War By Other Means: China’s Political Uses of Seapower

China’s development and use of naval and non-naval, non-military sea power has become a cause for concern – one that could alter the regional balance.

China’s recent assertiveness in the South China Seas is a harbinger of things to come.  Beijing’s seapower project and the enormous resources it has enjoyed have opened up new strategic vistas for Chinese leaders and military commanders.  With larger and more capable seagoing forces at its disposal, Beijing is well positioned to fashion sophisticated strategies that will be more effective and equally difficult to counter.  While such strategies do not—yet—portend the fundamental reordering of maritime Southeast Asia, they will likely yield incremental dividends that advance China’s larger aims at sea.

Comprehensive Chinese Seapower

China’s naval and maritime buildup is providing Beijing with the wherewithal to pursue its ambitions.  The rate and scale of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) modernization process have defied many predictions in the West, reversing sanguine and even condescending conclusions about China’s aptitude at sea.  But, seapower is more than just the navy.  Rather, it is a continuum that gives Beijing a range of options.  Non-naval and non-military platforms and systems account for a significant portion of Chinese seapower.

Long-range, precision-strike weaponry deployed on the mainland can influence events, perhaps decisively, at sea.  The anti-ship ballistic missile—a maneuverable ballistic missile capable of hitting moving targets at sea—is just one member of a large family of missiles in China’s arsenal that could perform maritime-strike missions.  Indeed, the PLA boasts large numbers of shore-based fighters, bombers, and cruise missile units that can launch salvos of anti-ship missiles.

The growth of China’s maritime surveillance and law-enforcement services has been equally impressive.  The civilian arm of Chinese seapower has enabled Beijing to dispatch nonmilitary ships to confront the Philippines in the South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea.  Even civilian vessels could form maritime militias to serve China’s nautical aims.  In short, Beijing possesses diverse elements of seapower to defend its prerogatives in the nautical domain.

Political Uses of Military and Non-Military Forces

Beijing’s burgeoning seapower has positioned it to employ strategies that involve the political uses of military and non-military implements of seapower against weaker opponents in the South China Sea.  These strategies deftly combine warfighting capabilities with calibrated shows of force.  They enhance China’s leverage in protracted politico-military struggles by chipping away at the will of the opponent.

In the event of peacetime maritime crises between China and relatively weak Southeast Asian powers, innovative combinations of PLA forces could be used to compel the will of Beijing’s southern neighbors.  Consider the aforementioned anti-ship ballistic missile.  If it performs as advertised, the missile would help compensate for current shortcomings in China’s maritime inventory.  The reach of such shore fire support over the entire South China Sea would ease the burdens on the Chinese fleet while applying constant pressure on challengers to Beijing’s interests in peacetime.

Under the protective umbrella of anti-ship ballistic missiles, even lesser warships would be ideal for intimating weaker parties.  For example, small flotillas of missile-armed fast-attack craft operating in the Spratlys under missile cover could hold most Southeast Asian surface fleets at bay.  Occasional sorties of such units would signal Chinese resolve, compelling opponents to back down or acquiesce to Beijing’s wishes.  This type of gunboat diplomacy with Chinese characteristics is conceivable in future crises.

China’s ability to exercise the non-military elements of its seapower was on full display at Scarborough Shoal this past spring.  The standoff with the Philippines involved coast-guard-like noncombat vessels under the control of China Marine Surveillance (CMS), an agency entrusted with protecting Beijing’s exclusive economic zones.  In an unprecedented demonstration of resolve, CMS vessels entered Japanese territorial waters near the Senkakus following Tokyo’s decision to nationalize the disputed islands in September 2012.

Employing non-navy assets in clashes over territory reveals a sophisticated, methodical strategy for securing China’s maritime claims.  The use of non-military means eschews escalation while ensuring that disputes remain localized.  Specifically, it deprives the United States and other outside powers the rationales to step in on behalf of embattled capitals in the region.

At the same time, noncombat ships empower Beijing to exert low-grade but unremitting pressure on rival claimants to South China Sea islands and waters. Constant patrols can probe weaknesses in coastal states’ maritime-surveillance capacity while testing their political resolve. Keeping disputes at a low simmer, moreover, grants China the diplomatic initiative to turn up or down the heat as strategic circumstances warrant.

And if all else fails, Beijing can still employ its navy and shore-based assets as a backstop to the civilian agencies. That China—unlike its weaker rivals—has the option of climbing the escalation ladder only amplifies the intimidation factor in places like Scarborough Shoal or the Spratly Islands. As noted above, the mere possibility of naval coercion may induce an opponent to back down in a crisis.  Indeed, the larger the naval balance tilts in China’s favor, the more likely it becomes that a long shadow casts over Southeast Asian capitals as they contemplate their options.

Innocuous in themselves, peacetime patrols carry significant weight when backed by real firepower.  The interplay between Chinese military and non-military forces thus augments Beijing’s strategic leverage.

A Strategy of Exhaustion at Sea?

Sporadic acts of coercion and intimidation may not produce outcomes as visible or decisive as a battlefield victory.  A series of showdowns may pass without an end in sight or any tangible gain for China.  But, the cumulative effects of a continuing stalemate could induce strategic fatigue that in turn advances China’s aims.  Short of a shooting war, Chinese provocations are too slight for the United States to intervene militarily.  Staying below the escalation threshold adds maneuver room to test U.S. steadfastness while solidifying its own claims.

As China pushes and probes, regional expectations that Washington should do something would inevitably mount even as weaker nations look for signs of wavering U.S. resolve.  The prospects of recurring confrontations with little hope of direct U.S. intervention could weigh heavily on Southeast Asian capitals.  Applied with patience and discipline, such a strategy of exhaustion could gradually erode regional confidence and undermine the political will to resist.

But this attritional approach is only a snapshot of Chinese seapower today.  It is possible that Beijing’s application of graduated pressure is merely a stopgap measure, buying China time to build up the capacity to dictate events at sea.  Recent trends suggest that both the military and non-military services will continue to bulk up on a steady diet of new hardware and manpower.

Twenty years of virtually uninterrupted double-digit hikes in the defense budget have afforded China the resources to develop options beyond those dedicated to a Taiwan contingency, an all-consuming preoccupation until recently.  Analysts have detected military buildups in staging areas assigned to the Southeast Asian theater of operations.  Beijing also appears to be pushing naval construction along multiple axes simultaneously, laying down hulls for warships of every type.

Similarly, the maritime-enforcement services are recruiting new manpower while taking delivery of decommissioned naval vessels. Furthermore, Chinese shipyards are turning out state-of-the-art cutters like sausages. Many are capable of sustained patrols in the farthest reaches of the China seas, assuring that Beijing can maintain a visible presence in waters where it asserts sovereign jurisdiction. Indeed, Haijian 84, one of China’s most modern law-enforcement vessels, occupied the epicenter of the Scarborough Shoal imbroglio.

To be sure, China still lacks adequate military means to make the South China Sea a Chinese lake. Sea control that more or less permanently excludes rival navies from these waters remains beyond its reach, if indeed that is the goal.

Nevertheless, even a modest increase in Chinese seapower could perceptibly tip the regional balance of power in Beijing’s favor in peacetime contingencies not involving the U.S. Navy.  Some local players, notably Vietnam, have embarked on naval modernization programs, but they are unlikely to keep pace with China.  Over time, left unopposed by powerful outsiders such as the United States, Japan, or Australia, even small-scale shows of Chinese maritime power over Southeast Asian fleets might start to win grudging acquiescence to Beijing’s foreign policy preferences.  Such consent, however reluctant, would deliver a severe blow to the foundations of regional order.

Implications for the U.S. “Rebalancing” to Asia

The foregoing analysis underscores the predicament of many Southeast Asian states if they faced China on their own.  Not surprisingly, many regional capitals look to the United States as a bulwark against Chinese advances.  They recognize that American primacy in maritime Asia will be the crucial arbiter of Chinese ambitions.  Washington, for its part, has delivered very public pronouncements about its own stake in Asian waters.  The Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia sought to reassure audiences in the region that the United States will not abdicate the stabilizing role it has long played.

Fortunately, there is still time to maximize this convergence of interests and organize an effective response.  China is at least a decade away from amassing the type of preponderant seapower that can keep the United States out of the South China Sea while running roughshod over Southeast Asian states.  In the meantime, Washington can adopt measures to ensure that regional submission to China’s wishes is not a foregone conclusion.

First, Washington and its allies should actively help Southeast Asian states help themselves. Local actors must possess some indigenous capability to cope with Chinese encroachments at sea.  The U.S. transfer of 1960s’ vintage coast guard cutters to the Philippines is a modest step in the right direction.  The timing of the deliveries turned out to be fortuitous: the first Philippine vessel to respond off Scarborough Shoal was flagship BRP Gregorio del Pilar, the former USCGC Hamilton. But, hand-me-downs are not enough to meet Manila’s needs.  More modern and capable platforms are necessary to match China’s vessels.  Japan’s recent offer of twelve brand new patrol boats to the Philippines is another encouraging sign that outside powers are seeking to right the regional balance of power.

Second, the United States should encourage the development of a region-wide effort to keep track of China’s maritime forces.  Unmanned aerial systems, for instance, could furnish a common picture of the nautical domain on a more-or-less permanent basis to coastal states surrounding the South China Sea.  By tapping into such technologies, an information sharing arrangement that make Asian waters both figuratively and literally more transparent would go a long way to shore up regional confidence and deterrence.  It is worth noting that Tokyo has been doing a signal service on behalf of the region by publicly reporting detailed accounts of Chinese naval transits through international straits and other activities near Japanese waters.

Third, the United States should draw up plans that would enable the U.S. military to rapidly deploy units armed with maritime-strike capability, such as anti-ship cruise missile batteries, on friendly or allied soil.  Possessing the option to surge defensive forces onto allied territory at short notice would reassure U.S. allies in peacetime while substantially bolstering the U.S. capacity to act effectively in times of crisis. American reinforcements would steady nerves while stiffening the resolve of local defenders.  The United States should also encourage allies and friends to develop or strengthen their own maritime-strike options.

Finally, the U.S. Navy should revisit prevailing assumptions about its ability to command the global commons.  Years of post-Cold War permissiveness induced an airy confidence that made it seductively easy to take sea control for granted.  Arguably, the last time that the U.S. Navy fought a serious foe was at Leyte Gulf in 1944.  As China marches to the seas, a far more lethal nautical environment lies in store.  For a service long accustomed to uncontested waters, coming to terms with risk to the fleet will be an ever urgent priority.

Networking the Region

These steps would help construct a layered and inter-connected defense posture that begins with the local actors themselves.  As frontline states, they must be empowered to perform as first responders to Chinese moves at sea.  Information sharing among the coastal states would underscore the shared stakes in the maritime commons while promoting collective action.  A network of players alert to Beijing’s maneuvers stands a far better chance of deterring, and, failing that, reacting more quickly to Chinese actions.  The United States, for its part, would provide a strategic backstop to Southeast Asian partners with low-profile, small-footprint military assets that pack a punch and serve as potent symbols of American commitment to the region.

Raising the costs of—and risks to—Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea would complicate Beijing’s calculus while inclining Chinese leaders to think twice before they act.  Inducing Chinese caution, moreover, would apply a brake to Beijing’s momentum at sea, brightening the prospects for restoring equilibrium to the region and for retaking the strategic initiative.

Toshi Yoshihara 

How the US and oil majors should view China-Japan tensions

Television pictures of rioting Chinese citizens are a startling demonstration of the seemingly spontaneous civic anger over Japan’s territorial claims to five uninhabited islands and three rocks known to Japanese as the Senkaku Islands and to the Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands.

At stake in the East China Sea (and in a separate row in the South China Sea) are not the barren rocks themselves but the oil and gas that might be found under surrounding waters. Oil majors contemplating investment need a primer in international law as well as an appreciation of the historical and political background before they venture into this region.

The Spratly Archipelago and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea
The South China Sea dispute, faintly grumbling along for some thirty years, appeared to mainstream media to suddenly rise in tempo for political and economic reasons in 2009. In fact, it grew noisier for a very concrete legal reason: 13 May 2009 was the deadline for States to make claims to extend the stretch of their rights to exploit seabed for hydrocarbons under article 76(8) of the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).

In very broad brush terms, what needs to be understood about the UNCLOS regime to appreciate the background to these events is as follows:-

1) Standard issue for coastal states is 12 nautical miles (“nm”) of territorial water projecting from their low tide baselines, stretching out to 200 nm of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in which they must permit some international activities – such as laying submarine cables, maritime passage and over-flight – but can bag the hydrocarbon and mineral wealth, as well as fisheries.

2) If you can lay claim to an island (naturally-formed and above water at high tide ), you get twelve miles around that and, if it can sustain habitation, you get the 200 nm EEZ around it, too (Article 121 UNCLOS).

3) If you can persuade the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that your continental shelf goes out beyond 200 nm into undisputed seabed, you could get some extra EEZ. If there is a dispute between states, the Commission lacks jurisdiction, and nor can it rule on Article 121 issues.

4) If States do not like what they see in submissions to the CLCS and want to beef about it, they put in to the UN Secretary General a document known by the somewhat oxymoronic French title “Note Verbale.”

5) States can opt out of binding UNCLOS dispute resolution, and China did.

6) If it is a sovereignty dispute over land, then UNCLOS is the wrong set of rules anyway; one is into customary international law and the heavy hand of history.

The UNCLOS template significantly favours Japan’s archipelagic geography over China’s continental coastline – because more islands generate more EEZs. Also UNCLOS requires states to be noisy in asserting their claims in a way that sits ill with Deng Xiaoping’s famous approach “Keep a cool head and maintain a low profile. Never take the lead – but aim to do something big.”

The states with a dog in the fight over a cluster of a hundred-odd geographic features scattered over 400,000 plus sq km of the central South China Sea are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, China and Taiwan.

When Malaysia and Vietnam put in their continental shelf submissions in 2009, what particularly exercised world opinion as evidencing expansionist territorial ambitions of China in the resulting flurry of exchanges of Notes Verbales (which continued into 2011), was what has become known as China’s nine dash (or dot as some prefer) map, appended to one Note Verbale.

This was taken by some as implying that China (encompassing Taiwan) may claim sovereignty of the whole of the South China Seas. China has managed to maintain a suitably inscrutable ambiguity (sometimes by resort to Latin maxims) in clarifying/obfuscating what the nine dots or dashes should be taken to mean in legal Morse Code.

The Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea
Japan formally annexed the islands in 1895. After the Second World War, they were administered by the US until 1972, when they were returned to Japan. Around this time oil was discovered in the region and China advanced its claim to the islands. It deployed historical arguments going back to the 15th century and used Taiwan’s separate claim to the territory by subsuming it into the ‘One China’ argument.

A striking contrast between the South China Sea and the East China Sea disputes is that the former (in which the potential for hydrocarbon producton is believed to be much greater) has not generated the political heat sparked by the latter.

The North East Asian dispute is laced with the lingering resentment of South Korea and China towards Japan as their former coloniser and wartime master.

The recent re-engagement of the USA with East Asia after a decade of obsession with the Middle East somewhat brings to mind the couple who nearly had their colour TV stolen while they were upstairs watching the jewellery.

What underlies America’s reawakening to the region is a growing concern with the massively increased economic gravitational pull of China, which has played a canny diplomatic game in ASEAN while Japan has tended to default to isolationist arrogance.

The worry then becomes whether China’s growing confidence and economic power, with the west hobbled by the depredations of its Great Recession, may lead it to greater aggression. The hope must be that Deng Xiaoping’s axiom that what China needs is stability at home and peace in the world will not be destabilised by some combination of US tub-thumping and miscalculation and resurgent Japanese militarism.

A 2010 survey by the Pew Research Centre placed China top (at 91 per cent) in a satisfaction survey of 22 diverse nations polled on their governments’ handling of the economy. Ranked bottom (at 15 per cent) was the notoriously-obedient Japanese citizenry’s satisfaction with their democratically-elected government.

One front-runner in Japanese politics, as elections loom, is Nobu Ishihara. His father Shintaro Ishihara (described in the Economist as a “crusty China-baiting nationalist”) led a campaign for the Tokyo metropolitan government to purchase the Senkakus from their private Japanese owners. The national government has intervened and disclosed that it is itself close to buying them.

A second emerging force is the populist mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto, who is reinvigorating Japanese politics with the launch of the Japan Restoration Party (JRP) and wants to rewrite Japan’s pacifist constitution.

While China’s president Hu Jintao and prime minister Wen Jiabao (and their anticipated successors Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang) are not subject to any type of Western-style democracy, they do need the acclamation of their population for what pre-communist dynasties saw as the Mandate of Heaven.

Being sensitive to their people’s enduring wish to redeem the shame of Japanese domination may be equivalent in the perception of China’s leaders to the impulse to grandstand to American voters, which causes Mitt Romney and his running mate to bray about what they will do to punish China as a currency manipulator if they get elected.

The right response from Washington
A sage US president would do well to bear in mind three things.

First, do not underestimate the importance and legitimacy that China accords to history and the unity of the Han Chinese civilisation. This is why the sovereignty of Taiwan and return of Hong Kong were always non-negotiable, and why Beijing cleaves to historical arguments to support territorial claims based on ancient dominion rather than following formal laws.

Secondly, recognise the high degree of pragmatism which has allowed China to take the one country, two systems approach in Hong Kong and makes it keen to adopt the joint development approach without prejudice to territorial and sovereignty claims that can be parked indefinitely if a workable solution can be found.

Thirdly, appreciate that the Confucian argument that rejects binding dispute resolution as a disharmonious way to go is virtually bound to win in these cases, where there is no compulsory dispute resolution mechanism and the question of whose legal arguments are right is theoretical.

Faced with reasonable pragmatic alternatives, which US leader in his right mind would risk testing his military muscle as the ultimate disharmonious form of practical dispute resolution? Hopefully, neither Barack Obama nor Mitt Romney.

What business should do
On the other hand the astute chief executive of an oil and gas major should get his legal department to seek some creative advice on how to structure investments through special purpose vehicles able to take advantage of Bilateral Investment Treaties engaged by China and Japan that may give some leverage to seek compensation from an international arbitration tribunal if investments become expropriated through state action contrary to international law.

Tim Taylor

Worry about Asia, Not Europe

Newspapers are now full of doom and gloom about Europe. A recent opinion piece in The New York Times even argued that “Europe”—the ideal of an integrated, prosperous, peaceable continent devoid of nationalism’s nasty variants—had failed outright.

Europe certainly has problems, among them massive unemployment, crushing debt, rising poverty, and resurgent xenophobic ideologies, parties and movements. But failure? Compared to what exactly?

Surely not the past. For five hundred years before 1945, Europe was the venue for horrific wars. World War I and II alone killed seventy million people. Extremist movements were ubiquitous. Noxious worldviews enabled horrors such as the Holocaust.

After World War II, thanks to the European Union (EU), Western Europe morphed into a community of democracy and peace. A common market emerged; later, labor and capital began to cross borders freely; then came the single currency. Joint decision making advanced on multiple fronts, with governments surrendering elements of sovereignty. And the EU has expanded eastward.

The prospect of Germany and France going to war, as they had in the past, soon became inconceivable and remains so. Ditto the revival of German militarism and imperialism; Germans embraced consensus-based multilateralism within the EU and NATO.

Europe’s welfare state was never perfect—what is?—and faces big challenges (especially given Europe’s aging population), but it bears no resemblance to the caricatures penned by some American pundits. It has provided millions a decent life and basic necessities. Taxes are high, but social services are extensive.

Is Europe a failure compared to other places? One way to answer this question is to look east—to the Far East, an economic dynamo.

The East’s Indelible Memories
This summer, Europe marked the end of World War II, as it always has, in unremarkable ways: with ceremonies, speeches honoring those who fought and lived and those who died fighting, visits to monuments, etc. The subtext of the commemoration continues to be: let’s recall the past so we never relive it.

In East Asia, by contrast, memories of the war still provoke anger and stoke regional animosities. Sixty-seven years after the end of World War II, the fury over “comfort women” (as the Japanese referred to South Korean females forcibly transported to Japan to provide sex to soldiers) and the 1937 Nanking Massacre persists. Bellicosity and indignant nationalism are omnipresent.

Consider what happened just last month. Two Japanese cabinet officials outraged China and South Korea by visiting the Yasukuni war memorial, a site that also holds the remains of men whom Chinese, Koreans and other East Asians consider war criminals. In China, attacked and brutally occupied by Japan from 1931–1945, and Korea, colonized by Japan from 1905–1945, the visit wasn’t considered an innocent pilgrimage, not least because it was not the first time Japanese officials had displayed bad timing in visiting Yasukuni. In a move that many in Japan saw as an insult, South Korea’s prime minister asked their emperor not to visit Seoul, observing that Japan had not apologized adequately for its misdeeds.

Japan’s “peace constitution” forsakes war, its defense budget hovers at a mere 1 percent of GDP, and its foreign policy reflects Japanese society’s pacifist, antimilitarist leanings. No matter. Japan remains suspect among its neighbors.

While no one in the region seriously anticipates another Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Imperial Japan’s euphemism for its empire in the 1940s, wounds from that period remain raw. That’s partly because Japan, unlike Germany, hasn’t fully confronted its past or shown what its neighbors consider sufficient and sincere contrition.

Another flashpoint in East Asia involves mini-archipelagos that fleck the Sea of Japan and the East and South China seas. In August, South Korea and Japan traded venom again over islands—basically a collection of rocks—in the Sea of Japan that the Koreans, who control them, call Dokdo, and the Japanese, who claim rightful ownership, know as Takeshima. When the South Korean president flew there on August 10, the Japanese were infuriated. Japan recalled its ambassador to South Korea and lodged a formal protest. South Korea sent back Japan’s written complaint.

China and Japan have their own quarrel over the Diaoyutai (in Chinese) or Senkaku Islands (in Japanese). When Japanese activists or politicians visit these East China Sea islets or Chinese trawlers play chicken with the Japanese Coast Guard, tempers flare on both sides. The blogosphere sizzles; sabers rattle; jingoistic banners flutter. There was a replay in August. Furious crowds in China vandalized Japanese cars and restaurants after Japan detained and deported a Chinese group that landed on one of the islands. The news broke this month that the Japanese government was moving to buy the islands from their owner. Beijing, already incensed by reports this spring that Tokyo’s ultranationalist governor, Shintaro Ishihara, was planning to mobilize funds to that the city could acquire them, warned that it would defend its sovereign rights in the face of an illegal act.

In the South China Sea, China, Taiwan and Vietnam each claim the Paracel Islands, and China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei claim the Spratly Islands. Chinese maps proclaimed ownership of both clusters via its “Nine-Dashed Line,” which, for good measure, encloses virtually the entire South China Sea. Beijing says it’s open to negotiations in principle, but it has spurned them in practice, dismissing rival claims and flaunting its naval power. Its message: might makes right.

Continental Differences
Ultimately, the tub-thumping over maritime rocks is less about sea-lanes, fishing grounds and energy deposits than about fear, anger and suspicion—and as it was once in Europe, all these anxieties are rooted in the past.

True, East Asia’s dense trade ties demonstrate the gains from win-win interactions, but the region lacks counterparts to the EU or NATO that can promote joint problem solving and shared security. And despite East Asia’s many achievements (China’s spectacular growth rates; South Korea’s emergence as a world-class economic power and a democracy; Japan’s military minimalism) the region has multiple sources of instability and conflict.

The claim that a narrow nationalism has reemerged in Europe is weak on at least two counts. First, it exaggerates the extent to which national sentiment had been transcended by a pan-European identity and also lacks a comparative context. The run-up to the big decisions the EU has taken (the admission of Britain, the design and later reform of the common agricultural policy, and the introduction of the euro, for instance) revealed national divisions. Second, the claim that nationalism has made a comeback in Europe is devoid of comparative perspective. Are European countries more nationalistic now than they were prior to the emergence of the EU? Certainly not. Comparing Europe with Asia—and Europe’s past with its present—provides perspective at a time when pessimism about Europe prevails. For all of its present problems, "Europe" hasn’t failed. Nor, if one uses a reasonable standard, is failure likely.

Rajan Menon

China reserves right to act on disputed islands

China's national defense minister warned Tuesday that Beijing reserves the right to take further action against Japan in the ongoing dispute over uninhabited islands in the East China Sea.

Standing next to U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, Gen. Liang Guanglie said Japan should bear full responsibility for the dispute, which has triggered violent protests in China against the Japanese. Panetta has been pressing both Liang and defense leaders in Japan to find ways to resolve the problem peacefully and diplomatically.

U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, left, stands at attention during the national anthem next to China's Defense Minister Liang Guanglie at the Bayi Building in Beijing, China Tuesday, Sept. 18, 2012. (AP Photo/Larry Downing, Pool)

Liang, however, made it clear during a press conference that while China still would like to see a negotiated solution, he hopes the Japanese government "will undo its mistakes and come back to the right track of negotiations." Tensions over the string of islands, called the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyu in China, spiked last week when the Japanese government said it was purchasing some of the islands from their private owner.

China's official Xinhua News Agency reported that during their private talks, Liang told Panetta that China was "resolutely opposed" to the islands' inclusion within the terms of the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty, the agreement signed in 1951 as the U.S. helped the island nation rebuild after World War II.

Liang said China hopes the U.S. will honor its commitment to maintain a neutral stance, Xinhua reported.

The island dispute has been a hot topic during Panetta's weeklong tour of the Asia-Pacific region. But his session with Liang also touched on a wide expanse of issues as the U.S. and China try to find a way to improve their military relationship.

U.S. relations with China have been rocky, especially over America's support of and arms sales to Taiwan, the self-governing island that Beijing claims as its own. The U.S. also has been critical of China for its lack of transparency regarding its massive military buildup.

"I've long believed that the United States-China relationship requires a long-term perspective," Panetta said during the press conference after a lengthy meeting Tuesday morning with Liang. "It is measured less by major breakthroughs than by slow, steady progress over time to build a relationship and to work on activities in areas of mutual interest."

In a move to enhance the relationship, Panetta announced that the U.S. will invite China to send a ship to participate in a major military maritime exercise in 2014.

Both Panetta and Liang said they talked about how their two nations can improve communications and work toward developing a greater mutual trust.

Speaking through an interpreter, Liang said the U.S. and China must work to gain a better understanding of each other so they can gradually reduce the ongoing suspicions that have plagued the relationship.

Their meeting came just days after the U.S. forged an agreement to put a second missile-defense radar system in Japan, a move China is likely to view as another effort by the U.S. to broaden its military power in the Asia-Pacific region.

This is Panetta's first trip to China as defense chief, and it is expected to include several historic visits, including a meeting Wednesday with the country's leader-in-waiting, Xi Jinping, just days after the ruler reappeared in public after a two-week absence.

Panetta's stay in China was extended in recent days so he could visit Qingdao, a key naval base where he will see a Chinese submarine and frigate.

China and the U.S. also faced off over trade issues this week. China filed a World Trade Organization case Monday challenging U.S. anti-dumping measures on billions of dollars of kitchen appliances, paper and other goods, adding to worsening trade strains as global demand weakens.

Beijing's move came shortly before the Obama administration filed its own WTO case accusing China of improperly subsidizing exports of automobiles and auto parts.

Associated Press

Japan businesses in China hit as protests rage

TOKYO (AP) — Scores of Japanese-owned factories and stores in China were shuttered Tuesday as anti-Japan demonstrations erupted in dozens of cities.

 In this Sept. 15, 2012 file photo, residents look at an over-turned Toyota car during an anti-Japan protest in Xi'an in northwest China's Shaanxi province. Scores of Japanese-owned factories and stores in China were shuttered Tuesday, Sept. 18 as anti-Japanese demonstrations raged in dozens of cities. At stake are billions of dollars in investments and far more in sales and trade between Japan and China, the world's third- and second-largest economies. The two are so closely entwined, though, that both would suffer from any long-term disruptions. (AP Photo/File)

At stake are billions of dollars in investments and far more in sales and trade between Japan and China, the world's third- and second-largest economies. The two are so closely entwined that both would suffer from any long-term disruptions.

While Chinese authorities appeared to be moving to clamp down on the protests, the Japanese government has been urging Beijing to do more to protect Japanese businesses from trespassing, looting and other damage, Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura told reporters.

"Japanese companies play an important role in the Chinese economy and employment. We believe we should be calm and make rational judgments from a broad perspective," Fujimura said. Some private and government-level meetings and events have been postponed or cancelled, he said.

Big name brands and retailers appeared to be suffering the brunt of the latest mass outburst of anti-Japanese sentiment, with companies in lower profile sectors less affected.

Many companies said they closed Tuesday as the 81st anniversary of a Japanese invasion brought a fresh wave of protests venting anger over the colonial past and a current dispute involving contested islands in the East China Sea.

Pain from the protests was being felt in Tokyo, too, where business has slowed for the many shopkeepers catering to Chinese tourists.

"It makes me wonder how Japan will emerge from this," 20-year-old Yui Watanabe said of the protests. "We just really need to be level-headed," she said.

In Shanghai, many of the Japanese-owned or oriented shops and restaurants in the western part of the city where the Japanese consulate is located had either closed or covered any Japan-brand signs.

Uniqlo, Asia's biggest clothing retailer, had closed some of its outlets but opened its huge flagship store on Shanghai's main Nanjing Rd. shopping street by the early afternoon. Amid calls for a boycott of Japanese products, the popular store was busy with shoppers.

Despite rancor over the territorial dispute, trade between the two countries has been thriving. Total trade rose 14 percent to $344.9 billion in 2011, setting a record, according to the Japan External Trade Organization, or JETRO. Japanese help run China's high-speed train lines and aid from Tokyo helped build much of the country's modern infrastructure, including its Pudong international airport in Shanghai.

Still, many employees of Japanese retailers, automakers and other companies were staying home Tuesday as thousands of anti-Japanese protesters marched in Beijing. The Japanese school in Beijing was closed on Monday, a Japanese public holiday, and on Tuesday. Staff said they were uncertain what would happen on Wednesday.

Many companies were wary of speaking in too much detail about the situation.

Toyota Motor Corp. would not reveal which or how many of its factories were closed, saying it was up to each affiliate or subsidiary to decide. Employee safety was the priority, it said in a company statement.

A Toyota dealership in Qingdao was burned and others had display models damaged, though there were no reports of injuries at the company's factories or dealerships.

Honda Motor Corp. said all five of its assembly plants in China were closed Tuesday and Wednesday, mainly to adjust production due to the impact of the anti-Japanese backlash on sales. Honda dealerships also have been damaged in recent protests, the company said.

Honda's China sales account for about one-fifth of its global total, with Toyota's accounting for about 10 percent and Nissan Motor Co.'s for over one-quarter. Until recently, all three were outperforming their domestic rivals, despite a cooling in demand over the past two years.

Kobe Steel shut four of its various steel, aluminum and construction machinery plants in China from yesterday or today, said spokesman Gary Tsuchida.

"As a precautionary measure, we decided it would be better to cool things," he said.

Sharp. Corp., which gets about a fifth of its sales from China, said its various factories are operating as usual, with no impact so far on their production. However, spokesman Yuta Oga said the company was taking precautions in having employees avoid unnecessary travel or excursions.

Kawasaki Heavy Industries, which has a big shipbuilding joint venture in the Yangtze River city of Nantong, near Shanghai, has likewise continued business as usual.

Sony Corp. said it had suspended production at two factories out of the seven it operates in China, to protect its employees.

Although Chinese manufacturers are upgrading their technology and equipment as they close the gap with their global rivals, many rely heavily on advanced robotic machinery and other Japanese technology, as well as state-of-the-art materials and components.

Halts to production caused by the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in northeastern Japan had an especially heavy impact on automakers. But the ripple effects of any major disruptions would be felt in many industries, from heavy manufacturing to clothing and cosmetics.

Associated Press

Japan and China on a conflicting course

Months after Tokyo governor, Shintaro Ishihara's island purchase plan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial spat has shown no signs of abating from both Tokyo and Beijing. Worst still, the likelihood that the islands row would escalate into a full blown political crisis has significantly increased after the Japanese Cabinet decided to wrap up the purchase deal with the islands' owner.

Unlike previous cases, the latest handling of the crisis has shown obvious misperceptions between the two nations. In so far as China's repeated claim on the disputed islands is not recognized by Tokyo, Japan's handling of the issue is also not seen as a conflict resolution gesture to Beijing but rather, a serious encroachment of its interest and territorial integrity. 

The fear of diplomatic backlash with China if the issue is played up by the right-wing Ishihara required the Japanese central government's swift response to nationalize the islands before spiraling out of its control. What the Yoshihiko Noda administration hoped to achieve out of this is to preserve the islands' status quo where the issue is kept from affecting the overall Sino-Japanese relations. Politically too, Noda is using the issue to garner more public and internal support after the passing of its unpopular sales tax hike bill in August and the coming Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) presidential election. 

The Chinese government, meanwhile, thinks otherwise. As part of its territories which is currently administered by Tokyo due to historical reasons, there existed a dispute between the two nations and any unilateral attempt by Tokyo is a direct violation against Beijing's national interest and recognition. 

The latest islands bid, be it symbolic or "legal", is viewed by the Chinese leadership as an effort to "wrest control" over the islands against China's interests and thereby, alter the present status quo of the islands. Moreover, the purchase has also shown Tokyo's unwillingness to bend on the dispute, something which the Chinese authorities had hoped for in the past. 

The road ahead

Unlike the September 2010 trawler collision near the contented islands, Beijing seemed to have learnt a valuable lesson not to over-play its card as a means of forcing the Japanese government to back down. So far, Beijing has remained reactive to Tokyo's move, preferring to observe as to how far the unusually assertive Noda administration would pursue on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands case before taking stern measures to stake its claim on the islands. 

In fact, recent discourses by Chinese leaders have hinted that Beijing may have reached its acceptable limits following the Japanese government's unusual assertiveness in ramming ahead the purchase plan of the disputed islands. 

As demonstrated during Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in early September, Chinese President Hu Jintao's outright rejection of any official sideline meeting with Prime Minister Noda had signaled that another round of frozen Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties reminiscent of the Koizumi years may be well ahead of us. Even the 15-minute informal conservation with his Japanese counterpart was marred with Hu's serious warning on the repercussions that the islands purchase would inflict to the overall bilateral relations coupled with his reiteration of China's will to defend its sovereignty at all costs. 

A day later, on September 10, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, also reaffirmed China's unwavering stand to stake its claim on the islands and pledged against making any concession with Japan regarding its islands' sovereignty. By far, these two statements are the strongest ever been by members of the top leadership ever since the islands purchase proposal was mooted by Ishihara in April. 

At the same time, there is also news that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is stepping up its military preparedness in the middle of the crisis. On September 6, the Jinan Military Region held a military operation in which it focused on a marine group landing and taking control of an island near the Yellow Sea. It seemed to indicate that the PLA is seriously contemplating similar operation if there is a need for military action on the Diaoyu Islands issue. Apart from that, Beijing may choose to employ its economic pressure once again against Japan after its successful attempt following the Chinese trawler collision incident in September 2010.

For Japan, it is highly questionable on whether the Noda administration is prepared or able to confront the prospect of temporary or small-scale skirmish with Beijing. While the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) already had an operation plan to defend the Senkaku Islands, the weak central government mired with a myriad of problems, from internal party bickering to domestic economic woes, meant there is no guarantee that Tokyo is ready for full mobilization of all its resources in response against Beijing's armed and economic reprisals. Also, the whole situation would become extremely dangerous and complicated if Japan seeks cooperation from its close ally, the United States in order to respond to China's retaliatory measures at an advantage. 

With all these developments in sight, it is highly skeptical to concur to any view that China would take more conciliatory approach as evident in the South China Sea dispute. The central leadership transition later this year, strong anti-Japanese sentiment in China and grave public outcry to what is perceived as Beijing's passive take on the islands issue, meant that the same instance of Beijing's diplomacy of restraint toward Japan may not apply this time around. 

It is crystal clear that the Noda administration's nationalization drive of the islands has failed in alleviating concern from the Chinese top leadership and defusing the Sino-Japanese territorial tension. On the contrary, it heightened political apprehension with Beijing as the latter viewed the move as changing the status quo of the islands. That China's reprisals against Japan may begin with the signing of a purchase agreement between Tokyo and the islands' private owner, has shown that we are braving for a political storm ahead of us. 

Karl C L Lee

China-U.S. power play at core of East Asian island disputes

At first glance, it seems to make little sense that China and U.S. allies in the Western Pacific would dredge up old fights over uninhabitable islands, provoking nationalist protests, diplomatic rifts and a threat of violent confrontation in a strategic maritime corridor.

Chinese nationalists in Chengdu, in the southern province of Sichuan, protest last month against Japanese claims to disputed islands in the East China Sea. Rival claims to tiny constellations of islands from the cold North Pacific to the tropical South China Sea have stirred old tensions and resentments throughout East Asia. Credit: Associated Press

The South China Sea and coastal passages from Malaysia to Russia are of vital economic interest to all who ply the shipping lanes used to ferry more than $1.2 trillion in goods annually between the United States and its Far East trading partners.

But for the past decade the U.S. has been distracted with wars in faraway Iraq and Afghanistan, leaving allies like Japan, South Korea and the Philippines on their own to face an increasingly assertive China staking claims to the islands and the natural resources around them.

As the United States recalibrates its foreign policy to recover its standing in East Asia, analysts say Washington must execute a delicate balancing act to nurture relations with China while preventing it from bullying weaker countries.

In the South China Sea, Beijing last month deployed a military garrison and administrative staff to bolster its claim to Scarborough Reef, a triangular atoll framed by China, Vietnam and the Philippines. Vietnamese officials complain that China last year sabotaged its oil exploration by cutting undersea cables. In April, Manila accused Beijing of blockading a key fishing ground to prevent the arrest of Chinese poachers. Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei also assert sovereignty over some islets.

Since mid-August, Japan, China and South Korea have been ratcheting up tensions over less resource-rich islands in the East China Sea. All three nations are gearing up for elections and leadership changes this fall, encouraging politicians to posture as fierce defenders of national sovereignty.

The Japanese government said Monday that it will buy the privately owned islands it calls Senkaku, prompting China to send two patrol ships to safeguard the outcroppings known in China as Diaoyu. South Korea has also indulged in provocation, with President Lee Myung-bak staging a lightning visit to the islets in early August.

South Korea and Japan also dispute sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks in the Sea of Japan, and Tokyo has a long-running conflict with Russia over two islands of the Kuril chain.

While the rock piles themselves are of little value, any nation that can establish sovereignty has exclusive rights to the resources within a 200-mile radius, notes Bonnie Glaser, senior fellow for China studies at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Glaser sees the main risks to regional security coming from "accident and miscalculation," like the 2010 ramming of two Japanese coast guard vessels by a drunken Chinese fishing boat captain that set off the most tense standoff between the Asian rivals in years. She also pointed to China's attempts to intimidate smaller neighbors by frustrating trade, as when Beijing cut off exports of rare earths to Japan two years ago and quarantined Philippine fruit imports.

"With the challenges facing the United States and the rise of China, there is a sense that some new system is emerging," said Jamie Metzl, a senior fellow at the Asia Society think tank. "Many of these conflicts that had been on ice are defrosting, and countries are pushing claims to test and explore the contours of the new power structure. When China challenges Japan, it is also challenging the U.S.-Japan alliance."

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta have said during recent visits to East Asia that Washington won't take sides in territorial spats between longtime allies and the economic powerhouse of China. Instead, U.S. officials have urged the nations to work through Asian diplomatic alliances or the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. There have also been calls for plans for mutually exploring, extracting and protecting the coveted resources.

"The fishing reserves grow more valuable as other fish stocks along the coast are depleted. There's plenty of reason to have a region-wide regime" for coordinating fishing seasons and sharing in the take, said Douglas Paal, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The United States can play an important role in helping the parties with technical assistance in resource management, but Washington is unlikely to be accepted as an impartial mediator because of statements by officials that appear to put the United States "on the side of everybody but China," Paal said.

He envisions a multilateral forum emerging under the guidance of a government far removed from the disputes, perhaps Australia or Norway, with expertise in good management of natural resources.

"The best that can be hoped for is a temporary solution," Paal said. "Nobody's going to be happy with that, but no agreements on sovereignty are going to be reached in such a turbulent era."

Los Angeles Times

Tensions mar APEC meeting

Tension over territorial disputes and rising protectionism have cast a rather gloomy shadow over the gathering of leaders of 21 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) members. These nations account for 54 percent of world economic output and 44 percent of trade.

China is throwing its weight around in the South China Sea dispute, provoking invective from Vietnam and the Philippines, and continues sabre-rattling at Japan for its plans to buy disputed islands in the East China Sea, near oil and gas reserves.

Japan is embroiled in further disputes with South Korea over more rocky islets, and with APEC host Russia over the Southern Kuriles — an archipelago seized from Japan by the former Soviet Union at the end of World War II.

Despite the tension, APEC leaders will flock to the annual summit on Saturday and Sunday on Russky Island, off Vladivostok, Russia’s most eastern city near South Korea, Japan and China.

Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov believes these tensions will not hinder the already strong economic cooperation between APEC members.

“APEC is built on solid foundations,” said Lavrov on Thursday.

“Considerable progress has been made by member economies in advancing their 2012 agendas.”

Lavrov’s optimism seems to have some relevance in the real world.

Chinese President Hu Jintao, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak arrived on Thursday and Friday.

It remains unclear, however, whether there will be any opportunity for the leaders to meet.

US President Barack Obama has skipped the summit as he prepares for the upcoming presidential election. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is representing the US.

President Susilo Bambang Yu-dhoyono, with his entourage of more than 200, arrived on Friday afternoon with scores of agendas in hands, including plans for bilateral meetings with China, Russia, Mexico, Peru and Chile. He is also due to talk at the prestigious APEC CEO Summit, and meet with a dozen noted Russian businessmen.

Indonesia’s participation this year, however, has been marred by growing allegations of protectionism from fellow APEC members, particularly over the country’s recent policies to ascend the value chain.

“There have been some discussions over protectionism issues, and the need to address them,” said Trade Ministry’s director general of international trade cooperation Iman Pambagyo.

“According to a presentation by the World Trade Organization, the trend of protectionism has increased over the years,” he said.

Indonesia has fallen victim to protectionism measures by several APEC members. The US, for example, has been putting environmental barriers against Indonesia’s crude palm oil (CPO).

“Our CPO market is worth around US$8 billion in the US, annually. We have proposed that the US lift the environmental concerns over our CPO so that other developed nations will follow suit,” said Trade Minister Gita Wirjawan.

Several developed APEC members, particularly Japan, have recently criticized Indonesia’s stance on capping raw mining exports, alleging such measure to be protectionist.

Indonesia claims its policy is actually aimed at encouraging local and foreign companies to process commodities internally by setting up processing facilities and thereby creating jobs.

A joint statement released after the APEC ministerial meeting on Thursday emphasized the need to resolve the protectionism issue.

“We note with concern the International Monetary Fund’s downward projection for global economic growth for this and next year and the rise in protectionist instances around the world. These developments increase the urgency for further action to keep markets open.”

APEC, set up in 1989 in response to growing interdependence of Asia-Pacific economies, brings together economies surrounding the Pacific Ocean — from China, Southeast Asia, Australia to Chile via the US. Its core mission is to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers among members.

Jakarta Post

From North Pacific to South China Sea, nationalism stoking bitter Asian island disputes

TAIPEI, Taiwan — They are mere specks on the map. Many are uninhabited, and others sparsely so by fishermen and seasonal residents. Yet the disputed ownership of these tiny constellations of islands is inflaming nationalist fervor from the cold North Pacific to the tropical South China Sea.

In recent weeks, these long-simmering tensions have returned to a boil, with violent protests in Chinese cities, a provocative island junket by South Korea’s lame-duck president, and Japan’s government reportedly planning to buy disputed islands from their private owners.

The popular analysis is that the rising tensions are fueled by a regional power shift that has seen China become increasingly assertive with its neighbors in securing claims over potentially resource-rich waters to its south and east. But the growing acrimony may have at least as much to do with domestic political posturing.

“Wrapping yourself up in the national flag gives a very convenient exit for people with other agendas to justify their positions,” said political scientist Koichi Nakano of Tokyo’s Sophia University.

Nationalism has often been used by China’s communist leaders to cover up domestic problems — such as the economic slowdown the country is now facing, not to mention problems with a growing rich-poor divide and official corruption.

The same could be said, to an extent, in Japan and South Korea, where some politicians seem to be using the island disputes to further their agendas ahead of elections or to divert attention from thornier topics.

Few believe the diverse Asian actors in this rapidly developing drama will actually come to blows, but manipulation of popular opinion among island disputants like China, South Korea and the Philippines is raising the chances of violence by either accident or miscalculation. Such an outcome would seriously threaten the fragile tranquility that has helped catapult tens of millions of Asians from poverty to prosperity.

The disputed islands were on the agenda this week as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton traveled across the region.

Meeting Monday with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, she urged members of the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations to present a united front to China in dealing with territorial disputes in the South China Sea. She also discussed the issue with Chinese leaders during meetings in Beijing this week.

Preferred access to potentially lucrative oil and gas reserves and rich fishing grounds is helping to drive the disputes, along with an increasingly prosperous and militarily strong China that is beginning to challenge America’s historic supremacy as a Pacific power.

“There is a big power shift in this region and that is encouraging the parties involved to make their case in order not to lose their ground,” said security specialist Narushige Michishita of Japan’s National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.

But the nationalist card is also front and center as governments jockey for position.

“Nationalism is playing a very large role in all of these disputes,” said international relations specialist George Tsai of Taipei’s Chinese Culture University. “Whether it’s China, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines or Korea, all these countries are appealing to nationalist sentiments.”

Right-wing politicians in Japan are using the issue to drum up nationalist support, and even mainstream politicians within the ruling party seem willing to let the issue grab headlines from issues like a tax hike and energy policy reforms that are being demanded after last year’s nuclear disaster, Nakano said.

Similar motives can be seen in outgoing South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to an island claimed by Seoul and Tokyo as he seeks to boost his legacy on what could become a key issue in his party’s bid to maintain power in what will be a toughly fought election.

Last month lame duck Lee became the first Korean president to set foot on Dokdo island, which is called Takeshima by Japan. Korea and Japan have a bitter history — marked by decades of harsh Japanese colonial rule on the Korean Peninsula. Thumbing one’s nose at Tokyo has long had substantial cachet for millions of Koreans.

“I’m skeptical that this has anything to do with international relations,” Nakano said. “It has more to do with domestic politics because internationally it doesn’t make any sense.”

In the Philippines, President Benigno Aquino III has been much more outspoken than predecessor Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on the need to defend the country’s territorial claims, and has publicly appealed to the U.S. for help with China’s challenge to disputed areas in the South China Sea.

Aquino wants international arbitrators to resolve the issues, a stance that has nettled China, which insists the best way of settling differences with Asian neighbors is through bilateral talks.

China has also been at loggerheads with Vietnam, particularly after Beijing’s formal creation of a municipality headquartered on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands, long a bone of contention between the two nations. China and Vietnam have a millennia-long history of fear and loathing, and China’s establishment of a Paracels prefecture prompted anti-China demonstrations in Hanoi, where authorities are normally quick to squelch popular manifestations of anger.

Vietnam has also sparred with Taiwan over the South China Sea’s Spratly Islands, claimed by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia. On Tuesday, the Taiwanese Coast Guard held a live fire exercise on Taiping Island in the Spratly chain, partly in response to the Vietnamese occupation of other Spratly locations. Taiwanese legislators rushed to attend the exercises.

Just north of Taiwan, China and Japan remain immersed in their long-running battle over what the Japanese call the Senkaku Islands and the Chinese call Diaoyutai. Located roughly equidistant from Chinese and Japanese territory, the Japanese-controlled islands surged to prominence earlier this year when Shintaro Ishihara, Tokyo’s strongly nationalistic governor, proposed purchasing and developing them. Japan’s central government stepped in, and on Wednesday Japanese media reported it had agreed to buy several islands from their private Japanese owners — a move that Japanese experts say is an attempt to sideline Ishihara and his nationalistic agenda.

Thousands took to the streets in Chinese cities last month to protest Japan’s claims, with demonstrators burning flags and vandalizing Japanese restaurants and cars.

Japan’s Deputy Prime Minister Katsuya Okada maintained Thursday that the flare-up had not hurt official relations between the countries and emotions on both sides were being fanned by activists.

 In this Sept. 4, 2012 file photo, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, left, speaks with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono during a bilateral meeting at the Presidential Palace in Jakarta, Indonesia. The disputed ownership of islands located in Asia were on the agenda this week as Clinton traveled across the region. Meeting with Yudhoyono, she urged members of the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations to present a united front to China in dealing with territorial disputes in the South China Sea. (AP Photo/Jim Watson, Pool)

 In this Aug. 15, 2012 file photo activists holding Chinese and Taiwanese flags are arrested by Japanese police officers after landing on Uotsuri Island, one of the islands of Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese, in the East China Sea. The disputed ownership of a tiny constellation of islands in Asia is inflaming nationalist fervor from the cold North Pacific to the tropical South China Sea. In recent weeks, these long-simmering tensions have returned to a boil, with violent protests in Chinese cities, a provocative island junket by South Korea's lame-duck president, and Japan's government reportedly planning to buy disputed islands from their private owners. (AP Photo/Yomiuri Shimbun, Masataka Morita)

In this Aug. 19, 2012 file photo, Japanese activists hold national flags on Uotsuri island, one of the islands of Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese, in the East China Sea. The disputed ownership of a tiny constellations of islands in Asia is inflaming nationalist fervor from the cold North Pacific to the tropical South China Sea. In recent weeks, these long-simmering tensions have returned to a boil, with violent protests in Chinese cities, a provocative island junket by South Korea's lame-duck president, and Japan's government reportedly planning to buy disputed islands from their private owners. (AP Photo/Kyodo News, File)

 In this Aug. 10, 2012 file photo South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, center, looks at a national flag upon his arrival at islands called Dokdo in Korea and Takeshima in Japan. The disputed ownership of these islands as well as others in the region is inflaming nationalist fervor from the cold North Pacific to the tropical South China Sea. In recent weeks, these long-simmering tensions have returned to a boil, with violent protests in Chinese cities, a provocative island junket by South Korea's lame-duck president, and Japan's government reportedly planning to buy disputed islands from their private owners. (AP Photo/Korea Pool, File)

In this Aug. 19, 2012 file photo protesters wave Chinese national flags while marching against Japan's claim to islands which are also claimed by China, in Chengdu, in southwestern China's Sichuan province. The disputed ownership of these tiny constellations of islands is inflaming nationalist fervor from the cold North Pacific to the tropical South China Sea. In recent weeks, these long-simmering tensions have returned to a boil, with violent protests in Chinese cities, a provocative island junket by South Korea's lame-duck president, and Japan's government reportedly planning to buy disputed islands from their private owners. (AP Photo/File)

Associated Press

South China Sea Dispute: Clinton Visit Brings U.S. Neutrality Doubts

BEIJING — U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton sat down Wednesday with Chinese President Hu Jintao to press Beijing to agree to peacefully resolve territorial disputes with its smaller neighbors over the South China Sea. But as she began her meetings here, China questioned the stated neutrality of the United States.

At the start of the talks with Hu, Clinton said the U.S.-China relationship is strong. "We are able to explore areas of agreement and disagreement in a very open manner, which I think demonstrates the maturity of the relationship and the chance to take it further in the future," she said.

There was no immediate comment on the talks, but a scheduled meeting with Vice President Xi Jinping for later Wednesday morning had been canceled by China "for unexpected scheduling reasons," said a senior State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Xi, who takes over as China's top leader later this year, also had a meeting canceled with the visiting prime minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong. No reasons for the cancellations have been given.

Clinton met late Tuesday with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi after arriving in China from Indonesia, where she urged Southeast Asian nations to present a unified front in dealing with China in attempts to ease rising tensions in the South China Sea.

The U.S. wants China and the other claimants to adopt a binding code of conduct for the region, along with a process to resolve maritime disputes without coercion, intimidation or the use of force. Clinton wants the Chinese to drop their insistence on settling conflicting claims with individual nations and instead embrace a multilateral mechanism that will give the smaller members of the Association of South East Asian Nations greater clout in negotiations.

She urged all parties to make "meaningful progress" by a November summit of East Asian leaders that President Barack Obama plans to attend in Cambodia.

In Jakarta, Indonesia's capital, Clinton offered strong U.S. support for a regionally endorsed plan to ease rising tensions by implementing the code of conduct. Jakarta is the headquarters of ASEAN, and Clinton pressed the group to insist that China agree to deal with them as a bloc.

The stance puts the U.S. squarely at odds with China, which has become more aggressive in pressing its territorial claims with its smaller neighbors and wants the disputes to be resolved with each country, giving it greater leverage.

Clinton made her case in Jakarta on Tuesday in meetings with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and ASEAN secretary general Surin Pitsuwan. Indonesia has played a leading role in putting the six-point plan together after ASEAN was unable to reach consensus on the matter in July.

Clinton said the U.S. is "encouraged" by the plan but wants it acted on – particularly implementation and enforcement of the code of conduct, which has languished since a preliminary framework for it was first agreed upon in 2002.

"The United States does not take a position on competing territorial claims ... but we believe the nations of the region should work collaboratively to resolve disputes without coercion, without intimidation and certainly without the use of force," Clinton told reporters at a news conference with Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa.

Yet China on Tuesday expressed skepticism that the U.S. is neutral in the disputes.

"The U.S. has many times said it does not take a position," Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei said Tuesday. "I hope they will keep their promise and do more to help stability and not the opposite. The South China Sea dispute is a complicated thing. To China, the South China Sea dispute is about the sovereignty of some of the islands there. China, like other countries in the world, has the obligation to safeguard its territories."

For the second day in a row Clinton was criticized Wednesday in editorials in Chinese newspapers. The Global Times said the United States was behind the disputes in the South China Sea and accused Clinton of seeking "unilateral compromise by China."

It said "China should not let the U.S. have any doubt or other misjudgments regarding its determination."

China and a host of Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei, have overlapping claims to several small, but potentially energy-rich areas of the South China Sea.

In July, China angered the United States, as well as Vietnam and the Philippines, by creating a city and military garrison on a remote island 220 miles (350 kilometers) from its southernmost province intended to administer hundreds of thousands of square miles of water where China wants to strengthen its control over disputed islands. China, which also has disputes with Japan in the East China Sea, rejected the criticism.

In addition to the South China Sea, Clinton will be discussing the situation in Syria as well as the efforts to deal with Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs while she is in the Chinese capital.

Clinton is in China at the midpoint of an 11-day, six-nation tour of the Asia-Pacific region that started in the Cook Islands and Indonesia. After she leaves China, she will visit East Timor and Brunei before heading to Russia's Far East to represent the United States at the annual meeting of leaders from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Vladivostock.

Huffington Post

South Korea’s Irresponsible Diplomacy With Japan

The Olympics is a time to lay aside political grievances and honor sportsmanship. Yet, when midfielder Park Jong-Woo displayed a sign reading “Dokdo is our land” after South Korea’s victory over Japan in the bronze medal soccer match, he gained the dishonorable distinction of being the only athlete at this Olympics to break this cherished tradition (and Olympic rules forbidding athletes from making political statements). He was subsequently barred from the medal ceremony.

The soccer match itself encapsulates Seoul’s recent approach with Tokyo. It was a fast-paced game in which, according to NBC announcers, South Korea came out extraordinarily aggressive, garnering three yellow cards in the first half. Soon thereafter South Korean President Lee Myung-bak earned himself a diplomatic yellow card by taking the unprecedented step of visiting islands controlled by Seoul but claimed by Tokyo (Dokdo in Korean, Takeshima in Japanese) and issued a number of demands on Japan. This has arguably brought bilateral ties to their worst nadir since Japan’s Junichiro Koizumi administration, and while subsequent Japanese governments worked to repair relations in that case, do not expect this from Tokyo this time around. Lee’s diplomacy was irresponsible and the consequences will be long lasting.

On August 10, Lee became the first South Korean president to visit the disputed islands. While it demonstrated Seoul’s continued control over the islands, it was an overreaction to simmering strains. Japan’s latest Defense White Paper included its claim to the islands. This was nothing new, as Japan has made this claim numerous times, but it brought the territorial dispute back as the central bilateral issue. Seoul escalated the situation by announcing it would stage regular military exercises near the islands. At this critical juncture, instead of finding a way to de-escalate tensions, Lee visited the islands. The visit poured fuel on the already volatile situation, igniting a diplomatic firestorm. Lee defended his actions by telling the press that it was intended to push Tokyo to settle colonial-era grievances, which he claimed Japan has repeatedly failed to resolve. He subsequently demanded a “heartfelt” apology from Emperor Akihito for Japan’s colonial occupation and said that Tokyo should sincerely apologize for its role in recruiting comfort women. Tokyo has taken umbrage to all of these.

This is not because Tokyo refuses to acknowledge its history, but because it has already done these things. The often unrecognized fact is that Japanese government and society have made concerted efforts to understand, reconcile, and apologize for Japan’s wartime aggression. This includes teaching about Japan’s imperial expansion and aggression (i.e. Nanjing, comfort women, forced labor) in textbooks that, according to a recent Stanford study by Daniel Sneider and Shin Gi-Wook, presents an unpatriotic account of Japan’s role (i.e. not inculcating patriotism or glorifying the war). It also includes the establishment of the quasi-public Asian Women’s Fund to compensate comfort women, which dispersed a handwritten apology by the sitting premier to those receiving compensation.

Importantly, since the 1990s, there has been a flurry of apologies for Japan’s wartime aggression. This includes the 1995 Murayama Statement, which stands as Japan’s official apology. It was preceded and followed by dozens of other apologies and statements of remorse by premiers and the current Emperor. The list is large and includes statements issued directly to South Korea, such as when premiers Toshiki Kaifu and Kiichi Miyazawa apologized to President Roh Tae-Woo in May 1990 and January 1992, respectively, for Japan’s actions against the Korean people, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s comfort women apology in June 1996 to President Kim Young-Sam, and Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s December 2010 apology for the colonization of Korea, which included the return of some 1,200 volumes of Korean royal documents looted during Japan’s annexation. 

Despite this, the actions of individual Japanese politicians that counter these official efforts receive the majority of attention. This includes statements that contradict official apologies or politicians visiting Yasukuni Shrine, where 2.5 million war dead are honored, including 14 Class-A war criminals enshrined in 1978.  Although these actions represent the personal views of a minority, they are often treated as representation of the dominant sentiment in Japan. In turn, they negate any positive forward-momentum gained by official government efforts.

These are markedly different, however, from statements made by a head of state like Lee, which have a claim of authority. Yet, in this case, Lee’s demands demonstrate a paucity of knowledge or an unwillingness to acknowledge Tokyo’s previous efforts. Or worse, they appear purely political. Lee’s popularity is lagging due to corruption scandals implicating his brother and close aides and his administration’s attempt to sign an information sharing agreement with Tokyo. Although constitutionally prohibited from running for re-election, Lee may be attempting to raise his party’s popularity before December’s election. At the very least, Lee’s actions tap into the country’s national pride.

Yet, from a diplomatic perspective, Lee’s behavior lacks logic as it unnecessarily escalates tensions. Although Lee’s visit was meant to press Japan to settle historical issues, it is unclear how provoking Tokyo will do this. Instead, it strains bilateral ties as continued calls for apologies produce a backlash in Japan, strengthening the hand of those who oppose conciliatory approaches. Tokyo summoned Seoul’s Ambassador to Japan to protest Lee’s visit and temporarily recalled its own Ambassador to South Korea.

Worse, Seoul and Tokyo face shared threats: the modernization of China’s military, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and the strengthening of Russia’s Far Eastern presence. As allies of the U.S., they are also responsible for helping ensure Washington’s rebalance to the region has substance. Lee’s move widens the gap between Tokyo and Seoul at a crucial time they should be finding ways to cooperate.    

The long-term consequences have the potential to be severe because Lee’s actions have put Tokyo in a position where it can no longer show flexibility with Seoul. Already Japan is considering how to internationalize the territorial issue, including bringing the case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It has not entertained this idea since 1962 out of consideration of bilateral ties. While a case cannot be heard unless all parties agree, it nevertheless has the potential of playing into Tokyo’s hand if Seoul refuses to engage, thereby “ceding the floor” to Japan on the international stage. Worse, bilateral ties could rapidly devolve. Tokyo is considering suspending all summits with Seoul, including an expected meeting on APEC’s sidelines this month and an expected visit to South Korea by Japan’s premier. The worst outcome is the possibility that China or North Korea may take advantage of the dissonance to leverage gains elsewhere. Japanese and North Korean Red Cross organizations met in August for the first time since 2002, where they discussed the repatriation of Japanese remains left behind after Japan’s occupation of the Peninsula. With their discussions concluding government involvement as necessary, both governmentsheld a meeting for the first time in four years based on the principle of settling historical issues and restoring normal relations. They also plan to hold another one in the near future. Given that 2002 Red Cross Organizations’ discussions on Japanese abductees helped assist other efforts that led to the surprise September 2002 Pyongyang Declaration, it is possible Pyongyang could strike a separate diplomatic agreement with Tokyo on important issues like normalization.   

In the past, calls for Japan to face up its past resonated because, apart from reparations, the government was largely silent on acknowledging its past role. Not so today. As noted above, Japanese government and society have made numerous efforts to acknowledge and atone for past wrongdoings. A 1998 joint declaration with South Korea even articulated President Kim Dae-Jung’s acceptance of Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s apology and expressed a need to overcome history and build a “future-oriented” relationship. When ambiguous demands like Lee’s recent ones for Japan to “face its past” or “sincerely apologize” are thrown at Tokyo now, it appears nothing more than a populist attempt to play the history card for purely political purposes.

Like the bronze medal soccer match, Seoul’s recent diplomatic behavior has been aggressive and demands a yellow card. While Lee’s Dokdo visit may have scored political points, the resulting bilateral damage demonstrates irresponsibility. Additionally, ambiguous calls for apologies or settling historical grievances need to be better articulated if Seoul hopes to achieve any positive effect. Although there is no agreement in South Korea on what constitutes an acceptable apology, Seoul should clarify how the Murayama Statement and the Asian Women’s Fund, and all other apologies, are wholly insufficient efforts by Japan to face its past. Maybe Seoul could explain why Tokyo’s word choice for apology (詫びる: wabiru) is linguistically inferior. Or, if South Korea is certain in its Dokdo claim, it should up the ante on Japan to take the dispute to the ICJ. In short, Seoul needs to proactively articulate what it wants instead of taking provocative actions and issuing ambiguous demands. Until it does so, actions like those recently taken by Seoul will only empower those within Japan who are tired of the history card being played for political purposes.

Jeffrey W. Hornung is an Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI and an Adjunct Fellow  with the Office of the Japan Chair at the Center for  Strategic and International  Studies in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are solely his.