War By Other Means: China’s Political Uses of Seapower

China’s development and use of naval and non-naval, non-military sea power has become a cause for concern – one that could alter the regional balance.

China’s recent assertiveness in the South China Seas is a harbinger of things to come.  Beijing’s seapower project and the enormous resources it has enjoyed have opened up new strategic vistas for Chinese leaders and military commanders.  With larger and more capable seagoing forces at its disposal, Beijing is well positioned to fashion sophisticated strategies that will be more effective and equally difficult to counter.  While such strategies do not—yet—portend the fundamental reordering of maritime Southeast Asia, they will likely yield incremental dividends that advance China’s larger aims at sea.

Comprehensive Chinese Seapower

China’s naval and maritime buildup is providing Beijing with the wherewithal to pursue its ambitions.  The rate and scale of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) modernization process have defied many predictions in the West, reversing sanguine and even condescending conclusions about China’s aptitude at sea.  But, seapower is more than just the navy.  Rather, it is a continuum that gives Beijing a range of options.  Non-naval and non-military platforms and systems account for a significant portion of Chinese seapower.

Long-range, precision-strike weaponry deployed on the mainland can influence events, perhaps decisively, at sea.  The anti-ship ballistic missile—a maneuverable ballistic missile capable of hitting moving targets at sea—is just one member of a large family of missiles in China’s arsenal that could perform maritime-strike missions.  Indeed, the PLA boasts large numbers of shore-based fighters, bombers, and cruise missile units that can launch salvos of anti-ship missiles.

The growth of China’s maritime surveillance and law-enforcement services has been equally impressive.  The civilian arm of Chinese seapower has enabled Beijing to dispatch nonmilitary ships to confront the Philippines in the South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea.  Even civilian vessels could form maritime militias to serve China’s nautical aims.  In short, Beijing possesses diverse elements of seapower to defend its prerogatives in the nautical domain.

Political Uses of Military and Non-Military Forces

Beijing’s burgeoning seapower has positioned it to employ strategies that involve the political uses of military and non-military implements of seapower against weaker opponents in the South China Sea.  These strategies deftly combine warfighting capabilities with calibrated shows of force.  They enhance China’s leverage in protracted politico-military struggles by chipping away at the will of the opponent.

In the event of peacetime maritime crises between China and relatively weak Southeast Asian powers, innovative combinations of PLA forces could be used to compel the will of Beijing’s southern neighbors.  Consider the aforementioned anti-ship ballistic missile.  If it performs as advertised, the missile would help compensate for current shortcomings in China’s maritime inventory.  The reach of such shore fire support over the entire South China Sea would ease the burdens on the Chinese fleet while applying constant pressure on challengers to Beijing’s interests in peacetime.

Under the protective umbrella of anti-ship ballistic missiles, even lesser warships would be ideal for intimating weaker parties.  For example, small flotillas of missile-armed fast-attack craft operating in the Spratlys under missile cover could hold most Southeast Asian surface fleets at bay.  Occasional sorties of such units would signal Chinese resolve, compelling opponents to back down or acquiesce to Beijing’s wishes.  This type of gunboat diplomacy with Chinese characteristics is conceivable in future crises.

China’s ability to exercise the non-military elements of its seapower was on full display at Scarborough Shoal this past spring.  The standoff with the Philippines involved coast-guard-like noncombat vessels under the control of China Marine Surveillance (CMS), an agency entrusted with protecting Beijing’s exclusive economic zones.  In an unprecedented demonstration of resolve, CMS vessels entered Japanese territorial waters near the Senkakus following Tokyo’s decision to nationalize the disputed islands in September 2012.

Employing non-navy assets in clashes over territory reveals a sophisticated, methodical strategy for securing China’s maritime claims.  The use of non-military means eschews escalation while ensuring that disputes remain localized.  Specifically, it deprives the United States and other outside powers the rationales to step in on behalf of embattled capitals in the region.

At the same time, noncombat ships empower Beijing to exert low-grade but unremitting pressure on rival claimants to South China Sea islands and waters. Constant patrols can probe weaknesses in coastal states’ maritime-surveillance capacity while testing their political resolve. Keeping disputes at a low simmer, moreover, grants China the diplomatic initiative to turn up or down the heat as strategic circumstances warrant.

And if all else fails, Beijing can still employ its navy and shore-based assets as a backstop to the civilian agencies. That China—unlike its weaker rivals—has the option of climbing the escalation ladder only amplifies the intimidation factor in places like Scarborough Shoal or the Spratly Islands. As noted above, the mere possibility of naval coercion may induce an opponent to back down in a crisis.  Indeed, the larger the naval balance tilts in China’s favor, the more likely it becomes that a long shadow casts over Southeast Asian capitals as they contemplate their options.

Innocuous in themselves, peacetime patrols carry significant weight when backed by real firepower.  The interplay between Chinese military and non-military forces thus augments Beijing’s strategic leverage.

A Strategy of Exhaustion at Sea?

Sporadic acts of coercion and intimidation may not produce outcomes as visible or decisive as a battlefield victory.  A series of showdowns may pass without an end in sight or any tangible gain for China.  But, the cumulative effects of a continuing stalemate could induce strategic fatigue that in turn advances China’s aims.  Short of a shooting war, Chinese provocations are too slight for the United States to intervene militarily.  Staying below the escalation threshold adds maneuver room to test U.S. steadfastness while solidifying its own claims.

As China pushes and probes, regional expectations that Washington should do something would inevitably mount even as weaker nations look for signs of wavering U.S. resolve.  The prospects of recurring confrontations with little hope of direct U.S. intervention could weigh heavily on Southeast Asian capitals.  Applied with patience and discipline, such a strategy of exhaustion could gradually erode regional confidence and undermine the political will to resist.

But this attritional approach is only a snapshot of Chinese seapower today.  It is possible that Beijing’s application of graduated pressure is merely a stopgap measure, buying China time to build up the capacity to dictate events at sea.  Recent trends suggest that both the military and non-military services will continue to bulk up on a steady diet of new hardware and manpower.

Twenty years of virtually uninterrupted double-digit hikes in the defense budget have afforded China the resources to develop options beyond those dedicated to a Taiwan contingency, an all-consuming preoccupation until recently.  Analysts have detected military buildups in staging areas assigned to the Southeast Asian theater of operations.  Beijing also appears to be pushing naval construction along multiple axes simultaneously, laying down hulls for warships of every type.

Similarly, the maritime-enforcement services are recruiting new manpower while taking delivery of decommissioned naval vessels. Furthermore, Chinese shipyards are turning out state-of-the-art cutters like sausages. Many are capable of sustained patrols in the farthest reaches of the China seas, assuring that Beijing can maintain a visible presence in waters where it asserts sovereign jurisdiction. Indeed, Haijian 84, one of China’s most modern law-enforcement vessels, occupied the epicenter of the Scarborough Shoal imbroglio.

To be sure, China still lacks adequate military means to make the South China Sea a Chinese lake. Sea control that more or less permanently excludes rival navies from these waters remains beyond its reach, if indeed that is the goal.

Nevertheless, even a modest increase in Chinese seapower could perceptibly tip the regional balance of power in Beijing’s favor in peacetime contingencies not involving the U.S. Navy.  Some local players, notably Vietnam, have embarked on naval modernization programs, but they are unlikely to keep pace with China.  Over time, left unopposed by powerful outsiders such as the United States, Japan, or Australia, even small-scale shows of Chinese maritime power over Southeast Asian fleets might start to win grudging acquiescence to Beijing’s foreign policy preferences.  Such consent, however reluctant, would deliver a severe blow to the foundations of regional order.

Implications for the U.S. “Rebalancing” to Asia

The foregoing analysis underscores the predicament of many Southeast Asian states if they faced China on their own.  Not surprisingly, many regional capitals look to the United States as a bulwark against Chinese advances.  They recognize that American primacy in maritime Asia will be the crucial arbiter of Chinese ambitions.  Washington, for its part, has delivered very public pronouncements about its own stake in Asian waters.  The Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia sought to reassure audiences in the region that the United States will not abdicate the stabilizing role it has long played.

Fortunately, there is still time to maximize this convergence of interests and organize an effective response.  China is at least a decade away from amassing the type of preponderant seapower that can keep the United States out of the South China Sea while running roughshod over Southeast Asian states.  In the meantime, Washington can adopt measures to ensure that regional submission to China’s wishes is not a foregone conclusion.

First, Washington and its allies should actively help Southeast Asian states help themselves. Local actors must possess some indigenous capability to cope with Chinese encroachments at sea.  The U.S. transfer of 1960s’ vintage coast guard cutters to the Philippines is a modest step in the right direction.  The timing of the deliveries turned out to be fortuitous: the first Philippine vessel to respond off Scarborough Shoal was flagship BRP Gregorio del Pilar, the former USCGC Hamilton. But, hand-me-downs are not enough to meet Manila’s needs.  More modern and capable platforms are necessary to match China’s vessels.  Japan’s recent offer of twelve brand new patrol boats to the Philippines is another encouraging sign that outside powers are seeking to right the regional balance of power.

Second, the United States should encourage the development of a region-wide effort to keep track of China’s maritime forces.  Unmanned aerial systems, for instance, could furnish a common picture of the nautical domain on a more-or-less permanent basis to coastal states surrounding the South China Sea.  By tapping into such technologies, an information sharing arrangement that make Asian waters both figuratively and literally more transparent would go a long way to shore up regional confidence and deterrence.  It is worth noting that Tokyo has been doing a signal service on behalf of the region by publicly reporting detailed accounts of Chinese naval transits through international straits and other activities near Japanese waters.

Third, the United States should draw up plans that would enable the U.S. military to rapidly deploy units armed with maritime-strike capability, such as anti-ship cruise missile batteries, on friendly or allied soil.  Possessing the option to surge defensive forces onto allied territory at short notice would reassure U.S. allies in peacetime while substantially bolstering the U.S. capacity to act effectively in times of crisis. American reinforcements would steady nerves while stiffening the resolve of local defenders.  The United States should also encourage allies and friends to develop or strengthen their own maritime-strike options.

Finally, the U.S. Navy should revisit prevailing assumptions about its ability to command the global commons.  Years of post-Cold War permissiveness induced an airy confidence that made it seductively easy to take sea control for granted.  Arguably, the last time that the U.S. Navy fought a serious foe was at Leyte Gulf in 1944.  As China marches to the seas, a far more lethal nautical environment lies in store.  For a service long accustomed to uncontested waters, coming to terms with risk to the fleet will be an ever urgent priority.

Networking the Region

These steps would help construct a layered and inter-connected defense posture that begins with the local actors themselves.  As frontline states, they must be empowered to perform as first responders to Chinese moves at sea.  Information sharing among the coastal states would underscore the shared stakes in the maritime commons while promoting collective action.  A network of players alert to Beijing’s maneuvers stands a far better chance of deterring, and, failing that, reacting more quickly to Chinese actions.  The United States, for its part, would provide a strategic backstop to Southeast Asian partners with low-profile, small-footprint military assets that pack a punch and serve as potent symbols of American commitment to the region.

Raising the costs of—and risks to—Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea would complicate Beijing’s calculus while inclining Chinese leaders to think twice before they act.  Inducing Chinese caution, moreover, would apply a brake to Beijing’s momentum at sea, brightening the prospects for restoring equilibrium to the region and for retaking the strategic initiative.

Toshi Yoshihara 

How the US and oil majors should view China-Japan tensions

Television pictures of rioting Chinese citizens are a startling demonstration of the seemingly spontaneous civic anger over Japan’s territorial claims to five uninhabited islands and three rocks known to Japanese as the Senkaku Islands and to the Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands.

At stake in the East China Sea (and in a separate row in the South China Sea) are not the barren rocks themselves but the oil and gas that might be found under surrounding waters. Oil majors contemplating investment need a primer in international law as well as an appreciation of the historical and political background before they venture into this region.

The Spratly Archipelago and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea
The South China Sea dispute, faintly grumbling along for some thirty years, appeared to mainstream media to suddenly rise in tempo for political and economic reasons in 2009. In fact, it grew noisier for a very concrete legal reason: 13 May 2009 was the deadline for States to make claims to extend the stretch of their rights to exploit seabed for hydrocarbons under article 76(8) of the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).

In very broad brush terms, what needs to be understood about the UNCLOS regime to appreciate the background to these events is as follows:-

1) Standard issue for coastal states is 12 nautical miles (“nm”) of territorial water projecting from their low tide baselines, stretching out to 200 nm of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in which they must permit some international activities – such as laying submarine cables, maritime passage and over-flight – but can bag the hydrocarbon and mineral wealth, as well as fisheries.

2) If you can lay claim to an island (naturally-formed and above water at high tide ), you get twelve miles around that and, if it can sustain habitation, you get the 200 nm EEZ around it, too (Article 121 UNCLOS).

3) If you can persuade the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that your continental shelf goes out beyond 200 nm into undisputed seabed, you could get some extra EEZ. If there is a dispute between states, the Commission lacks jurisdiction, and nor can it rule on Article 121 issues.

4) If States do not like what they see in submissions to the CLCS and want to beef about it, they put in to the UN Secretary General a document known by the somewhat oxymoronic French title “Note Verbale.”

5) States can opt out of binding UNCLOS dispute resolution, and China did.

6) If it is a sovereignty dispute over land, then UNCLOS is the wrong set of rules anyway; one is into customary international law and the heavy hand of history.

The UNCLOS template significantly favours Japan’s archipelagic geography over China’s continental coastline – because more islands generate more EEZs. Also UNCLOS requires states to be noisy in asserting their claims in a way that sits ill with Deng Xiaoping’s famous approach “Keep a cool head and maintain a low profile. Never take the lead – but aim to do something big.”

The states with a dog in the fight over a cluster of a hundred-odd geographic features scattered over 400,000 plus sq km of the central South China Sea are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, China and Taiwan.

When Malaysia and Vietnam put in their continental shelf submissions in 2009, what particularly exercised world opinion as evidencing expansionist territorial ambitions of China in the resulting flurry of exchanges of Notes Verbales (which continued into 2011), was what has become known as China’s nine dash (or dot as some prefer) map, appended to one Note Verbale.

This was taken by some as implying that China (encompassing Taiwan) may claim sovereignty of the whole of the South China Seas. China has managed to maintain a suitably inscrutable ambiguity (sometimes by resort to Latin maxims) in clarifying/obfuscating what the nine dots or dashes should be taken to mean in legal Morse Code.

The Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea
Japan formally annexed the islands in 1895. After the Second World War, they were administered by the US until 1972, when they were returned to Japan. Around this time oil was discovered in the region and China advanced its claim to the islands. It deployed historical arguments going back to the 15th century and used Taiwan’s separate claim to the territory by subsuming it into the ‘One China’ argument.

A striking contrast between the South China Sea and the East China Sea disputes is that the former (in which the potential for hydrocarbon producton is believed to be much greater) has not generated the political heat sparked by the latter.

The North East Asian dispute is laced with the lingering resentment of South Korea and China towards Japan as their former coloniser and wartime master.

The recent re-engagement of the USA with East Asia after a decade of obsession with the Middle East somewhat brings to mind the couple who nearly had their colour TV stolen while they were upstairs watching the jewellery.

What underlies America’s reawakening to the region is a growing concern with the massively increased economic gravitational pull of China, which has played a canny diplomatic game in ASEAN while Japan has tended to default to isolationist arrogance.

The worry then becomes whether China’s growing confidence and economic power, with the west hobbled by the depredations of its Great Recession, may lead it to greater aggression. The hope must be that Deng Xiaoping’s axiom that what China needs is stability at home and peace in the world will not be destabilised by some combination of US tub-thumping and miscalculation and resurgent Japanese militarism.

A 2010 survey by the Pew Research Centre placed China top (at 91 per cent) in a satisfaction survey of 22 diverse nations polled on their governments’ handling of the economy. Ranked bottom (at 15 per cent) was the notoriously-obedient Japanese citizenry’s satisfaction with their democratically-elected government.

One front-runner in Japanese politics, as elections loom, is Nobu Ishihara. His father Shintaro Ishihara (described in the Economist as a “crusty China-baiting nationalist”) led a campaign for the Tokyo metropolitan government to purchase the Senkakus from their private Japanese owners. The national government has intervened and disclosed that it is itself close to buying them.

A second emerging force is the populist mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto, who is reinvigorating Japanese politics with the launch of the Japan Restoration Party (JRP) and wants to rewrite Japan’s pacifist constitution.

While China’s president Hu Jintao and prime minister Wen Jiabao (and their anticipated successors Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang) are not subject to any type of Western-style democracy, they do need the acclamation of their population for what pre-communist dynasties saw as the Mandate of Heaven.

Being sensitive to their people’s enduring wish to redeem the shame of Japanese domination may be equivalent in the perception of China’s leaders to the impulse to grandstand to American voters, which causes Mitt Romney and his running mate to bray about what they will do to punish China as a currency manipulator if they get elected.

The right response from Washington
A sage US president would do well to bear in mind three things.

First, do not underestimate the importance and legitimacy that China accords to history and the unity of the Han Chinese civilisation. This is why the sovereignty of Taiwan and return of Hong Kong were always non-negotiable, and why Beijing cleaves to historical arguments to support territorial claims based on ancient dominion rather than following formal laws.

Secondly, recognise the high degree of pragmatism which has allowed China to take the one country, two systems approach in Hong Kong and makes it keen to adopt the joint development approach without prejudice to territorial and sovereignty claims that can be parked indefinitely if a workable solution can be found.

Thirdly, appreciate that the Confucian argument that rejects binding dispute resolution as a disharmonious way to go is virtually bound to win in these cases, where there is no compulsory dispute resolution mechanism and the question of whose legal arguments are right is theoretical.

Faced with reasonable pragmatic alternatives, which US leader in his right mind would risk testing his military muscle as the ultimate disharmonious form of practical dispute resolution? Hopefully, neither Barack Obama nor Mitt Romney.

What business should do
On the other hand the astute chief executive of an oil and gas major should get his legal department to seek some creative advice on how to structure investments through special purpose vehicles able to take advantage of Bilateral Investment Treaties engaged by China and Japan that may give some leverage to seek compensation from an international arbitration tribunal if investments become expropriated through state action contrary to international law.

Tim Taylor

Worry about Asia, Not Europe

Newspapers are now full of doom and gloom about Europe. A recent opinion piece in The New York Times even argued that “Europe”—the ideal of an integrated, prosperous, peaceable continent devoid of nationalism’s nasty variants—had failed outright.

Europe certainly has problems, among them massive unemployment, crushing debt, rising poverty, and resurgent xenophobic ideologies, parties and movements. But failure? Compared to what exactly?

Surely not the past. For five hundred years before 1945, Europe was the venue for horrific wars. World War I and II alone killed seventy million people. Extremist movements were ubiquitous. Noxious worldviews enabled horrors such as the Holocaust.

After World War II, thanks to the European Union (EU), Western Europe morphed into a community of democracy and peace. A common market emerged; later, labor and capital began to cross borders freely; then came the single currency. Joint decision making advanced on multiple fronts, with governments surrendering elements of sovereignty. And the EU has expanded eastward.

The prospect of Germany and France going to war, as they had in the past, soon became inconceivable and remains so. Ditto the revival of German militarism and imperialism; Germans embraced consensus-based multilateralism within the EU and NATO.

Europe’s welfare state was never perfect—what is?—and faces big challenges (especially given Europe’s aging population), but it bears no resemblance to the caricatures penned by some American pundits. It has provided millions a decent life and basic necessities. Taxes are high, but social services are extensive.

Is Europe a failure compared to other places? One way to answer this question is to look east—to the Far East, an economic dynamo.

The East’s Indelible Memories
This summer, Europe marked the end of World War II, as it always has, in unremarkable ways: with ceremonies, speeches honoring those who fought and lived and those who died fighting, visits to monuments, etc. The subtext of the commemoration continues to be: let’s recall the past so we never relive it.

In East Asia, by contrast, memories of the war still provoke anger and stoke regional animosities. Sixty-seven years after the end of World War II, the fury over “comfort women” (as the Japanese referred to South Korean females forcibly transported to Japan to provide sex to soldiers) and the 1937 Nanking Massacre persists. Bellicosity and indignant nationalism are omnipresent.

Consider what happened just last month. Two Japanese cabinet officials outraged China and South Korea by visiting the Yasukuni war memorial, a site that also holds the remains of men whom Chinese, Koreans and other East Asians consider war criminals. In China, attacked and brutally occupied by Japan from 1931–1945, and Korea, colonized by Japan from 1905–1945, the visit wasn’t considered an innocent pilgrimage, not least because it was not the first time Japanese officials had displayed bad timing in visiting Yasukuni. In a move that many in Japan saw as an insult, South Korea’s prime minister asked their emperor not to visit Seoul, observing that Japan had not apologized adequately for its misdeeds.

Japan’s “peace constitution” forsakes war, its defense budget hovers at a mere 1 percent of GDP, and its foreign policy reflects Japanese society’s pacifist, antimilitarist leanings. No matter. Japan remains suspect among its neighbors.

While no one in the region seriously anticipates another Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Imperial Japan’s euphemism for its empire in the 1940s, wounds from that period remain raw. That’s partly because Japan, unlike Germany, hasn’t fully confronted its past or shown what its neighbors consider sufficient and sincere contrition.

Another flashpoint in East Asia involves mini-archipelagos that fleck the Sea of Japan and the East and South China seas. In August, South Korea and Japan traded venom again over islands—basically a collection of rocks—in the Sea of Japan that the Koreans, who control them, call Dokdo, and the Japanese, who claim rightful ownership, know as Takeshima. When the South Korean president flew there on August 10, the Japanese were infuriated. Japan recalled its ambassador to South Korea and lodged a formal protest. South Korea sent back Japan’s written complaint.

China and Japan have their own quarrel over the Diaoyutai (in Chinese) or Senkaku Islands (in Japanese). When Japanese activists or politicians visit these East China Sea islets or Chinese trawlers play chicken with the Japanese Coast Guard, tempers flare on both sides. The blogosphere sizzles; sabers rattle; jingoistic banners flutter. There was a replay in August. Furious crowds in China vandalized Japanese cars and restaurants after Japan detained and deported a Chinese group that landed on one of the islands. The news broke this month that the Japanese government was moving to buy the islands from their owner. Beijing, already incensed by reports this spring that Tokyo’s ultranationalist governor, Shintaro Ishihara, was planning to mobilize funds to that the city could acquire them, warned that it would defend its sovereign rights in the face of an illegal act.

In the South China Sea, China, Taiwan and Vietnam each claim the Paracel Islands, and China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei claim the Spratly Islands. Chinese maps proclaimed ownership of both clusters via its “Nine-Dashed Line,” which, for good measure, encloses virtually the entire South China Sea. Beijing says it’s open to negotiations in principle, but it has spurned them in practice, dismissing rival claims and flaunting its naval power. Its message: might makes right.

Continental Differences
Ultimately, the tub-thumping over maritime rocks is less about sea-lanes, fishing grounds and energy deposits than about fear, anger and suspicion—and as it was once in Europe, all these anxieties are rooted in the past.

True, East Asia’s dense trade ties demonstrate the gains from win-win interactions, but the region lacks counterparts to the EU or NATO that can promote joint problem solving and shared security. And despite East Asia’s many achievements (China’s spectacular growth rates; South Korea’s emergence as a world-class economic power and a democracy; Japan’s military minimalism) the region has multiple sources of instability and conflict.

The claim that a narrow nationalism has reemerged in Europe is weak on at least two counts. First, it exaggerates the extent to which national sentiment had been transcended by a pan-European identity and also lacks a comparative context. The run-up to the big decisions the EU has taken (the admission of Britain, the design and later reform of the common agricultural policy, and the introduction of the euro, for instance) revealed national divisions. Second, the claim that nationalism has made a comeback in Europe is devoid of comparative perspective. Are European countries more nationalistic now than they were prior to the emergence of the EU? Certainly not. Comparing Europe with Asia—and Europe’s past with its present—provides perspective at a time when pessimism about Europe prevails. For all of its present problems, "Europe" hasn’t failed. Nor, if one uses a reasonable standard, is failure likely.

Rajan Menon

China reserves right to act on disputed islands

China's national defense minister warned Tuesday that Beijing reserves the right to take further action against Japan in the ongoing dispute over uninhabited islands in the East China Sea.

Standing next to U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, Gen. Liang Guanglie said Japan should bear full responsibility for the dispute, which has triggered violent protests in China against the Japanese. Panetta has been pressing both Liang and defense leaders in Japan to find ways to resolve the problem peacefully and diplomatically.

U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, left, stands at attention during the national anthem next to China's Defense Minister Liang Guanglie at the Bayi Building in Beijing, China Tuesday, Sept. 18, 2012. (AP Photo/Larry Downing, Pool)

Liang, however, made it clear during a press conference that while China still would like to see a negotiated solution, he hopes the Japanese government "will undo its mistakes and come back to the right track of negotiations." Tensions over the string of islands, called the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyu in China, spiked last week when the Japanese government said it was purchasing some of the islands from their private owner.

China's official Xinhua News Agency reported that during their private talks, Liang told Panetta that China was "resolutely opposed" to the islands' inclusion within the terms of the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty, the agreement signed in 1951 as the U.S. helped the island nation rebuild after World War II.

Liang said China hopes the U.S. will honor its commitment to maintain a neutral stance, Xinhua reported.

The island dispute has been a hot topic during Panetta's weeklong tour of the Asia-Pacific region. But his session with Liang also touched on a wide expanse of issues as the U.S. and China try to find a way to improve their military relationship.

U.S. relations with China have been rocky, especially over America's support of and arms sales to Taiwan, the self-governing island that Beijing claims as its own. The U.S. also has been critical of China for its lack of transparency regarding its massive military buildup.

"I've long believed that the United States-China relationship requires a long-term perspective," Panetta said during the press conference after a lengthy meeting Tuesday morning with Liang. "It is measured less by major breakthroughs than by slow, steady progress over time to build a relationship and to work on activities in areas of mutual interest."

In a move to enhance the relationship, Panetta announced that the U.S. will invite China to send a ship to participate in a major military maritime exercise in 2014.

Both Panetta and Liang said they talked about how their two nations can improve communications and work toward developing a greater mutual trust.

Speaking through an interpreter, Liang said the U.S. and China must work to gain a better understanding of each other so they can gradually reduce the ongoing suspicions that have plagued the relationship.

Their meeting came just days after the U.S. forged an agreement to put a second missile-defense radar system in Japan, a move China is likely to view as another effort by the U.S. to broaden its military power in the Asia-Pacific region.

This is Panetta's first trip to China as defense chief, and it is expected to include several historic visits, including a meeting Wednesday with the country's leader-in-waiting, Xi Jinping, just days after the ruler reappeared in public after a two-week absence.

Panetta's stay in China was extended in recent days so he could visit Qingdao, a key naval base where he will see a Chinese submarine and frigate.

China and the U.S. also faced off over trade issues this week. China filed a World Trade Organization case Monday challenging U.S. anti-dumping measures on billions of dollars of kitchen appliances, paper and other goods, adding to worsening trade strains as global demand weakens.

Beijing's move came shortly before the Obama administration filed its own WTO case accusing China of improperly subsidizing exports of automobiles and auto parts.

Associated Press

Japan businesses in China hit as protests rage

TOKYO (AP) — Scores of Japanese-owned factories and stores in China were shuttered Tuesday as anti-Japan demonstrations erupted in dozens of cities.

 In this Sept. 15, 2012 file photo, residents look at an over-turned Toyota car during an anti-Japan protest in Xi'an in northwest China's Shaanxi province. Scores of Japanese-owned factories and stores in China were shuttered Tuesday, Sept. 18 as anti-Japanese demonstrations raged in dozens of cities. At stake are billions of dollars in investments and far more in sales and trade between Japan and China, the world's third- and second-largest economies. The two are so closely entwined, though, that both would suffer from any long-term disruptions. (AP Photo/File)

At stake are billions of dollars in investments and far more in sales and trade between Japan and China, the world's third- and second-largest economies. The two are so closely entwined that both would suffer from any long-term disruptions.

While Chinese authorities appeared to be moving to clamp down on the protests, the Japanese government has been urging Beijing to do more to protect Japanese businesses from trespassing, looting and other damage, Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura told reporters.

"Japanese companies play an important role in the Chinese economy and employment. We believe we should be calm and make rational judgments from a broad perspective," Fujimura said. Some private and government-level meetings and events have been postponed or cancelled, he said.

Big name brands and retailers appeared to be suffering the brunt of the latest mass outburst of anti-Japanese sentiment, with companies in lower profile sectors less affected.

Many companies said they closed Tuesday as the 81st anniversary of a Japanese invasion brought a fresh wave of protests venting anger over the colonial past and a current dispute involving contested islands in the East China Sea.

Pain from the protests was being felt in Tokyo, too, where business has slowed for the many shopkeepers catering to Chinese tourists.

"It makes me wonder how Japan will emerge from this," 20-year-old Yui Watanabe said of the protests. "We just really need to be level-headed," she said.

In Shanghai, many of the Japanese-owned or oriented shops and restaurants in the western part of the city where the Japanese consulate is located had either closed or covered any Japan-brand signs.

Uniqlo, Asia's biggest clothing retailer, had closed some of its outlets but opened its huge flagship store on Shanghai's main Nanjing Rd. shopping street by the early afternoon. Amid calls for a boycott of Japanese products, the popular store was busy with shoppers.

Despite rancor over the territorial dispute, trade between the two countries has been thriving. Total trade rose 14 percent to $344.9 billion in 2011, setting a record, according to the Japan External Trade Organization, or JETRO. Japanese help run China's high-speed train lines and aid from Tokyo helped build much of the country's modern infrastructure, including its Pudong international airport in Shanghai.

Still, many employees of Japanese retailers, automakers and other companies were staying home Tuesday as thousands of anti-Japanese protesters marched in Beijing. The Japanese school in Beijing was closed on Monday, a Japanese public holiday, and on Tuesday. Staff said they were uncertain what would happen on Wednesday.

Many companies were wary of speaking in too much detail about the situation.

Toyota Motor Corp. would not reveal which or how many of its factories were closed, saying it was up to each affiliate or subsidiary to decide. Employee safety was the priority, it said in a company statement.

A Toyota dealership in Qingdao was burned and others had display models damaged, though there were no reports of injuries at the company's factories or dealerships.

Honda Motor Corp. said all five of its assembly plants in China were closed Tuesday and Wednesday, mainly to adjust production due to the impact of the anti-Japanese backlash on sales. Honda dealerships also have been damaged in recent protests, the company said.

Honda's China sales account for about one-fifth of its global total, with Toyota's accounting for about 10 percent and Nissan Motor Co.'s for over one-quarter. Until recently, all three were outperforming their domestic rivals, despite a cooling in demand over the past two years.

Kobe Steel shut four of its various steel, aluminum and construction machinery plants in China from yesterday or today, said spokesman Gary Tsuchida.

"As a precautionary measure, we decided it would be better to cool things," he said.

Sharp. Corp., which gets about a fifth of its sales from China, said its various factories are operating as usual, with no impact so far on their production. However, spokesman Yuta Oga said the company was taking precautions in having employees avoid unnecessary travel or excursions.

Kawasaki Heavy Industries, which has a big shipbuilding joint venture in the Yangtze River city of Nantong, near Shanghai, has likewise continued business as usual.

Sony Corp. said it had suspended production at two factories out of the seven it operates in China, to protect its employees.

Although Chinese manufacturers are upgrading their technology and equipment as they close the gap with their global rivals, many rely heavily on advanced robotic machinery and other Japanese technology, as well as state-of-the-art materials and components.

Halts to production caused by the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in northeastern Japan had an especially heavy impact on automakers. But the ripple effects of any major disruptions would be felt in many industries, from heavy manufacturing to clothing and cosmetics.

Associated Press

Japan and China on a conflicting course

Months after Tokyo governor, Shintaro Ishihara's island purchase plan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial spat has shown no signs of abating from both Tokyo and Beijing. Worst still, the likelihood that the islands row would escalate into a full blown political crisis has significantly increased after the Japanese Cabinet decided to wrap up the purchase deal with the islands' owner.

Unlike previous cases, the latest handling of the crisis has shown obvious misperceptions between the two nations. In so far as China's repeated claim on the disputed islands is not recognized by Tokyo, Japan's handling of the issue is also not seen as a conflict resolution gesture to Beijing but rather, a serious encroachment of its interest and territorial integrity. 

The fear of diplomatic backlash with China if the issue is played up by the right-wing Ishihara required the Japanese central government's swift response to nationalize the islands before spiraling out of its control. What the Yoshihiko Noda administration hoped to achieve out of this is to preserve the islands' status quo where the issue is kept from affecting the overall Sino-Japanese relations. Politically too, Noda is using the issue to garner more public and internal support after the passing of its unpopular sales tax hike bill in August and the coming Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) presidential election. 

The Chinese government, meanwhile, thinks otherwise. As part of its territories which is currently administered by Tokyo due to historical reasons, there existed a dispute between the two nations and any unilateral attempt by Tokyo is a direct violation against Beijing's national interest and recognition. 

The latest islands bid, be it symbolic or "legal", is viewed by the Chinese leadership as an effort to "wrest control" over the islands against China's interests and thereby, alter the present status quo of the islands. Moreover, the purchase has also shown Tokyo's unwillingness to bend on the dispute, something which the Chinese authorities had hoped for in the past. 

The road ahead

Unlike the September 2010 trawler collision near the contented islands, Beijing seemed to have learnt a valuable lesson not to over-play its card as a means of forcing the Japanese government to back down. So far, Beijing has remained reactive to Tokyo's move, preferring to observe as to how far the unusually assertive Noda administration would pursue on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands case before taking stern measures to stake its claim on the islands. 

In fact, recent discourses by Chinese leaders have hinted that Beijing may have reached its acceptable limits following the Japanese government's unusual assertiveness in ramming ahead the purchase plan of the disputed islands. 

As demonstrated during Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in early September, Chinese President Hu Jintao's outright rejection of any official sideline meeting with Prime Minister Noda had signaled that another round of frozen Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties reminiscent of the Koizumi years may be well ahead of us. Even the 15-minute informal conservation with his Japanese counterpart was marred with Hu's serious warning on the repercussions that the islands purchase would inflict to the overall bilateral relations coupled with his reiteration of China's will to defend its sovereignty at all costs. 

A day later, on September 10, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, also reaffirmed China's unwavering stand to stake its claim on the islands and pledged against making any concession with Japan regarding its islands' sovereignty. By far, these two statements are the strongest ever been by members of the top leadership ever since the islands purchase proposal was mooted by Ishihara in April. 

At the same time, there is also news that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is stepping up its military preparedness in the middle of the crisis. On September 6, the Jinan Military Region held a military operation in which it focused on a marine group landing and taking control of an island near the Yellow Sea. It seemed to indicate that the PLA is seriously contemplating similar operation if there is a need for military action on the Diaoyu Islands issue. Apart from that, Beijing may choose to employ its economic pressure once again against Japan after its successful attempt following the Chinese trawler collision incident in September 2010.

For Japan, it is highly questionable on whether the Noda administration is prepared or able to confront the prospect of temporary or small-scale skirmish with Beijing. While the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) already had an operation plan to defend the Senkaku Islands, the weak central government mired with a myriad of problems, from internal party bickering to domestic economic woes, meant there is no guarantee that Tokyo is ready for full mobilization of all its resources in response against Beijing's armed and economic reprisals. Also, the whole situation would become extremely dangerous and complicated if Japan seeks cooperation from its close ally, the United States in order to respond to China's retaliatory measures at an advantage. 

With all these developments in sight, it is highly skeptical to concur to any view that China would take more conciliatory approach as evident in the South China Sea dispute. The central leadership transition later this year, strong anti-Japanese sentiment in China and grave public outcry to what is perceived as Beijing's passive take on the islands issue, meant that the same instance of Beijing's diplomacy of restraint toward Japan may not apply this time around. 

It is crystal clear that the Noda administration's nationalization drive of the islands has failed in alleviating concern from the Chinese top leadership and defusing the Sino-Japanese territorial tension. On the contrary, it heightened political apprehension with Beijing as the latter viewed the move as changing the status quo of the islands. That China's reprisals against Japan may begin with the signing of a purchase agreement between Tokyo and the islands' private owner, has shown that we are braving for a political storm ahead of us. 

Karl C L Lee

China-U.S. power play at core of East Asian island disputes

At first glance, it seems to make little sense that China and U.S. allies in the Western Pacific would dredge up old fights over uninhabitable islands, provoking nationalist protests, diplomatic rifts and a threat of violent confrontation in a strategic maritime corridor.

Chinese nationalists in Chengdu, in the southern province of Sichuan, protest last month against Japanese claims to disputed islands in the East China Sea. Rival claims to tiny constellations of islands from the cold North Pacific to the tropical South China Sea have stirred old tensions and resentments throughout East Asia. Credit: Associated Press

The South China Sea and coastal passages from Malaysia to Russia are of vital economic interest to all who ply the shipping lanes used to ferry more than $1.2 trillion in goods annually between the United States and its Far East trading partners.

But for the past decade the U.S. has been distracted with wars in faraway Iraq and Afghanistan, leaving allies like Japan, South Korea and the Philippines on their own to face an increasingly assertive China staking claims to the islands and the natural resources around them.

As the United States recalibrates its foreign policy to recover its standing in East Asia, analysts say Washington must execute a delicate balancing act to nurture relations with China while preventing it from bullying weaker countries.

In the South China Sea, Beijing last month deployed a military garrison and administrative staff to bolster its claim to Scarborough Reef, a triangular atoll framed by China, Vietnam and the Philippines. Vietnamese officials complain that China last year sabotaged its oil exploration by cutting undersea cables. In April, Manila accused Beijing of blockading a key fishing ground to prevent the arrest of Chinese poachers. Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei also assert sovereignty over some islets.

Since mid-August, Japan, China and South Korea have been ratcheting up tensions over less resource-rich islands in the East China Sea. All three nations are gearing up for elections and leadership changes this fall, encouraging politicians to posture as fierce defenders of national sovereignty.

The Japanese government said Monday that it will buy the privately owned islands it calls Senkaku, prompting China to send two patrol ships to safeguard the outcroppings known in China as Diaoyu. South Korea has also indulged in provocation, with President Lee Myung-bak staging a lightning visit to the islets in early August.

South Korea and Japan also dispute sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks in the Sea of Japan, and Tokyo has a long-running conflict with Russia over two islands of the Kuril chain.

While the rock piles themselves are of little value, any nation that can establish sovereignty has exclusive rights to the resources within a 200-mile radius, notes Bonnie Glaser, senior fellow for China studies at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Glaser sees the main risks to regional security coming from "accident and miscalculation," like the 2010 ramming of two Japanese coast guard vessels by a drunken Chinese fishing boat captain that set off the most tense standoff between the Asian rivals in years. She also pointed to China's attempts to intimidate smaller neighbors by frustrating trade, as when Beijing cut off exports of rare earths to Japan two years ago and quarantined Philippine fruit imports.

"With the challenges facing the United States and the rise of China, there is a sense that some new system is emerging," said Jamie Metzl, a senior fellow at the Asia Society think tank. "Many of these conflicts that had been on ice are defrosting, and countries are pushing claims to test and explore the contours of the new power structure. When China challenges Japan, it is also challenging the U.S.-Japan alliance."

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta have said during recent visits to East Asia that Washington won't take sides in territorial spats between longtime allies and the economic powerhouse of China. Instead, U.S. officials have urged the nations to work through Asian diplomatic alliances or the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. There have also been calls for plans for mutually exploring, extracting and protecting the coveted resources.

"The fishing reserves grow more valuable as other fish stocks along the coast are depleted. There's plenty of reason to have a region-wide regime" for coordinating fishing seasons and sharing in the take, said Douglas Paal, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The United States can play an important role in helping the parties with technical assistance in resource management, but Washington is unlikely to be accepted as an impartial mediator because of statements by officials that appear to put the United States "on the side of everybody but China," Paal said.

He envisions a multilateral forum emerging under the guidance of a government far removed from the disputes, perhaps Australia or Norway, with expertise in good management of natural resources.

"The best that can be hoped for is a temporary solution," Paal said. "Nobody's going to be happy with that, but no agreements on sovereignty are going to be reached in such a turbulent era."

Los Angeles Times

Tensions mar APEC meeting

Tension over territorial disputes and rising protectionism have cast a rather gloomy shadow over the gathering of leaders of 21 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) members. These nations account for 54 percent of world economic output and 44 percent of trade.

China is throwing its weight around in the South China Sea dispute, provoking invective from Vietnam and the Philippines, and continues sabre-rattling at Japan for its plans to buy disputed islands in the East China Sea, near oil and gas reserves.

Japan is embroiled in further disputes with South Korea over more rocky islets, and with APEC host Russia over the Southern Kuriles — an archipelago seized from Japan by the former Soviet Union at the end of World War II.

Despite the tension, APEC leaders will flock to the annual summit on Saturday and Sunday on Russky Island, off Vladivostok, Russia’s most eastern city near South Korea, Japan and China.

Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov believes these tensions will not hinder the already strong economic cooperation between APEC members.

“APEC is built on solid foundations,” said Lavrov on Thursday.

“Considerable progress has been made by member economies in advancing their 2012 agendas.”

Lavrov’s optimism seems to have some relevance in the real world.

Chinese President Hu Jintao, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak arrived on Thursday and Friday.

It remains unclear, however, whether there will be any opportunity for the leaders to meet.

US President Barack Obama has skipped the summit as he prepares for the upcoming presidential election. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is representing the US.

President Susilo Bambang Yu-dhoyono, with his entourage of more than 200, arrived on Friday afternoon with scores of agendas in hands, including plans for bilateral meetings with China, Russia, Mexico, Peru and Chile. He is also due to talk at the prestigious APEC CEO Summit, and meet with a dozen noted Russian businessmen.

Indonesia’s participation this year, however, has been marred by growing allegations of protectionism from fellow APEC members, particularly over the country’s recent policies to ascend the value chain.

“There have been some discussions over protectionism issues, and the need to address them,” said Trade Ministry’s director general of international trade cooperation Iman Pambagyo.

“According to a presentation by the World Trade Organization, the trend of protectionism has increased over the years,” he said.

Indonesia has fallen victim to protectionism measures by several APEC members. The US, for example, has been putting environmental barriers against Indonesia’s crude palm oil (CPO).

“Our CPO market is worth around US$8 billion in the US, annually. We have proposed that the US lift the environmental concerns over our CPO so that other developed nations will follow suit,” said Trade Minister Gita Wirjawan.

Several developed APEC members, particularly Japan, have recently criticized Indonesia’s stance on capping raw mining exports, alleging such measure to be protectionist.

Indonesia claims its policy is actually aimed at encouraging local and foreign companies to process commodities internally by setting up processing facilities and thereby creating jobs.

A joint statement released after the APEC ministerial meeting on Thursday emphasized the need to resolve the protectionism issue.

“We note with concern the International Monetary Fund’s downward projection for global economic growth for this and next year and the rise in protectionist instances around the world. These developments increase the urgency for further action to keep markets open.”

APEC, set up in 1989 in response to growing interdependence of Asia-Pacific economies, brings together economies surrounding the Pacific Ocean — from China, Southeast Asia, Australia to Chile via the US. Its core mission is to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers among members.

Jakarta Post

Give Up the Senkakus

And pigs will fly. But still...

Ideally, the governments of Japan, Korea and China would take their escalating territorial disputes to the International Court of Justice for a final settlement. Tokyo recently proposed just such an action regarding the tiny cluster of islands in the middle of the Sea of Japan, they call the Takeshimas and the Koreans the call Dokdos.

Fat Chance

That is approximately how in 1984 Chile and Argentina settled their long-standing dispute over three islands in the Beagle Channel off the southern tip of Terra Del Fuego, a dispute that had brought the two South American countries to the brink of war. In this case, a Papal mediation ruled for Chile and Argentina accepted the decision.

On August 21 the government of Japan formally proposed to South Korea that the dispute over the sovereignty of the islets be settled in a “calm fair and peaceful way based on International law” through adjudication by the ICU.

But this was a deeply cynical move by Japan. Tokyo knew full well that Seoul wouldn’t agree to any binding arbitration. It has turned down two previous requests. And if the Koreans by some chance had agreed to such a move, Tokyo would be in a pickle, since leaders of Japan have no intention of accepting any kind of ruling that might undermine their claim to the islands.

Thus the judges of the international court were deprived of the pleasure of spending perhaps years poring through the voluminous arcane and baroque arguments, obscure maps and purported landings going back centuries, that Japan, China and Korea use to buttress their territorial claims.

There is really only one way out of this impasse, one that Japan almost certainly won’t take. But Japan could cut through the Gordian Knot and graciously cede the Dokdos and Senkakus to South Korea and China respectively along with their nearby resources with no strings attached. Call it a kind of belated reparation for invasion and occupation of the two countries during and before World War II.

That would be appropriate because history weighs heavily on these islands. Forget about the supposed undersea riches that possession of these islands might bring. Certainly, there are people in the appropriate government ministries in Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo who worry about such things. But the Chinese smashing Japanese cars in Shenzhen were not thinking about marine hydrates.

For Koreans the Dokdos stand as a symbol for everything that the average citizen feels aggrieved by and for which Japan won’t fess up: the years of colonial rule, women forced into the sex trade to service soldiers, conscripted labor to Japan – the whole truckload. The Senkakus have much of the same symbolic power for China. The only way to exorcise this is for Japan to give up the islands.

Fair or not, it is Japan that bears the burden of this history. It doesn’t matter that the events took place 70 years ago, for many in Korea and China it might have happened yesterday. No apology from the government would carry the kind of weight that ceding the islands would carry.

Much has to do with the changing power relationships going back 100 years. Japan annexed the Takeshimas in 1905. Korea, then a Japanese protectorate, was not in a position to protest. Fast forward to 1954 and South Korea, fully mobilized after the Korean War, seizes control of the islands while Japan, just emerging from its own occupation, is disarmed and has no means to resist.

Japan annexed the Senkakus in 1895 supposedly after ascertaining that nobody else wanted them. For the next 70 years or so China was silent. Only in the 1970s when undersea soundings and exploration suggested that these islands might have some value did the Chinese begin to lay claim. That is Japan’s position.

One might argue that for those 70-odd years China was distracted by its internal problems – not the least being invasion and occupation by Japan - and a perception of weakness. Ironically, some commentators say that the perception of confusion and weakness in Japan’s national politics today has embolden both China and Korea to push their claims.

Obviously, surrendering the islands would involve a considerable climb-down for the Japanese government, which officially maintains that there is “no dispute,” that the Takeshima and Senkaku islands belong to Japan. But if they did, it would come to pass that they lost nothing really valuable and gained the kind of good will in Asia that it has always lacked.

Interestingly, at least one important Japanese politician may have been thinking along these lines. The Korean newspaper Dong-A Ilbo said that Ichiro Ozawa told Korea’s president that Japan would give up its claim to Takeshima if he became prime minister provided Seoul allowed Japanese to fish in nearby waters. Ozawa, who recently formed new break-away party, has denied the story, however.

Another reason to give up the islands: The Koreans and Chinese want them a lot more than the Japanese do. Of course, right wing nationalists such as Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara would consider any such move intolerable appeasement. But how attached to the islands are the bulk of the Japanese people? Not very, I would venture to say.

Where are the big demonstrations against Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s provocative visit to the Dokdo? The issue that agitates Japanese today and sends many of them into the streets to protest is not Takeshima; it is nuclear power and the government’s decision to restart two reactors in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. In Korea the government issues postage stamps with the Dokdos on them, and the largest war ship in the Korean navy, an 18,000-ton light aircraft carrier, is provocatively named ROKS Dokdo.

If Japan did cede the Senkaku to China it should demand in return an unequivocal statement from Beijing that it forever renounces any future claim to the Japanese Nansei islands, the string of smaller islands that extend south of Okinawa, some almost within sight of Taiwan.

Beijing makes no such claim - yet, but part of its rationale for owning the Senkaku/Daioyu comes from supposed visits by Chinese fishermen as far back as the Ming Dynasty. That is probably true, but these same fishermen undoubtedly also visited Ishigaki and other islands in the southern Ryukyu chain now part of Japan. Would that be the basis for some future claim?

For that matter, some Chinese chauvinists in the deep recesses of policymakers, occasionally speculate about acquiring Okinawa based on the fact that the independent Kingdom of the Ryukyus once paid tribute to the Middle Kingdom. Of course, if China based territorial claims on historical tributary vassals, it would be claiming Korea, Vietnam and Thailand.

The situation with these wretched and totally useless outposts can only get worse. Right now a kind of arms race is building as China acquires more and bigger “fisheries protection” vessels. Meanwhile, in Japan, conservative outlets demand more and better armed coast guard vessels now stretched to the limit to police the waters around the islets against constant intrusions.

It would be hard and in many ways unfair for Japan to unilaterally cede these two disputed island groups, but may be the only way to lance a boil that will only get worse. A country dealing with a tsunami and nuclear disaster, an ageing workforce, trade deficits and fiscal problems should not be distracted by these territorial issues.

Todd Crowell

Taiwan warns Japan against nationalizing islands

PENGCHIA, Taiwan (AP) — Taiwan's president used a high-profile visit to a Taiwanese islet on Friday to warn Japan against making any attempts to nationalize islands that are part of a disputed chain in the East China Sea.

Escorted by warplanes and naval vessels, President Ma Ying-jeou flew by military helicopter to Taiwan's Pengchia Islet, which lies off northern Taiwan, only about 140 kilometers (85 miles) west of the disputed chain.

The chain — known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China — is controlled by Japan but also claimed by China and Taiwan, and has been a key part of simmering regional tensions over rival territorial claims. Japan's government reportedly is planning to buy several of the islands from their private Japanese owners.

Analysts say Ma chose the Taiwanese islet to make his well-measured gesture to raise international attention without further aggravating tensions.

Disputes have flared over island chains in the East China and South China seas, rich fishing grounds with potentially lucrative oil and gas reserves.

But diplomatically isolated Taiwan — which China claims a part of its own territory 63 years after the two sides split amid civil war — has been largely left out of the spotlight.

Ma called on the East China Sea chain's three claimants — Taiwan, China and Japan — to put aside their disputes and hold dialogues to jointly develop the rich resources there. He suggested bilateral or trilateral talks "to resolve the issue in a peaceful way."

Ma also asked commanders at two Taiwan-controlled islets in South China Sea's Pratas and Spratly island chains to strengthen guards. Those chains are claimed by Taiwan, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia.

"Ma has tried to avoid provoking tension, but as Taiwan's leader, he must make a gesture even though the impact may be limited," said Lo Chih-cheng, a political scientist at Taipei's Soochow University.

While Taiwanese media were generally skeptical about the visit's impact, some say Ma's trip may manage to rebut Beijing's appeal for a united front with Taiwan over the disputes. Many Taiwanese fear Beijing may be using its warming economic ties with Taiwan in recent years to further its goal of unifying with the self-ruled democratic island.

"The mainland is trying to create the false scenario of cross-Strait cooperation in the East and South China" seas, Taiwan's China Times said in an editorial.

In Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei reacted to Ma's visit by reiterating China's longstanding stance on the dispute.

"The Diaoyu islands have belonged to China since ancient times," he said. "People from both sides of the strait both have responsibility in safeguarding Chinese territories."

Bloomberg

From North Pacific to South China Sea, nationalism stoking bitter Asian island disputes

TAIPEI, Taiwan — They are mere specks on the map. Many are uninhabited, and others sparsely so by fishermen and seasonal residents. Yet the disputed ownership of these tiny constellations of islands is inflaming nationalist fervor from the cold North Pacific to the tropical South China Sea.

In recent weeks, these long-simmering tensions have returned to a boil, with violent protests in Chinese cities, a provocative island junket by South Korea’s lame-duck president, and Japan’s government reportedly planning to buy disputed islands from their private owners.

The popular analysis is that the rising tensions are fueled by a regional power shift that has seen China become increasingly assertive with its neighbors in securing claims over potentially resource-rich waters to its south and east. But the growing acrimony may have at least as much to do with domestic political posturing.

“Wrapping yourself up in the national flag gives a very convenient exit for people with other agendas to justify their positions,” said political scientist Koichi Nakano of Tokyo’s Sophia University.

Nationalism has often been used by China’s communist leaders to cover up domestic problems — such as the economic slowdown the country is now facing, not to mention problems with a growing rich-poor divide and official corruption.

The same could be said, to an extent, in Japan and South Korea, where some politicians seem to be using the island disputes to further their agendas ahead of elections or to divert attention from thornier topics.

Few believe the diverse Asian actors in this rapidly developing drama will actually come to blows, but manipulation of popular opinion among island disputants like China, South Korea and the Philippines is raising the chances of violence by either accident or miscalculation. Such an outcome would seriously threaten the fragile tranquility that has helped catapult tens of millions of Asians from poverty to prosperity.

The disputed islands were on the agenda this week as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton traveled across the region.

Meeting Monday with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, she urged members of the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations to present a united front to China in dealing with territorial disputes in the South China Sea. She also discussed the issue with Chinese leaders during meetings in Beijing this week.

Preferred access to potentially lucrative oil and gas reserves and rich fishing grounds is helping to drive the disputes, along with an increasingly prosperous and militarily strong China that is beginning to challenge America’s historic supremacy as a Pacific power.

“There is a big power shift in this region and that is encouraging the parties involved to make their case in order not to lose their ground,” said security specialist Narushige Michishita of Japan’s National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.

But the nationalist card is also front and center as governments jockey for position.

“Nationalism is playing a very large role in all of these disputes,” said international relations specialist George Tsai of Taipei’s Chinese Culture University. “Whether it’s China, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines or Korea, all these countries are appealing to nationalist sentiments.”

Right-wing politicians in Japan are using the issue to drum up nationalist support, and even mainstream politicians within the ruling party seem willing to let the issue grab headlines from issues like a tax hike and energy policy reforms that are being demanded after last year’s nuclear disaster, Nakano said.

Similar motives can be seen in outgoing South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to an island claimed by Seoul and Tokyo as he seeks to boost his legacy on what could become a key issue in his party’s bid to maintain power in what will be a toughly fought election.

Last month lame duck Lee became the first Korean president to set foot on Dokdo island, which is called Takeshima by Japan. Korea and Japan have a bitter history — marked by decades of harsh Japanese colonial rule on the Korean Peninsula. Thumbing one’s nose at Tokyo has long had substantial cachet for millions of Koreans.

“I’m skeptical that this has anything to do with international relations,” Nakano said. “It has more to do with domestic politics because internationally it doesn’t make any sense.”

In the Philippines, President Benigno Aquino III has been much more outspoken than predecessor Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on the need to defend the country’s territorial claims, and has publicly appealed to the U.S. for help with China’s challenge to disputed areas in the South China Sea.

Aquino wants international arbitrators to resolve the issues, a stance that has nettled China, which insists the best way of settling differences with Asian neighbors is through bilateral talks.

China has also been at loggerheads with Vietnam, particularly after Beijing’s formal creation of a municipality headquartered on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands, long a bone of contention between the two nations. China and Vietnam have a millennia-long history of fear and loathing, and China’s establishment of a Paracels prefecture prompted anti-China demonstrations in Hanoi, where authorities are normally quick to squelch popular manifestations of anger.

Vietnam has also sparred with Taiwan over the South China Sea’s Spratly Islands, claimed by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia. On Tuesday, the Taiwanese Coast Guard held a live fire exercise on Taiping Island in the Spratly chain, partly in response to the Vietnamese occupation of other Spratly locations. Taiwanese legislators rushed to attend the exercises.

Just north of Taiwan, China and Japan remain immersed in their long-running battle over what the Japanese call the Senkaku Islands and the Chinese call Diaoyutai. Located roughly equidistant from Chinese and Japanese territory, the Japanese-controlled islands surged to prominence earlier this year when Shintaro Ishihara, Tokyo’s strongly nationalistic governor, proposed purchasing and developing them. Japan’s central government stepped in, and on Wednesday Japanese media reported it had agreed to buy several islands from their private Japanese owners — a move that Japanese experts say is an attempt to sideline Ishihara and his nationalistic agenda.

Thousands took to the streets in Chinese cities last month to protest Japan’s claims, with demonstrators burning flags and vandalizing Japanese restaurants and cars.

Japan’s Deputy Prime Minister Katsuya Okada maintained Thursday that the flare-up had not hurt official relations between the countries and emotions on both sides were being fanned by activists.

 In this Sept. 4, 2012 file photo, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, left, speaks with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono during a bilateral meeting at the Presidential Palace in Jakarta, Indonesia. The disputed ownership of islands located in Asia were on the agenda this week as Clinton traveled across the region. Meeting with Yudhoyono, she urged members of the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations to present a united front to China in dealing with territorial disputes in the South China Sea. (AP Photo/Jim Watson, Pool)

 In this Aug. 15, 2012 file photo activists holding Chinese and Taiwanese flags are arrested by Japanese police officers after landing on Uotsuri Island, one of the islands of Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese, in the East China Sea. The disputed ownership of a tiny constellation of islands in Asia is inflaming nationalist fervor from the cold North Pacific to the tropical South China Sea. In recent weeks, these long-simmering tensions have returned to a boil, with violent protests in Chinese cities, a provocative island junket by South Korea's lame-duck president, and Japan's government reportedly planning to buy disputed islands from their private owners. (AP Photo/Yomiuri Shimbun, Masataka Morita)

In this Aug. 19, 2012 file photo, Japanese activists hold national flags on Uotsuri island, one of the islands of Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese, in the East China Sea. The disputed ownership of a tiny constellations of islands in Asia is inflaming nationalist fervor from the cold North Pacific to the tropical South China Sea. In recent weeks, these long-simmering tensions have returned to a boil, with violent protests in Chinese cities, a provocative island junket by South Korea's lame-duck president, and Japan's government reportedly planning to buy disputed islands from their private owners. (AP Photo/Kyodo News, File)

 In this Aug. 10, 2012 file photo South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, center, looks at a national flag upon his arrival at islands called Dokdo in Korea and Takeshima in Japan. The disputed ownership of these islands as well as others in the region is inflaming nationalist fervor from the cold North Pacific to the tropical South China Sea. In recent weeks, these long-simmering tensions have returned to a boil, with violent protests in Chinese cities, a provocative island junket by South Korea's lame-duck president, and Japan's government reportedly planning to buy disputed islands from their private owners. (AP Photo/Korea Pool, File)

In this Aug. 19, 2012 file photo protesters wave Chinese national flags while marching against Japan's claim to islands which are also claimed by China, in Chengdu, in southwestern China's Sichuan province. The disputed ownership of these tiny constellations of islands is inflaming nationalist fervor from the cold North Pacific to the tropical South China Sea. In recent weeks, these long-simmering tensions have returned to a boil, with violent protests in Chinese cities, a provocative island junket by South Korea's lame-duck president, and Japan's government reportedly planning to buy disputed islands from their private owners. (AP Photo/File)

Associated Press

Is China Losing the Diplomatic Plot?

SINGAPORE – In 2016, China’s share of the global economy will be larger than America’s in purchasing-price-parity terms. This is an earth-shaking development; in 1980, when the United States accounted for 25% of world output, China’s share of the global economy was only 2.2%. And yet, after 30 years of geopolitical competence, the Chinese seem to be on the verge of losing it just when they need it most.

China’s leaders would be naïve and foolish to bank on their country’s peaceful and quiet rise to global preeminence. At some point, America will awaken from its geopolitical slumber; there are already signs that it has opened one eye.

But China has begun to make serious mistakes. After Japan acceded to Chinese pressure and released a captured Chinese trawler in September 2010, China went overboard and demanded an apology from Japan, rattling the Japanese establishment.

Similarly, after North Korean shells killed innocent South Korean civilians in November 2010, China remained essentially silent. In a carefully calibrated response, South Korea sent its ambassador to attend the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for the imprisoned Chinese human-rights activist Liu Xiaobo in December 2010.

China has also ruffled many Indian feathers by arbitrarily denying visas to senior officials. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao subsequently calmed the waters in meetings with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, but such unnecessary provocations left a residue of mistrust in India.

But all of these mistakes pale in comparison with what China did to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in July. For the first time in 45 years, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) failed to agree to a joint communiqué, ostensibly because ASEAN’s current chair, Cambodia, did not want the communiqué to refer to bilateral disputes in the South China Sea. But the whole world, including most ASEAN countries, perceived Cambodia’s stance as the result of enormous Chinese pressure.

China’s victory proved to be Pyrrhic. It won the battle of the comminiqué, but it may have lost 20 years of painstakingly accumulated goodwill, the result of efforts such as the ASEAN-China free-trade agreement, signed in November 2002. More importantly, China’s previous leaders had calculated that a strong and unified ASEAN provided a valuable buffer against any possible US containment strategy. Now, by dividing ASEAN, China has provided America with its best possible geopolitical opportunity in the region. If Deng Xiaoping were alive, he would be deeply concerned.

It may be unfair to blame China’s leaders for the ASEAN debacle. More likely than not, over-zealous junior officials pushed a hard line on the South China Sea, whereas no Chinese leader, if given the choice, would have opted to wreck the AMM Communiqué. But the fact that it happened reveals the scope of China’s recent poor decision-making.

The “nine-dotted line” that China has drawn over the South China Sea may prove to be nothing but a big geopolitical millstone around China’s neck. It was unwise to attach the map in a note verbale responding to a joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in May 2009. This was the first time that China had included the map in an official communication to the UN, and it caused great concern among some ASEAN members.

The geopolitical opportunity implied by inclusion of the map has not been lost on America, which is why the US, somewhat unusually, has made another effort to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention. Having tabled the nine-dotted line at the UN, China walked into a no-win situation, owing to the difficulty of defending the map under international law. Indeed, as the eminent historian Wang Gungwu has pointed out, the first maps to claim the South China Sea were Japanese, and were inherited by Nationalist China.

Domestically, too, the nine-dotted line may cause problems for the government by presenting critics with a useful weapon. Any hint of compromise will expose officials politically. In other words, a few rocks in the South China Sea have put China between a rock and a hard place.

There is no doubt that China will have to find a way to compromise over the nine-dotted line. In private, it has begun to do so. Even though the line covers the waters northeast of the Indonesian-owned Natuna Islands, the Chinese government has given Indonesia categorical assurances that China does not claim the Natuna Islands or their Exclusive Economic Zone.

These private assurances calmed relations with Indonesia. So why not make similar overtures to other ASEAN states?

The legacies of Deng and his predecessor, Mao Zedong, are very different. But the People’s Republic’s two most important leaders did agree in one area: both bent over backwards to make territorial concessions to resolve border disputes. This explains why China was so generous to Russia, for example, in its border settlements.

Mao and Deng could do this because both provided China with strong leadership. The challenge for the world now is that China has become politically pluralistic: no leader is strong enough to make wise unilateral concessions.

Nothing will happen in China until the leadership transition is completed in November. The new administration of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang will need some time to settle in. But America is waking up. So, too, will the rest of the world in 2016. The big question then will be: Is China as geopolitically competent as number one as it was when it was number two?

Kishore Mahbubani