal states’ maritime-surveillance capacity while testing their political resolve. Keeping disputes at a low simmer, moreover, grants China the diplomatic initiative to turn up or down the heat as strategic circumstances warrant.

And if all else fails, Beijing can still employ its navy and shore-based assets as a backstop to the civilian agencies. That China—unlike its weaker rivals—has the option of climbing the escalation ladder only amplifies the intimidation factor in places like Scarborough Shoal or the Spratly Islands. As noted above, the mere possibility of naval coercion may induce an opponent to back down in a crisis.  Indeed, the larger the naval balance tilts in China’s favor, the more likely it becomes that a long shadow casts over Southeast Asian capitals as they contemplate their options.

Innocuous in themselves, peacetime patrols carry significant weight when backed by real firepower.  The interplay between Chinese military and non-military forces thus augments Beijing’s strategic leverage.

A Strategy of Exhaustion at Sea?

Sporadic acts of coercion and intimidation may not produce outcomes as visible or decisive as a battlefield victory.  A series of showdowns may pass without an end in sight or any tangible gain for China.  But, the cumulative effects of a continuing stalemate could induce strategic fatigue that in turn advances China’s aims.  Short of a shooting war, Chinese provocations are too slight for the United States to intervene militarily.  Staying below the escalation threshold adds maneuver room to test U.S. steadfastness while solidifying its own claims.

As China pushes and probes, regional expectations that Washington should do something would inevitably mount even as weaker nations look for signs of wavering U.S. resolve.  The prospects of recurring confrontations with little hope of direct U.S. intervention could weigh heavily on Southeast Asian capitals.  Applied with patience and discipline, such a strategy of exhaustion could gradually erode regional confidence and undermine the political will to resist.

But this attritional approach is only a snapshot of Chinese seapower today.  It is possible that Beijing’s application of graduated pressure is merely a stopgap measure, buying China time to build up the capacity to dictate events at sea.  Recent trends suggest that both the military and non-military services will continue to bulk up on a steady diet of new hardware and manpower.

Twenty years of virtually uninterrupted double-digit hikes in the defense budget have afforded China the resources to develop options beyond those dedicated to a Taiwan contingency, an all-consuming preoccupation until recently.  Analysts have detected military buildups in staging areas assigned to the Southeast Asian theater of operations.  Beijing also appears to be pushing naval construction along multiple axes simultaneously, laying down hulls for warships of every type.

Similarly, the maritime-enforcement services are recruiting new manpower while taking delivery of decommissioned naval vessels. Furthermore, Chinese shipyards are turning out state-of-the-art cutters like sausages. Many are capable of sustained patrols in the farthest reaches of the China seas, assuring that Beijing can maintain a visible presence in waters where it asserts sovereign jurisdiction. Indeed, Haijian 84, one of China’s most modern law-enforcement vessels, occupied the epicenter of the Scarborough Shoal imbroglio.

To be sure, China still lacks adequate military means to make the South China Sea a Chinese lake. Sea control that more or less permanently excludes rival navies from these waters remains beyond its reach, if indeed that is the goal.

Nevertheless, even a modest increase in Chinese seapower could perceptibly tip the regional balance of power in Beijing’s favor in peacetime contingencies not involving the U.S. Navy.  Some local players, notably Vietnam, have embarked on naval modernization programs, but they are unlikely to keep pace with China.  Over time, left unopposed by powerful outsiders such as the United States, Japan, or Australia, even small-scale shows of Chinese maritime power over Southeast Asian fleets might start to win grudging acquiescence to Beijing’s foreign policy preferences.  Such consent, however reluctant, would deliver a severe blow to the foundations of regional order.

Implications for the U.S. “Rebalancing” to Asia

The foregoing analysis underscores the predicament of many Southeast Asian states if they faced China on their own.  Not surprisingly, many regional capitals look to the United States as a bulwark against Chinese advances.  They recognize that American primacy in maritime Asia will be the crucial arbiter of Chinese ambitions.  Washington, for its part, has delivered very public pronouncements about its own stake in Asian waters.  The Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia sought to reassure audiences in the region that the United States will not abdicate the stabilizing role it has long played.

Fortunately, there is still time to maximize this convergence of interests and organize an effective response.  China is at least a decade away from amassing the type of preponderant seapower that can keep the United States out of the South China Sea while running roughshod over Southeast Asian states.  In the meantime, Washington can adopt measures to ensure that regional submission to China’s wishes is not a foregone conclusion.

First, Washington and its allies should actively help Southeast Asian states help themselves. Local actors must possess some indigenous capability to cope with Chinese encroachments at sea.  The U.S. transfer of 1960s’ vintage coast guard cutters to the Philippines is a modest step in the right direction.  The timing of the deliveries turned out to be fortuitous: the first Philippine vessel to respond off Scarborough Shoal was flagship BRP Gregorio del Pilar, the former USCGC Hamilton. But, hand-me-downs are not enough to meet Manila’s needs.  More modern and capable platforms are necessary to match China’s vessels.  Japan’s recent offer of twelve brand new patrol boats to the Philippines is another encouraging sign that outside powers are seeking to right the regional balance of power.

Second, the United States should encourage the development of a region-wide effort to keep track of China’s maritime forces.  Unmanned aerial systems, for instance, could furnish a common picture of the nautical domain on a more-or-less permanent basis to coastal states surrounding the South China Sea.  By tapping into such technologies, an information sharing arrangement that make Asian waters both figuratively and literally more transparent would go a long way to shore up regional confidence and deterrence.  It is worth noting that Tokyo has been doing a signal service on behalf of the region by publicly reporting detailed accounts of Chinese naval transits through international straits and other activities near Japanese waters.

Third, the United States should draw up plans that would enable the U.S. military to rapidly deploy units armed with maritime-strike capability, such as anti-ship cruise missile batteries, on friendly or allied soil.  Possessing the option to surge defensive forces onto allied territory at short notice would reassure U.S. allies in peacetime while substantially bolstering the U.S. capacity to act effectively in times of crisis. American reinforcements would steady nerves while stiffening the resolve of local defenders.  The United States should also encourage allies and friends to develop or strengthen their own maritime-strike options.

Finally, the U.S. Navy should revisit prevailing assumptions about its ability to command the global commons.  Years of post-Cold War permissiveness induced an airy confidence that made it seductively easy to take sea control for granted.  Arguably, the last time that the U.S. Navy fought a serious foe was at Leyte Gulf in 1944.  As China marches to the seas, a far more lethal nautical environment lies in store.  For a service long accustomed to uncontested waters, coming to terms with risk to the fleet will be an ever urgent priority.

Networking the Region

These steps would help construct a layered and inter-connected defense posture that begins with the local actors themselves.  As frontline states, they must be empowered to perform as first responders to Chinese moves at sea.  Information sharing among the coastal states would underscore the shared stakes in the maritime commons while promoting collective action.  A network of players alert to Beijing’s maneuvers stands a far better chance of deterring, and, failing that, reacting more quickly to Chinese actions.  The United States, for its part, would provide a strategic backstop to Southeast Asian partners with low-profile, small-footprint military assets that pack a punch and serve as potent symbols of American commitment to the region.

Raising the costs of—and risks to—Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea would complicate Beijing’s calculus while inclining Chinese leaders to think twice before they act.  Inducing Chinese caution, moreover, would apply a brake to Beijing’s momentum at sea, brightening the prospects for restoring equilibrium to the region and for retaking the strategic initiative.

Toshi Yoshihara 

False targets and the rise of fascism

BEIJING - The very first sign of fascism in Europe was the capture of Fiume in 1919 by a bunch of Italian World War I veterans led by poet-warrior Gabriele D'Annunzio. Italy had won the war but lost the peace, as many right-wing propagandists were fond of saying, and the symbol of the loss was embodied in Fiume, a city of mixed nationalities that had well represented the multi-ethnicity of the Habsburg Empire.

But after the war redrew European borders, by respecting national lines rather than loyalties to a crown, Fiume was caught in the middle. Half-Slav, half-Italian, with a sprinkling of German blood, Fiume was pulled between the newborn union of southern Slavs (Yugoslavia) and infant Italy. Despite its young age (it had proclaimed unification just 58 years earlier, in 1861, and had wrested Rome, its capital, from the pope 49 years before, in 1870), the latter came swaggering on to the international scene like a grand power.

The reasons Fiume was given to Yugoslavia and not Italy were indeed debatable. There was the possibility that the victorious allies, London and Paris, wanted to contain the power and swagger of then-boastful Italy, which had managed to win the 1918 Piave Offensive almost on its own. Yet for D'Annunzio to lead a band of ragtag veterans to invade Fiume and thus destroy on the ground the agreement the powers had just reached in Paris was an entirely different matter.

D'Annunzio and the Italians, who then supported his action, vanquished not only the weak Yugoslavs, but also any prospect of a lasting peace in Europe. They opened the doors to fascism and World War II. (Fiume is now the Croatian city of Rijeka.)

Borders are in fact always disputable and never certain. One can contest them with discussions and arguments or by using force and threats. The first method is more manageable; the latter breaks the existing order with consequences that are hard to predict, especially in a volatile international context.

In Europe, even a defeated country used that method of contesting the terms of peace, when again a group of veterans led by an artist - a failed painter sporting a small mustache, Adolf Hitler - accused generals of having betrayed the German people and argued that Germany had indeed won World War I but was stabbed in the back by the Jews and communist defeatists. Then Hitler disputed Germany's borders and tried to expand the country at the cost of its neighbors.

As was made clear by the results of World War II, the generals who in World War I surrendered without waiting for Allied forces to pillage Berlin had done their best to save the country, but Hitler did the worst for Germany.

Is there a lesson for China in this? In recent days, thousands of Chinese have taken to the streets to protest against Japanese "occupation" of "Chinese" islands called Diaoyu in China and Senkaku in Japan. This is legitimate. What is illegitimate and very dangerous for China, as Hitler proved in Germany, is shouting slogans that call for dropping nuclear bombs on Japan or singing songs advocating that Tokyo be stamped down. There have been violent anti-Japanese protests in the past, but the violence of these present slogans is unprecedented.

Moreover, the past demonstrations were against alleged sleights for Japanese actions that had already been done and had to be amended. Now, protests are over an open wound that can't be fixed overnight; maybe it can't be fixed at all. It is hard to think that Japan tomorrow will decide to give the Senkakus to China, and even if this were to happen, it would send a frightening message to the world. Japan would be seen to have buckled under China's arrogance and threats, almost like France and Britain tried to appease Hitler's Germany and gave in to his requests over Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia in 1937. This gesture is now widely regarded in Europe as having accelerated the onset of World War II.

Japan may well be wrong in claiming to own the contested islands, but waging war against it to redress this alleged wrong suggests fascism. Moreover, similarly to what happened in Italy, this new breed of Chinese "fascists" use Japan as a false target. Their real goal is to put on the spot the present Chinese leadership, considered too weak with foreigners and thus undeserving to rule.

China has a long tradition of using foreigners to protest against its leaders. In 1919, after World War I, young Chinese students protested the peace terms accepted by republican China and started a movement that eventually led to breaking up the country and the arrival to power of the Communists. The Communists in the 1930s accused the Nationalists (Kuomintang) of betraying the country because they were not fighting the Japanese. Today, again some youngsters shout anti-Japanese slogans, burn Japanese cars, and don old-fashioned Mao jackets, a statement, like the black shirts in Italy or brown shirts in Germany, against the present post-Maoist Chinese leadership.

Chinese nationalism then helps to breed Japanese nationalism, never quite off the mainstream of Tokyo politics, and the two rightist movements de facto support each other, like images reflected in parallel mirrors in their respective countries. The louder the Chinese nationalists become, the stronger also Japanese nationalists can be. This also does not mean that the Japanese position on the islands is right and the Chinese is wrong or vice versa. There are also Japanese mistakes in handling the issues. Yet this is beyond the point.

It's hard to overstate the danger this movement poses for China and the world. Many considered China a threat simply for its peaceful economic and political development, without hearing Chinese people shouting any war cries. Now these slogans hint to countries steeped in the European historical tradition that a fascist and aggressive China is indeed a possibility. Then, in a nutshell, either Beijing takes care of its fascists or the world will take care of China, much to its chagrin.

Stamping down the roots of this new Chinese fascism may not be easy. Certainly, it might not be too difficult to forbid violent slogans or songs and arrest warmongers, but it is a different thing to root out the suffering of the people who are venting their many frustrations for what is ultimately the fast pace of change. This will naturally take decades.

In the meantime, people have to be allowed to vent their anger in a manner that is both peaceful and does not compromise the government, and the government needs any legitimacy it can muster to crack down on excesses. Governments mandated by a popular election have greater legitimacy in putting down protests they deem excessive: I can take this down because the majority is with me; you are a minority, you are free to express your opinions but can't act to endanger the majority.

Governments without the legitimization of a popular election have a harder time doing that because protesters can claim they represent the majority, and thus its best interests. How can a non-elected government disprove that?

Therefore, China needs political reforms to make it better able to crack down on the dangerous sprouting of fascism. Of course, these reforms have to be carefully crafted and should not become the very springboard for full-fledged fascism. Both in Italy and Germany, fascists came to power through democratic elections.

Navigating this narrow and subtle road is perhaps the biggest challenge for the next Communist Party congress this autumn.

Francesco Sisci

China’s rising global power and its implications on Sino-Tibetan affairs

This analytical paper is written to coincide with the gathering of the second special general meeting of the Tibetan Diaspora towards the end of September 2012.

The Kashag of the Central Tibetan Administration and the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile have convened this important gathering to mobilise, energise and find new solutions to overcome the very urgent and desperate current situation in occupied Tibet, particularly the stream of selfless act of self-immolations carried out by Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet. The general consensus of the motivation and reasons behind the drastic acts of these Tibetans were for the return of His Holiness The Dalai Lama to Tibet and to achieve freedom for Tibetans from the rule of communist China.

This piece that I am about to communicate is an independent analysis of the present day China, China and the world, the world and China, the Tibetan issue and the opportunities as well as the realities that Tibetan movement faces. I am writing this piece not as an academician or as a specialist on either China or Tibet but as a lay person, who has watched, worked and continues to study the Sino-Tibetan relationship or no relationship with keen interest.

Therefore, it is fitting to quote a stanza from an ancient master Shanti Deva who said:

“Here I shall say nothing that has not been said before,

And in the art of prosody I have no skill.

I therefore have no thought that this might be of benefit to others;

I wrote it only to habituate my mind.”

I am sure that there is nothing in this piece that the reader has not read or heard already. But I hope this piece will serve as a small aide-memoires of the current position of China and the current international scenario that are necessary to be considered in making our deliberation to find solutions for Tibet and Tibetans inside Tibet.

It is particularly important this time because the deliberations of the delegates will not formally be commented, protected or blessed by His Holiness The Dalai Lama as the political head of Tibetan people. In other words, we do not have the safety cover of His Holiness The Dalai Lama, which we have always relied upon as a fall back and a guarantor. We are not so lucky now.

It is absolutely essential and vitally important that we consider the wider context under which China is now operating in the world and how other countries including superpowers are behaving, positioning and formulating not only their foreign policies, but also their economic and domestic policies towards China and its impact and consequences on Tibetan issues now and for years to come.

Within a period of thirty years, a periodic span of three generations of Chinese leadership (Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao), China has been transformed from a crippling communist regime to a super power next to the United States.

At the beginning of 2012, The Economist almost as a matter-of-fact reported that China will have a larger economy than America in purchasing power parity in less than five years from now (2016)

The economist also methodically chronicled and published the following statistics:

* China’s net foreign assets surpassed the United States in 2003 (China’s net foreign assets of $2 trillion today versus US net foreign debt of $2.5 trillion);

* Chinese exports surpassed the US in 2007;

* Chinese fixed capital investment took the lead in 2009;

* Chinese manufacturing output surpassed US in 2010;

* Chinese energy consumption also surpassed US in 2010;

* Chinese patent applications granted exceeded the United States applications for the first time in 2010.

* Based on reasonable projections of relative real growth rates China will have the larger GDP as measured by market exchange rates within the next seven years (2018)

China’s stated global aim and core interests:

Beijing’s stated core objectives, loosely and by no means exhaustive, consists of (a) the preservation of communist party and it’s rule in China, (b) unification of Taiwan with mainland China, (c) continuation of rule of Tibet, (d) unhindered access to world’s mineral resources and (e) non acceptance of what China calls imposition or importation of western values such as human rights and democracy in Chinese society.

The world and China

What has become evident is that, during these last three decades, China’s attitude towards the rest of the world has significantly changed since the early days of Deng Xiaoping’s modernisation program or vision of Chinese economy for alleviating the Chinese society from poverty in the aftermath of Mao’s cultural revolution and isolation of China from the rest of the world.

During the past decade, buoyed by China economic success, the country’s regime has manifested in a very assertive entity, threatening those countries with punitive economic repercussion who criticises its human right records, democracy, and issues relating to Tibet and Xinjiang.

This assertive Chinese policy on global development and dominance is imposed on other countries through a mixture of force and diplomacy. It has rattled and confronted the reality, the challenges that other governments especially western governments, parliamentarians, political thinkers and ordinary members of the society alike, may have envisaged on such a turn around. But none are not only unprepared for the consequences but at the speed of its arrival.

It seems the reality of Deng Xiaoping’s famous tactical policy for China of “biding time and hiding one’s talents or strength” has arrived suddenly within a very short period of three decades, with shock waves for the future of world order politically, economically, and the emergence of the concept of human rights, democracy and rule of law in Asia. My assumption here is that once China has actually obtained national wealth and superpower status, it will increasingly act unilaterally without adherence to international norms.

As a consequence is visible from the changing US policy and perhaps many regional countries too are likely to take active measures to hedge against a more unilateral China in the future so that they are not caught unprepared.

American President George W Bush senior rightly saw and politely stated that China is a competitor, but the US and western world accepted China as a “friendly partner” overshadowed by the stream of cheap imports from China that was to glut the insatiable wants of the western consumer society.

Transfer of western manufacturing know-how and technical expertise to China in the search for high profits for the corporations has made the economic benefits more lucrative to political expediency in the past three decades.

The Rise of China and its Impact on the Regional and Global Order

The real question throughout the world today is what does this rise and rise of China means for the regional and global order. What are its real impacts on both regional and global peace, prosperity, security and stability for the immediate decades ahead? How does this economically powerful China affect it treatment of Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongolians and other minorities in China?

The current rise of economic power of China has been compared to the possible down fall of Western economic power primarily due to the global financial crisis, which started around 2006 that resulted in a long and still continuing economic recession in Europe and USA. The present economic crisis in Europe is so acute that it is not only affecting the economic recovery of US, but it still has the full potential to unleash a second round of Global Financial Crisis.

For the Western world this unprecedented rise of China is a very uncomfortable force to be reckoned with. According to Kevin Rudd, the former Prime Minister and current Foreign Secretary of Australia, “this will be the first time ever a non western power will dominate the global economic power since the rise of Spanish Empire in 1492 and that this will be the first time ever a non-democratic country will be the world’s largest economy for nearly 300 years”.

When we look at the impact of the rise of China in terms of global peace and security, we must look at it in a much wider worldwide and historical context than the relatives of G2 (US and China) metrics of the 21st century. The global implications of China rising to the top of the global economic position are simply jaw dropping to consider.

It is, therefore, a subject worthy of the most serious reflection and analysis, not just in Beijing and Washington, but across Asia, across Europe and across the world.

Asia Pacific and USA Foreign Policy change:

The inexorable rise of China has forced US to look eastward withdrawing from their war engagements from Iraq and Afghanistan and Europe First policy engagement with North Atlantic Alliance, which has been the back bone of US foreign policy for the past 60 years.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pronounced the Obama administration’s new approach to Asia Pacific in her November 2011 “America’s Pacific Century” speech where she declared that “the future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action”. And she further went on to say that “as we move forward to set the stage for engagement in the Asia-Pacific over the next 60 years, we are focused on the steps we have to take at home to secure and sustain our leadership abroad”.

In a very fluid world of changing politics dominated by giants powers, we need to look back and recollect with deep interest how President Obama’s administration has written a new chapter in American foreign policy, saying that United States will move away from South West Asia to focus on the rising power of china.

Clearly, America is broadening its strategic reach and relations in the pacific region both with individual countries as well as with Asian institutions such as ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) and EAS (East Asia Summit) to engage and to maintain a balance of power to counter the growing power and assertive influence of China. China’s growing global power, influence and its assertive territorial claims in South China Sea has made ASEAN countries nervous of the intentions of China. The Asia Pivot policy of Obama Administration has embraced the US by Vietnam and other member countries as a fallback security against their giant neighbour.

It is important to point out that for the first time ever in the ASEAN Regional Forum’s 45 year history, since its inception, there was no agreed communiqué in their 2012 Annual meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, because South-east Asian countries have failed to reach an agreement on how to deal with China’s assertive sovereignty claims on disputed territory in the South China Sea. 

The Philippines and Vietnamese wanted ASEAN Regional Forum to have a unified policy on South China Sea dispute and to resist Beijing’s insistence that the disputes should be handled on a bilateral level only. Perhaps, American Asia Pivot Foreign Policy may have given these smaller countries some confidence and may have increased their resistance level with China and it seems such countries are reciprocating favourably to the US declared role in Asia Pacific. Rival countries have made claims over territory in the South China Sea for centuries but the recent upsurge in tension has sparked concern that the area is becoming a flashpoint with global consequences.

US had clearly concluded that it not only has vital interests in this Asia Pacific Region in the century ahead, but also that this region will progressively represent the centre of gravity of global economic and strategic power.

US and most of its allies believes that this strategic positioning has kept and will keep the region in peace, thereby enabling open economies to develop, trade and commerce to flourish, and democracies to emerge.

This is where core American and Chinese strategic concepts clash against each other, because the Chinese view that US alliance structures in Asia and Pacific are relics of a cold war past that should be disbanded and that the retention of these alliances is designed to constrain China; and in doing so, continue to frustrate the reunification of Taiwan with the motherland.

Burma

It is not a coincidence that the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton should make the first-ever and a landmark historical visit to Burma in December 2011, reversing a fifty year US Policy of engagement with Burma so soon after Obama Administrations Asia Pivot Policy announcement. US is well aware that such high level visit by the administration will not only give high hopes and expectations for the democratic movement in Burma, but that this will also provide the possibility for the Burmese authorities to rebalance its one sided and suffocating relationship with China, which has been resented by ordinary Burmese people.

Secretary of State Clinton’s meeting with Ms Aung Sun Suu Kyi, a Nobel Laureate, human rights icon and champaign of democracy in Burma, has paved the way for greater normalisation of relations between Burma with US and Europe.

Burma has become a client state of China for the past many decades. China has invested heavily in Burma both for its natural resources and for securing and carrying out the so called Maoist encirclement strategic position in surrounding India – which has given home to His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan community and enabling and facilitating the exile Tibetans to preserve their language, customs and the unique cultural heritage of Tibet – from the east, Sri Lanka from the south, Pakistan from the west and occupied Tibet and Nepal from the north.

Japan

The continued mistrust between Japan and China are self evident in the past, but the clash between Chinese fighting boats with coastguard off Japan at the end of 2011 and allowing anti-Japanese protests and demonstration to take place in major cities in China by the Chinese Communist Party is a reminder of another flash point with global consequences.

Japan is one of the most important partners of USA in Asia, and China has consistently complained at USA and Japan’s military alliance. In reference to the annual USA and Japan military drill, which took place in Gotemba at the foothill of Mount Fuji on 21st August 2012, China Daily quotes a defence commentator as saying that the drill “is increasing tension in the region and has shown Washington’s true colours, despite its so-called neutral stance over the issue of disputed islands in the East China Sea”.

Again if we look back to the early days of Obama presidency, one could argue that the preparation for the Asia Pivot and American Pacific Century thinking was already underway soon after the end of 2008. It was evident because the Japanese Prime Minister was the first Oval Office visitor from abroad in early 2009 and Secretary Clinton’s first overseas trip was to Tokyo and not to London or Europe.

Australia

In line with US new policy of engagement in Asia, United State has secured a far reaching agreement with Australia to expand its military presence in the country and facility for joint exercises, training, and access to bases and eventual postings of up to 2500 American troops in northern Australia. Naturally, China is very unhappy with this US positioning.

Australia being a member of the club of G-20 and East Asia Summit Forum is also interested in shaping the future of Asia and Pacific region. Australia has huge commercial interests with mainland China with its mineral resources.

European Union and China

The European Union is the biggest and most important trading partner of China. The EU pursues a friendly strategic partnership with China and welcomes Chinese nods and winks when it hints that they may prop up the Euro. Chinese are openly lobbying Chinese government’s interests in Brussels and in the capitals of the European countries, yet at the same time Chinese leaders are telling off and pointing fingers at the European leaders for their lack of leadership for not “putting their houses in order”. Perhaps, it is really a sign of change in time of European fortune that we witness remarkable and extraordinary acts of dependency and vulnerability to see European States publicly seeking China’s financial support to intervene in Euro-bond markets.

Europe welcomes Chinese investments and China has taken advantage in investing and taking over well known brands and buying up ownership in strategic key industries requiring cash injection for the corporation’s survival.

In less prosperous European economies they have invested by either taking over the control or have taken stakes in key industries such as Ocean terminal at Piraeus port in Greece and wind-power farm in Romania. In other key industries they have taken stakes such as in the makers of polysilicon for solar panels in Norway, 40% stake in Norwegian Statoil, Addax Petroleum of Switzerland, a stake in the Fortis bank of Belgium, stake in the Barclays bank in UK etc.

China has two major demands from the EU. Firstly, China would like EU to lift the arms embargo imposed on it after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Secondly, it would like EU to grant them the status of a full market economy, which would shield it from anti-dumping measures.

EU member states remains divided and unable to agree on both issues because of the very sensitive political nature of the arms embargo and the inherent nature of the protection required for home grown industries to safeguard employment from cheap imports.

This has inevitably allowed China to manipulate the internal divisions of the member states and play one member state against others thorough the so called bilateral talks and discussions a format China has very successfully followed in South East Asia.

China and Africa, Latin America

Although China’s global influence, be it through force of assertiveness, through natural course or through bullying and blackmailing tactics, is felt almost throughout the entire world. In the above short and very superficial analysis, I have concentrated mainly on China and its relationships with the United States of America, Europe, Asia and Pacific.

Dominance of Chinese influence in the entire continent of Africa is without any dispute. China’s economic controls and political influence in the whole of Latin American world, former USSR republics are also undisputed. China is promoting their state interests in these countries through a combination of aid programs, particularly in Africa where China is now using aid programs to explore open markets for oil, minerals and other resources. In return for the access to natural resources, China lends cheap money, builds roads, railways, airports, bridges, hospitals, sport stadiums, schools and official buildings.

Although, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did not mention Beijing by name but was directed at China when she said “be wary of donors who are more interested in extracting your resources than in building your capacity. Some funding might help fill short-term budget gaps, but we’ve seen time and again that these quick fixes won’t produce self-sustaining results.” at the global summit on development and aid held in South Korea.

For many of the developing nations China has become an essential partner particularly for those repressive and rogue regime states in African continent, Middle East and Latin American oil reach states.

An Overview on China

Whilst China’s economic power is growing and unstoppable, yet this is a country not at ease with itself and there is a huge number of areas which could derail their progress from becoming the world’s number one superpower.

The particular areas to look out for are both internal and external forces, but the explosion of an internal force is more likely and will have more devastating and chaotic outcome if that were to happen. The internal pressure for reform in China is like a boiling kettle and the Chinese government’s own admitted cost of maintaining the internal security in 2010 was US Dollars 93 billion. Experts believe that this amount is $1 billion more than the government’s publicly admitted national defense budget, and surely, such spending on internal security is a devastating blow for the image of a stable China, which it would like to portray and an undoubted evidence of a State at odds with its own people.

A leading UK think-tank on international affairs, Chatham House, states that there were 9 million petitions to the central government in 2009 and estimates that there are as many as 180,000 mass incidents each year. Most of the disputes have arisen because of infringement and summary acquisition of land rights, unsettled pension payments, conflict of political and lack of participation in decision making process in civil society frustrated by the non transparent and control imposed by one party system.

The second major area of internal conflict pressure point is the existence of massive inequalities in income between cities and countryside; development and income gap between coastal and inland regions; between eastern and western regions, as most of the development and wealth is concentrated in coastal regions. The scale of inequality is illustrated by World Bank’s statistics which states that China has 150 million people living in abject poverty, 24 million people malnourished, but China has 35 Dollar billionaires and over 100 Dollar millionaires.

The third pressure point is the massive problem of corruption and nepotism in Chinese society which is enhancing the marginalisation of ethic minorities, non communist party members, religious affiliated groups and other vulnerable members of the society.

The fourth pressure point is both an internal as well as an international issue which relate to Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia on one hand and Taiwan on the other. China’s continued inability to address and resolve the real and unprecedented grievances of the people of Tibet and Xinjiang has continued to dogged the Chinese government by a series of public disorders, unrest, protests and international condemnation of the Chinese government for its hard line policies and handling of these issues, which continues to taint it’s authority and legitimacy of rule in these ethnic regions, especially in occupied Tibet.

Sino-Tibetan Relations: The Way Forward

The objectives of Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People proposed by the Tibetan side, which provides the basis for a realistic and sustainable political solution to the issue of Tibet, is sill achievable through a strategy of campaign and continued engagement and negotiation with China even in the face of the latter’s intransigence. All we need is a political will from Beijing to resolve the question of Tibet. The last round of talks between the two side was held in January 2010.

A progressively wealthy and powerful China should have the confidence to settle the Tibetan issue during the life time of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, who is revered and enjoys the full confidence of all Tibetans both living inside and outside of Tibet. China should not fear the sincere overtures of His Holiness in helping China to settle the question of Tibet for the mutual benefit of Tibetan and Chinese peoples.

His Holiness has often talked about and recognised the need and benefits of a wealthy, powerful and industrious China to help bring economic development to Tibet. It is important for the Chinese leaders to realise and appreciate His Holiness’s genuine views and hopes for the benefit of both Chinese and Tibetan communities.

China must also be wise and confident enough to accept that it is in the best interest of China to settle the Tibetan issue as quickly as possible. The unsettled Tibet problem is one of the worst burdens that China has and this is holding back China in the eyes of international community. An amicable political settlement of the issue of Tibet with the return of His Holiness to Tibet will undoubtedly earn China international recognition for its political maturity and moral authority necessary to be a world super power.

Since the election of Kalon Tripa Dr. Lobsang Sangay, the unannounced official Chinese position had been that of a non engagement policy with His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration.

Of course, this is much regretted from Tibetan side and I hope the new Chinese leadership, which will be selected in mid October, will reverse the existing hard line policy of non engagement with His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Central Tibetan Administration. The new Chinese leadership has the opportunity to seize the moment to restore freedom in Tibet by putting an immediate end to the draconian control imposed in Tibetan areas. This will give breathing space for normal existence to begin, whereby the trauma of hopelessness will cease and may help to end the cycle of tragic self-immolations in Tibet.

As I am giving my finishing and final thoughts to this piece, the number of Tibetans who have set themselves on fire reached 51, of which 41 died. But unfortunately, there is no sign of abatement in this drastic form of non-violent protest against the continued Chinese rule in occupied Tibet and the denial of the return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to his homeland.

The political movement of self-immolation, which started from inside Tibet, is a testament of desperation and unhappiness endured by Tibetans in Tibet.

We really need to collectively engage in the forthcoming Second Special General Meeting to come up with strategies and programmes, which will enable us to achieve an amicable resolution of the political future of Tibet based on the forward-looking and foresighted principles, philosophies and guidance of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

Sonam T Frasi is a former Member of Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile