Cooler Heads in the South China Sea

The United States is realizing that the escalating tensions in the Far East, especially between China and Japan, should no longer be viewed as an opportunity to contain China. Instead, our first priority should be to get everyone to calm down.

At issue are the territorial rights over some forty piles of rock, most uninhabited, some barely sticking out of the water. These conflicts already have led to large nationalist anti-Japanese demonstrations in China and similar anti-Chinese demonstrations in Japan; saber-rattling activists planting their nation’s flag on some of the islands; and clashes between vessels of several regional nations—all fueled by increasingly hot rhetoric by public leaders. These smaller clashes look increasingly like the type of incidents that can spin out of control and lead to more serious conflagrations.

The United States, which keeps veering between seeking to engage China and moves to “contain” it, had at first—at least indirectly—urged the nations of the area to band together and push back against Chinese claims to many of the islands at issue. However, most recently Secretary Panetta called on China and Japan “to move forward and not have this dispute get out of hand” and emphasized that all parties share a responsibility to resolve the conflicts peacefully. And—the ever industrious U.S. think tanks have taken off their shelves a whole host of proposals that could defuse the crisis.

Disputes over maritime territorial rights fall under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and should be settled in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). (The fact that the United States did not ratify the treaty involved seems immaterial because Washington typically operates as if it were committed to UNCLOS.) But such settlements take years.

In the short term, the think tankers are calling on China and Japan to establish a hotline so that their leaders will be better able to nip in the bud any unintended confrontations. Moreover, both nations are urged to declare unequivocally that “military force is not an option.” A more ambitious plan calls for a return to a derailed 2010 agreement for the joint development of gas fields in the South China Sea. The Economist suggests that the nations involved should do the environment a favor and turn the islands and surrounding seas into marine protected areas to combat overfishing, a problem that seriously threatens the economies and ecology of the region.

Douglas H. Paal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace points out that to combat overfishing, China, Vietnam and Taiwan have already “initiated fishing seasons, periodic bans, and limits on sizes of catches to support sustainable harvesting, but these are not harmonized and often conflict.” Hence Paal calls “greater control of the fishing fleets, with effective sanctions on misbehavior under rules agreed upon in common, [an] achievable and responsible goal.”

One must acknowledge that islands are not fought over simply as real estate but because they serve as markers for determining maritime rights. According to a widely followed reading of international law, a nation’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extends two hundred miles off its shores. Thus, if nations can populate and prove ownership over tiny islands in their near seas, they can expand their EEZ and gain access to the surrounding natural resources—not only fish but also coveted fuels and minerals that lie beneath the seabed. Hence, for nations such as China and Japan, whose economies are highly dependent on the secure access to and development of such resources, these islands are much more than “piles of rocks.”

In Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, Mark Valencia, Jon Van Dyke and Noel Ludwig suggest establishing “regional sovereignty” over the islands in the South China Sea among the six claimants, allowing them to collectively manage the islands, territorial seas and airspace. Of course, this would require an agreement among the parties as how to share the spoils.

Another option, put forward by Peter Dutton of the Naval War College, would emulate the resolution of the dispute over Svalbard, an island located between Norway and Greenland. The Treaty of Spitsbergen, signed in 1920, awarded primary sovereignty over Svarlbard to Norway but assigned resource-related rights to all signatories. Applying this model to the South and East China Seas likely would entail giving sovereignty to China while permitting other countries to benefit from the resources. Though, at least in the near term, such a solution is unlikely to be accepted by the other claimants.

Still others have suggested declaring a moratorium on any exploration until the tensions are defused and conflicts are worked out. And a troika of foreign ministers in the region, including nations not directly involved such as Indonesia and Australia, has been urged to help work out an evenhanded solution.

Those who hold that all these suggestions are naive should note that such settlements do take place. One case will have to stand for several others. In 2009, five years after the decades-old dispute was brought to court, the ICJ settled a dispute between Ukraine and Romania over the Black Sea, whose seabed holds an estimated ten million tons of oil. One key issue was whether the Serpent Island would be considered a cliff or an island. The Romanians claimed it was “a cliff” (hence irrelevant to territorial demarcation) while Ukraine held it was “an island” and thus that Ukraine’s maritime boundaries extended beyond Serpent Island’s shores. The ICJ ruled it a cliff and delivered a judgment that granted Romania about 80 percent of the disputed area (though the oil was more concentrated on the Ukrainian side). Both sides accepted the decision.

If cooler heads prevail and Washington continues to throw its weight in support of tensions reduction and conflict resolution by negotiation, some of these proposals or others like them may carry the day. All sides surely realize—given the fragile state of the global economy, the political transition in China, the rise of nationalism that threatens to spin out of control—that this is a particularly poor time to escalate tensions.

Resource allocation is a contentious issue, but raw materials have a virtue: they can be divided. Disputes over such assets do not have to be settled in a winner-takes-all fashion, allowing all the nations involved to gain some of the spoils and save face. In contrast, if the clashes spin out of control, the disputants and the bystanders will all be losers.

Amitai Etzioni 

China Mends Fences in Sea Dispute

It appears to be showing flexibility in efforts to devise a code of conduct for South China Sea claimants.

RFA

China’s territorial claim to the South China Sea includes two disputed island chains.

As Beijing flexes its muscles over its territorial dispute with Japan in the East China Sea, it is mending fences with Southeast Asian nations after a spate of tensions in the contested South China Sea.

Following much prodding and diplomacy, China appears to be showing some flexibility in its approach towards drawing up a code of conduct with the Southeast Asian nations aimed at avoiding clashes over competing territorial claims in the vast sea, diplomats in the region told RFA.

Although they are skeptical of any early breakthrough for a legally binding document between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to guide behavior in the sea, there is optimism that negotiations will occur on a sustained basis.

“We see some flexibility to discuss the COC with ASEAN,” one Southeast Asian diplomat said, referring to the elusive Code of Conduct or COC which ASEAN—comprising Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam—has been striving to devise with Beijing for a decade.

In an initial display of seriousness that it is prepared to come to the table, China sent its senior officials to Cambodia last week to informally discuss with their counterparts from ASEAN the prospects for drawing up a code, officials said.

This is the first meeting between the two sides specifically on the maritime dispute since ASEAN plunged into a crisis two months ago when foreign ministers of the 10-member bloc failed to issue their customary joint statement at the conclusion of their annual meeting hosted by Cambodia, China’s top ally in Southeast Asia.

Some ASEAN diplomats had charged that Cambodia had been influenced by China not to incorporate in the statement the views of ASEAN member states the Philippines and Vietnam, which had tiffs earlier this year with Beijing over islands and reefs in the South China Sea, causing an impasse at the meeting.

The ASEAN-China Senior Officials’ Informal Consultations on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, as last week’s meeting in Phnom Penh was officially called, was among a series of discussions in preparation for the ASEAN summit and the East Asia Summit in November.

“Compared to two months ago, when there was complete reluctance to come to the table, China appears willing to sit down and talk,” said one Southeast Asian official, who was briefed on the talks but spoke on condition of anonymity.

“Indirectly, they may be feeling the heat from the mounting criticism over what happened at the meeting in July which was a big blow to ASEAN,” the official said.

“But China has also asked the ASEAN states to do their part by reducing tensions and not conducting border incursions and creating a conducive environment for any future talks. They don’t want us to bring in third parties [the United States] over the conflict and want us to stick to the 2002 declaration,” the diplomat said.

Under a 2002 agreement for managing their overlapping territorial claims, ASEAN and China adopted a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, called DOC as a first step towards a binding code of conduct.

But in a reflection of the sensitivity over the issue, it was only last year—after 10 years—that they agreed on a set of guidelines to implement the declaration that was aimed at laying the groundwork for discussions on the regional code of conduct.

Ray of hope

The new ray of hope for achieving a COC comes after extensive diplomacy, including U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s trip to Southeast Asia and China, with a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao.

Chinese leaders told Clinton—who has often emphasized that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is a U.S. “national interest”—that they want to pursue the COC, U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke told a forum in Washington last week, saying the talks between the two sides were “very good.”

“I’ve also heard from many prominent Chinese academics that China would like somehow to return to the status quo, that they would like to lower the temperature,” Locke said.

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Yechi had also visited Indonesia as well as Malaysia and Brunei, giving reassurances that diplomacy was still on track.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, embarrassed by the failure by his country as 2012 ASEAN chairman to forge an agreement on the foreign ministers’ joint statement, also made a trip to China this month, meeting Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.

Hun Sen won assurances from Wen that Beijing will “closely work” to make the upcoming East Asia Summit which Cambodia will host a success,” Chinese media reported.

Southeast Asian diplomats said a key objective is to get an initial ASEAN-China accord on the COC before the November East Asia Summit, to be attended by leaders of ASEAN as well as China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, Russia and the United States.

Key elements of the COC have been agreed upon by ASEAN member states whose foreign ministers will meet to consider a full draft document on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York this coming week, the diplomats said.

“We are now in the process of spelling out the draft [of the code] and we hope to be able to share it with my ASEAN foreign minister colleagues when I meet them in New York,” Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said, according to the Jakarta Globe newspaper.

“The development of the South China Sea [issues] reminds us how we desperately need the code of conduct, [so] I’m trying to use the momentum,” Marty said, as Indonesia asserts a leadership role in ASEAN to deal with the South China Sea issue, Asia’s biggest potential military flashpoint.

Cambodia or Thailand, which is the ASEAN coordinator for China issues, could host another round of informal talks between senior officials from ASEAN and China on the COC before the East Asia Summit.

“Both sides might also issue a joint statement to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the DOC at Summit,” an official involved in the planning of the summit told RFA, referring to the declaration adopted in 2002 in Cambodia to set the stage for the regional code of conduct.

Beijing has maintained all this while that it wants to resolve the South China Sea territorial conflicts on a bilateral basis with ASEAN members Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, which have competing claims with China.

China claims sovereignty over nearly all of the resource-rich South China Sea, which is also home to important shipping lanes. It is also locked in a territorial tussle with Japan over disputed islands in the East China Sea.

Bloc

Southeast Asian officials say ASEAN would negotiate the COC with China as a bloc but not in the specific delineation or settlement of the claims between the claimant states.

ASEAN’s role “is not to deal with the claims themselves but in the broader setting up of the framework which would allow for a peaceful resolution of these claims,” Singapore Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam said, according to the island state’s media.

Beijing has stressed that ASEAN should have no role in negotiating on behalf of the four members who were claimant states.

“For China, the COC is only a tool to promote mutual trust over the South China Sea and not to resolve disputes. They stressed this again at the Phnom Penh meeting last week,” a Southeast Asian diplomat said.

Still, as the COC is being drafted, China has to grapple with various basic questions—which it has brushed off previously—over its claim to the South China Sea.

While officials have to first pin down the South China Sea area to be governed by the code, there is much uncertainty over the territory China claims—represented by the nine-dashed, U-shaped line encircling most of the sea on Chinese official maps.

The location of those dashes has never been pinpointed as China has not supplied the coordinates for them. The nature of the Chinese claim has also not been clearly defined.

In addition, there is the question of the Paracel islands’ inclusion in the code’s area of application. Vietnam still maintains its claim to the islands although China seized them from its fellow communist neighbor in 1974.

Uncertainty

Former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino said the uncertainty over where a “binding code of conduct” would apply was one of the factors cited for downgrading the 2002 ASEAN-China agreement from a legal code to a political declaration.

“Is the uncertainty of its area of application still a factor in and an obstacle to its adoption,” he asked.

“If these [outstanding] issues were fudged in the proposed document, as seems most likely to be the case at this time, how would the problem be overcome? What would the formulation be?”

Severino said one fundamental reason why the problems arising from the conflicting claims in the South China Sea are so difficult and intractable is not only the size and strategic location of that body of water but also that all the claimants feel that their footholds in the sea are essential to what they consider as their national interests.

“Therefore, the disputes in the South China Sea cannot be resolved any time soon, if at all. The most that can be done is to prevent those disputes from developing into armed conflict. This could be the overarching aim of any code of conduct that ASEAN and China might produce.”

Parameswaran Ponnudurai

War By Other Means: China’s Political Uses of Seapower

China’s development and use of naval and non-naval, non-military sea power has become a cause for concern – one that could alter the regional balance.

China’s recent assertiveness in the South China Seas is a harbinger of things to come.  Beijing’s seapower project and the enormous resources it has enjoyed have opened up new strategic vistas for Chinese leaders and military commanders.  With larger and more capable seagoing forces at its disposal, Beijing is well positioned to fashion sophisticated strategies that will be more effective and equally difficult to counter.  While such strategies do not—yet—portend the fundamental reordering of maritime Southeast Asia, they will likely yield incremental dividends that advance China’s larger aims at sea.

Comprehensive Chinese Seapower

China’s naval and maritime buildup is providing Beijing with the wherewithal to pursue its ambitions.  The rate and scale of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) modernization process have defied many predictions in the West, reversing sanguine and even condescending conclusions about China’s aptitude at sea.  But, seapower is more than just the navy.  Rather, it is a continuum that gives Beijing a range of options.  Non-naval and non-military platforms and systems account for a significant portion of Chinese seapower.

Long-range, precision-strike weaponry deployed on the mainland can influence events, perhaps decisively, at sea.  The anti-ship ballistic missile—a maneuverable ballistic missile capable of hitting moving targets at sea—is just one member of a large family of missiles in China’s arsenal that could perform maritime-strike missions.  Indeed, the PLA boasts large numbers of shore-based fighters, bombers, and cruise missile units that can launch salvos of anti-ship missiles.

The growth of China’s maritime surveillance and law-enforcement services has been equally impressive.  The civilian arm of Chinese seapower has enabled Beijing to dispatch nonmilitary ships to confront the Philippines in the South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea.  Even civilian vessels could form maritime militias to serve China’s nautical aims.  In short, Beijing possesses diverse elements of seapower to defend its prerogatives in the nautical domain.

Political Uses of Military and Non-Military Forces

Beijing’s burgeoning seapower has positioned it to employ strategies that involve the political uses of military and non-military implements of seapower against weaker opponents in the South China Sea.  These strategies deftly combine warfighting capabilities with calibrated shows of force.  They enhance China’s leverage in protracted politico-military struggles by chipping away at the will of the opponent.

In the event of peacetime maritime crises between China and relatively weak Southeast Asian powers, innovative combinations of PLA forces could be used to compel the will of Beijing’s southern neighbors.  Consider the aforementioned anti-ship ballistic missile.  If it performs as advertised, the missile would help compensate for current shortcomings in China’s maritime inventory.  The reach of such shore fire support over the entire South China Sea would ease the burdens on the Chinese fleet while applying constant pressure on challengers to Beijing’s interests in peacetime.

Under the protective umbrella of anti-ship ballistic missiles, even lesser warships would be ideal for intimating weaker parties.  For example, small flotillas of missile-armed fast-attack craft operating in the Spratlys under missile cover could hold most Southeast Asian surface fleets at bay.  Occasional sorties of such units would signal Chinese resolve, compelling opponents to back down or acquiesce to Beijing’s wishes.  This type of gunboat diplomacy with Chinese characteristics is conceivable in future crises.

China’s ability to exercise the non-military elements of its seapower was on full display at Scarborough Shoal this past spring.  The standoff with the Philippines involved coast-guard-like noncombat vessels under the control of China Marine Surveillance (CMS), an agency entrusted with protecting Beijing’s exclusive economic zones.  In an unprecedented demonstration of resolve, CMS vessels entered Japanese territorial waters near the Senkakus following Tokyo’s decision to nationalize the disputed islands in September 2012.

Employing non-navy assets in clashes over territory reveals a sophisticated, methodical strategy for securing China’s maritime claims.  The use of non-military means eschews escalation while ensuring that disputes remain localized.  Specifically, it deprives the United States and other outside powers the rationales to step in on behalf of embattled capitals in the region.

At the same time, noncombat ships empower Beijing to exert low-grade but unremitting pressure on rival claimants to South China Sea islands and waters. Constant patrols can probe weaknesses in coastal states’ maritime-surveillance capacity while testing their political resolve. Keeping disputes at a low simmer, moreover, grants China the diplomatic initiative to turn up or down the heat as strategic circumstances warrant.

And if all else fails, Beijing can still employ its navy and shore-based assets as a backstop to the civilian agencies. That China—unlike its weaker rivals—has the option of climbing the escalation ladder only amplifies the intimidation factor in places like Scarborough Shoal or the Spratly Islands. As noted above, the mere possibility of naval coercion may induce an opponent to back down in a crisis.  Indeed, the larger the naval balance tilts in China’s favor, the more likely it becomes that a long shadow casts over Southeast Asian capitals as they contemplate their options.

Innocuous in themselves, peacetime patrols carry significant weight when backed by real firepower.  The interplay between Chinese military and non-military forces thus augments Beijing’s strategic leverage.

A Strategy of Exhaustion at Sea?

Sporadic acts of coercion and intimidation may not produce outcomes as visible or decisive as a battlefield victory.  A series of showdowns may pass without an end in sight or any tangible gain for China.  But, the cumulative effects of a continuing stalemate could induce strategic fatigue that in turn advances China’s aims.  Short of a shooting war, Chinese provocations are too slight for the United States to intervene militarily.  Staying below the escalation threshold adds maneuver room to test U.S. steadfastness while solidifying its own claims.

As China pushes and probes, regional expectations that Washington should do something would inevitably mount even as weaker nations look for signs of wavering U.S. resolve.  The prospects of recurring confrontations with little hope of direct U.S. intervention could weigh heavily on Southeast Asian capitals.  Applied with patience and discipline, such a strategy of exhaustion could gradually erode regional confidence and undermine the political will to resist.

But this attritional approach is only a snapshot of Chinese seapower today.  It is possible that Beijing’s application of graduated pressure is merely a stopgap measure, buying China time to build up the capacity to dictate events at sea.  Recent trends suggest that both the military and non-military services will continue to bulk up on a steady diet of new hardware and manpower.

Twenty years of virtually uninterrupted double-digit hikes in the defense budget have afforded China the resources to develop options beyond those dedicated to a Taiwan contingency, an all-consuming preoccupation until recently.  Analysts have detected military buildups in staging areas assigned to the Southeast Asian theater of operations.  Beijing also appears to be pushing naval construction along multiple axes simultaneously, laying down hulls for warships of every type.

Similarly, the maritime-enforcement services are recruiting new manpower while taking delivery of decommissioned naval vessels. Furthermore, Chinese shipyards are turning out state-of-the-art cutters like sausages. Many are capable of sustained patrols in the farthest reaches of the China seas, assuring that Beijing can maintain a visible presence in waters where it asserts sovereign jurisdiction. Indeed, Haijian 84, one of China’s most modern law-enforcement vessels, occupied the epicenter of the Scarborough Shoal imbroglio.

To be sure, China still lacks adequate military means to make the South China Sea a Chinese lake. Sea control that more or less permanently excludes rival navies from these waters remains beyond its reach, if indeed that is the goal.

Nevertheless, even a modest increase in Chinese seapower could perceptibly tip the regional balance of power in Beijing’s favor in peacetime contingencies not involving the U.S. Navy.  Some local players, notably Vietnam, have embarked on naval modernization programs, but they are unlikely to keep pace with China.  Over time, left unopposed by powerful outsiders such as the United States, Japan, or Australia, even small-scale shows of Chinese maritime power over Southeast Asian fleets might start to win grudging acquiescence to Beijing’s foreign policy preferences.  Such consent, however reluctant, would deliver a severe blow to the foundations of regional order.

Implications for the U.S. “Rebalancing” to Asia

The foregoing analysis underscores the predicament of many Southeast Asian states if they faced China on their own.  Not surprisingly, many regional capitals look to the United States as a bulwark against Chinese advances.  They recognize that American primacy in maritime Asia will be the crucial arbiter of Chinese ambitions.  Washington, for its part, has delivered very public pronouncements about its own stake in Asian waters.  The Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia sought to reassure audiences in the region that the United States will not abdicate the stabilizing role it has long played.

Fortunately, there is still time to maximize this convergence of interests and organize an effective response.  China is at least a decade away from amassing the type of preponderant seapower that can keep the United States out of the South China Sea while running roughshod over Southeast Asian states.  In the meantime, Washington can adopt measures to ensure that regional submission to China’s wishes is not a foregone conclusion.

First, Washington and its allies should actively help Southeast Asian states help themselves. Local actors must possess some indigenous capability to cope with Chinese encroachments at sea.  The U.S. transfer of 1960s’ vintage coast guard cutters to the Philippines is a modest step in the right direction.  The timing of the deliveries turned out to be fortuitous: the first Philippine vessel to respond off Scarborough Shoal was flagship BRP Gregorio del Pilar, the former USCGC Hamilton. But, hand-me-downs are not enough to meet Manila’s needs.  More modern and capable platforms are necessary to match China’s vessels.  Japan’s recent offer of twelve brand new patrol boats to the Philippines is another encouraging sign that outside powers are seeking to right the regional balance of power.

Second, the United States should encourage the development of a region-wide effort to keep track of China’s maritime forces.  Unmanned aerial systems, for instance, could furnish a common picture of the nautical domain on a more-or-less permanent basis to coastal states surrounding the South China Sea.  By tapping into such technologies, an information sharing arrangement that make Asian waters both figuratively and literally more transparent would go a long way to shore up regional confidence and deterrence.  It is worth noting that Tokyo has been doing a signal service on behalf of the region by publicly reporting detailed accounts of Chinese naval transits through international straits and other activities near Japanese waters.

Third, the United States should draw up plans that would enable the U.S. military to rapidly deploy units armed with maritime-strike capability, such as anti-ship cruise missile batteries, on friendly or allied soil.  Possessing the option to surge defensive forces onto allied territory at short notice would reassure U.S. allies in peacetime while substantially bolstering the U.S. capacity to act effectively in times of crisis. American reinforcements would steady nerves while stiffening the resolve of local defenders.  The United States should also encourage allies and friends to develop or strengthen their own maritime-strike options.

Finally, the U.S. Navy should revisit prevailing assumptions about its ability to command the global commons.  Years of post-Cold War permissiveness induced an airy confidence that made it seductively easy to take sea control for granted.  Arguably, the last time that the U.S. Navy fought a serious foe was at Leyte Gulf in 1944.  As China marches to the seas, a far more lethal nautical environment lies in store.  For a service long accustomed to uncontested waters, coming to terms with risk to the fleet will be an ever urgent priority.

Networking the Region

These steps would help construct a layered and inter-connected defense posture that begins with the local actors themselves.  As frontline states, they must be empowered to perform as first responders to Chinese moves at sea.  Information sharing among the coastal states would underscore the shared stakes in the maritime commons while promoting collective action.  A network of players alert to Beijing’s maneuvers stands a far better chance of deterring, and, failing that, reacting more quickly to Chinese actions.  The United States, for its part, would provide a strategic backstop to Southeast Asian partners with low-profile, small-footprint military assets that pack a punch and serve as potent symbols of American commitment to the region.

Raising the costs of—and risks to—Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea would complicate Beijing’s calculus while inclining Chinese leaders to think twice before they act.  Inducing Chinese caution, moreover, would apply a brake to Beijing’s momentum at sea, brightening the prospects for restoring equilibrium to the region and for retaking the strategic initiative.

Toshi Yoshihara 

How the US and oil majors should view China-Japan tensions

Television pictures of rioting Chinese citizens are a startling demonstration of the seemingly spontaneous civic anger over Japan’s territorial claims to five uninhabited islands and three rocks known to Japanese as the Senkaku Islands and to the Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands.

At stake in the East China Sea (and in a separate row in the South China Sea) are not the barren rocks themselves but the oil and gas that might be found under surrounding waters. Oil majors contemplating investment need a primer in international law as well as an appreciation of the historical and political background before they venture into this region.

The Spratly Archipelago and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea
The South China Sea dispute, faintly grumbling along for some thirty years, appeared to mainstream media to suddenly rise in tempo for political and economic reasons in 2009. In fact, it grew noisier for a very concrete legal reason: 13 May 2009 was the deadline for States to make claims to extend the stretch of their rights to exploit seabed for hydrocarbons under article 76(8) of the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).

In very broad brush terms, what needs to be understood about the UNCLOS regime to appreciate the background to these events is as follows:-

1) Standard issue for coastal states is 12 nautical miles (“nm”) of territorial water projecting from their low tide baselines, stretching out to 200 nm of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in which they must permit some international activities – such as laying submarine cables, maritime passage and over-flight – but can bag the hydrocarbon and mineral wealth, as well as fisheries.

2) If you can lay claim to an island (naturally-formed and above water at high tide ), you get twelve miles around that and, if it can sustain habitation, you get the 200 nm EEZ around it, too (Article 121 UNCLOS).

3) If you can persuade the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that your continental shelf goes out beyond 200 nm into undisputed seabed, you could get some extra EEZ. If there is a dispute between states, the Commission lacks jurisdiction, and nor can it rule on Article 121 issues.

4) If States do not like what they see in submissions to the CLCS and want to beef about it, they put in to the UN Secretary General a document known by the somewhat oxymoronic French title “Note Verbale.”

5) States can opt out of binding UNCLOS dispute resolution, and China did.

6) If it is a sovereignty dispute over land, then UNCLOS is the wrong set of rules anyway; one is into customary international law and the heavy hand of history.

The UNCLOS template significantly favours Japan’s archipelagic geography over China’s continental coastline – because more islands generate more EEZs. Also UNCLOS requires states to be noisy in asserting their claims in a way that sits ill with Deng Xiaoping’s famous approach “Keep a cool head and maintain a low profile. Never take the lead – but aim to do something big.”

The states with a dog in the fight over a cluster of a hundred-odd geographic features scattered over 400,000 plus sq km of the central South China Sea are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, China and Taiwan.

When Malaysia and Vietnam put in their continental shelf submissions in 2009, what particularly exercised world opinion as evidencing expansionist territorial ambitions of China in the resulting flurry of exchanges of Notes Verbales (which continued into 2011), was what has become known as China’s nine dash (or dot as some prefer) map, appended to one Note Verbale.

This was taken by some as implying that China (encompassing Taiwan) may claim sovereignty of the whole of the South China Seas. China has managed to maintain a suitably inscrutable ambiguity (sometimes by resort to Latin maxims) in clarifying/obfuscating what the nine dots or dashes should be taken to mean in legal Morse Code.

The Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea
Japan formally annexed the islands in 1895. After the Second World War, they were administered by the US until 1972, when they were returned to Japan. Around this time oil was discovered in the region and China advanced its claim to the islands. It deployed historical arguments going back to the 15th century and used Taiwan’s separate claim to the territory by subsuming it into the ‘One China’ argument.

A striking contrast between the South China Sea and the East China Sea disputes is that the former (in which the potential for hydrocarbon producton is believed to be much greater) has not generated the political heat sparked by the latter.

The North East Asian dispute is laced with the lingering resentment of South Korea and China towards Japan as their former coloniser and wartime master.

The recent re-engagement of the USA with East Asia after a decade of obsession with the Middle East somewhat brings to mind the couple who nearly had their colour TV stolen while they were upstairs watching the jewellery.

What underlies America’s reawakening to the region is a growing concern with the massively increased economic gravitational pull of China, which has played a canny diplomatic game in ASEAN while Japan has tended to default to isolationist arrogance.

The worry then becomes whether China’s growing confidence and economic power, with the west hobbled by the depredations of its Great Recession, may lead it to greater aggression. The hope must be that Deng Xiaoping’s axiom that what China needs is stability at home and peace in the world will not be destabilised by some combination of US tub-thumping and miscalculation and resurgent Japanese militarism.

A 2010 survey by the Pew Research Centre placed China top (at 91 per cent) in a satisfaction survey of 22 diverse nations polled on their governments’ handling of the economy. Ranked bottom (at 15 per cent) was the notoriously-obedient Japanese citizenry’s satisfaction with their democratically-elected government.

One front-runner in Japanese politics, as elections loom, is Nobu Ishihara. His father Shintaro Ishihara (described in the Economist as a “crusty China-baiting nationalist”) led a campaign for the Tokyo metropolitan government to purchase the Senkakus from their private Japanese owners. The national government has intervened and disclosed that it is itself close to buying them.

A second emerging force is the populist mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto, who is reinvigorating Japanese politics with the launch of the Japan Restoration Party (JRP) and wants to rewrite Japan’s pacifist constitution.

While China’s president Hu Jintao and prime minister Wen Jiabao (and their anticipated successors Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang) are not subject to any type of Western-style democracy, they do need the acclamation of their population for what pre-communist dynasties saw as the Mandate of Heaven.

Being sensitive to their people’s enduring wish to redeem the shame of Japanese domination may be equivalent in the perception of China’s leaders to the impulse to grandstand to American voters, which causes Mitt Romney and his running mate to bray about what they will do to punish China as a currency manipulator if they get elected.

The right response from Washington
A sage US president would do well to bear in mind three things.

First, do not underestimate the importance and legitimacy that China accords to history and the unity of the Han Chinese civilisation. This is why the sovereignty of Taiwan and return of Hong Kong were always non-negotiable, and why Beijing cleaves to historical arguments to support territorial claims based on ancient dominion rather than following formal laws.

Secondly, recognise the high degree of pragmatism which has allowed China to take the one country, two systems approach in Hong Kong and makes it keen to adopt the joint development approach without prejudice to territorial and sovereignty claims that can be parked indefinitely if a workable solution can be found.

Thirdly, appreciate that the Confucian argument that rejects binding dispute resolution as a disharmonious way to go is virtually bound to win in these cases, where there is no compulsory dispute resolution mechanism and the question of whose legal arguments are right is theoretical.

Faced with reasonable pragmatic alternatives, which US leader in his right mind would risk testing his military muscle as the ultimate disharmonious form of practical dispute resolution? Hopefully, neither Barack Obama nor Mitt Romney.

What business should do
On the other hand the astute chief executive of an oil and gas major should get his legal department to seek some creative advice on how to structure investments through special purpose vehicles able to take advantage of Bilateral Investment Treaties engaged by China and Japan that may give some leverage to seek compensation from an international arbitration tribunal if investments become expropriated through state action contrary to international law.

Tim Taylor

Worry about Asia, Not Europe

Newspapers are now full of doom and gloom about Europe. A recent opinion piece in The New York Times even argued that “Europe”—the ideal of an integrated, prosperous, peaceable continent devoid of nationalism’s nasty variants—had failed outright.

Europe certainly has problems, among them massive unemployment, crushing debt, rising poverty, and resurgent xenophobic ideologies, parties and movements. But failure? Compared to what exactly?

Surely not the past. For five hundred years before 1945, Europe was the venue for horrific wars. World War I and II alone killed seventy million people. Extremist movements were ubiquitous. Noxious worldviews enabled horrors such as the Holocaust.

After World War II, thanks to the European Union (EU), Western Europe morphed into a community of democracy and peace. A common market emerged; later, labor and capital began to cross borders freely; then came the single currency. Joint decision making advanced on multiple fronts, with governments surrendering elements of sovereignty. And the EU has expanded eastward.

The prospect of Germany and France going to war, as they had in the past, soon became inconceivable and remains so. Ditto the revival of German militarism and imperialism; Germans embraced consensus-based multilateralism within the EU and NATO.

Europe’s welfare state was never perfect—what is?—and faces big challenges (especially given Europe’s aging population), but it bears no resemblance to the caricatures penned by some American pundits. It has provided millions a decent life and basic necessities. Taxes are high, but social services are extensive.

Is Europe a failure compared to other places? One way to answer this question is to look east—to the Far East, an economic dynamo.

The East’s Indelible Memories
This summer, Europe marked the end of World War II, as it always has, in unremarkable ways: with ceremonies, speeches honoring those who fought and lived and those who died fighting, visits to monuments, etc. The subtext of the commemoration continues to be: let’s recall the past so we never relive it.

In East Asia, by contrast, memories of the war still provoke anger and stoke regional animosities. Sixty-seven years after the end of World War II, the fury over “comfort women” (as the Japanese referred to South Korean females forcibly transported to Japan to provide sex to soldiers) and the 1937 Nanking Massacre persists. Bellicosity and indignant nationalism are omnipresent.

Consider what happened just last month. Two Japanese cabinet officials outraged China and South Korea by visiting the Yasukuni war memorial, a site that also holds the remains of men whom Chinese, Koreans and other East Asians consider war criminals. In China, attacked and brutally occupied by Japan from 1931–1945, and Korea, colonized by Japan from 1905–1945, the visit wasn’t considered an innocent pilgrimage, not least because it was not the first time Japanese officials had displayed bad timing in visiting Yasukuni. In a move that many in Japan saw as an insult, South Korea’s prime minister asked their emperor not to visit Seoul, observing that Japan had not apologized adequately for its misdeeds.

Japan’s “peace constitution” forsakes war, its defense budget hovers at a mere 1 percent of GDP, and its foreign policy reflects Japanese society’s pacifist, antimilitarist leanings. No matter. Japan remains suspect among its neighbors.

While no one in the region seriously anticipates another Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Imperial Japan’s euphemism for its empire in the 1940s, wounds from that period remain raw. That’s partly because Japan, unlike Germany, hasn’t fully confronted its past or shown what its neighbors consider sufficient and sincere contrition.

Another flashpoint in East Asia involves mini-archipelagos that fleck the Sea of Japan and the East and South China seas. In August, South Korea and Japan traded venom again over islands—basically a collection of rocks—in the Sea of Japan that the Koreans, who control them, call Dokdo, and the Japanese, who claim rightful ownership, know as Takeshima. When the South Korean president flew there on August 10, the Japanese were infuriated. Japan recalled its ambassador to South Korea and lodged a formal protest. South Korea sent back Japan’s written complaint.

China and Japan have their own quarrel over the Diaoyutai (in Chinese) or Senkaku Islands (in Japanese). When Japanese activists or politicians visit these East China Sea islets or Chinese trawlers play chicken with the Japanese Coast Guard, tempers flare on both sides. The blogosphere sizzles; sabers rattle; jingoistic banners flutter. There was a replay in August. Furious crowds in China vandalized Japanese cars and restaurants after Japan detained and deported a Chinese group that landed on one of the islands. The news broke this month that the Japanese government was moving to buy the islands from their owner. Beijing, already incensed by reports this spring that Tokyo’s ultranationalist governor, Shintaro Ishihara, was planning to mobilize funds to that the city could acquire them, warned that it would defend its sovereign rights in the face of an illegal act.

In the South China Sea, China, Taiwan and Vietnam each claim the Paracel Islands, and China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei claim the Spratly Islands. Chinese maps proclaimed ownership of both clusters via its “Nine-Dashed Line,” which, for good measure, encloses virtually the entire South China Sea. Beijing says it’s open to negotiations in principle, but it has spurned them in practice, dismissing rival claims and flaunting its naval power. Its message: might makes right.

Continental Differences
Ultimately, the tub-thumping over maritime rocks is less about sea-lanes, fishing grounds and energy deposits than about fear, anger and suspicion—and as it was once in Europe, all these anxieties are rooted in the past.

True, East Asia’s dense trade ties demonstrate the gains from win-win interactions, but the region lacks counterparts to the EU or NATO that can promote joint problem solving and shared security. And despite East Asia’s many achievements (China’s spectacular growth rates; South Korea’s emergence as a world-class economic power and a democracy; Japan’s military minimalism) the region has multiple sources of instability and conflict.

The claim that a narrow nationalism has reemerged in Europe is weak on at least two counts. First, it exaggerates the extent to which national sentiment had been transcended by a pan-European identity and also lacks a comparative context. The run-up to the big decisions the EU has taken (the admission of Britain, the design and later reform of the common agricultural policy, and the introduction of the euro, for instance) revealed national divisions. Second, the claim that nationalism has made a comeback in Europe is devoid of comparative perspective. Are European countries more nationalistic now than they were prior to the emergence of the EU? Certainly not. Comparing Europe with Asia—and Europe’s past with its present—provides perspective at a time when pessimism about Europe prevails. For all of its present problems, "Europe" hasn’t failed. Nor, if one uses a reasonable standard, is failure likely.

Rajan Menon

China reserves right to act on disputed islands

China's national defense minister warned Tuesday that Beijing reserves the right to take further action against Japan in the ongoing dispute over uninhabited islands in the East China Sea.

Standing next to U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, Gen. Liang Guanglie said Japan should bear full responsibility for the dispute, which has triggered violent protests in China against the Japanese. Panetta has been pressing both Liang and defense leaders in Japan to find ways to resolve the problem peacefully and diplomatically.

U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, left, stands at attention during the national anthem next to China's Defense Minister Liang Guanglie at the Bayi Building in Beijing, China Tuesday, Sept. 18, 2012. (AP Photo/Larry Downing, Pool)

Liang, however, made it clear during a press conference that while China still would like to see a negotiated solution, he hopes the Japanese government "will undo its mistakes and come back to the right track of negotiations." Tensions over the string of islands, called the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyu in China, spiked last week when the Japanese government said it was purchasing some of the islands from their private owner.

China's official Xinhua News Agency reported that during their private talks, Liang told Panetta that China was "resolutely opposed" to the islands' inclusion within the terms of the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty, the agreement signed in 1951 as the U.S. helped the island nation rebuild after World War II.

Liang said China hopes the U.S. will honor its commitment to maintain a neutral stance, Xinhua reported.

The island dispute has been a hot topic during Panetta's weeklong tour of the Asia-Pacific region. But his session with Liang also touched on a wide expanse of issues as the U.S. and China try to find a way to improve their military relationship.

U.S. relations with China have been rocky, especially over America's support of and arms sales to Taiwan, the self-governing island that Beijing claims as its own. The U.S. also has been critical of China for its lack of transparency regarding its massive military buildup.

"I've long believed that the United States-China relationship requires a long-term perspective," Panetta said during the press conference after a lengthy meeting Tuesday morning with Liang. "It is measured less by major breakthroughs than by slow, steady progress over time to build a relationship and to work on activities in areas of mutual interest."

In a move to enhance the relationship, Panetta announced that the U.S. will invite China to send a ship to participate in a major military maritime exercise in 2014.

Both Panetta and Liang said they talked about how their two nations can improve communications and work toward developing a greater mutual trust.

Speaking through an interpreter, Liang said the U.S. and China must work to gain a better understanding of each other so they can gradually reduce the ongoing suspicions that have plagued the relationship.

Their meeting came just days after the U.S. forged an agreement to put a second missile-defense radar system in Japan, a move China is likely to view as another effort by the U.S. to broaden its military power in the Asia-Pacific region.

This is Panetta's first trip to China as defense chief, and it is expected to include several historic visits, including a meeting Wednesday with the country's leader-in-waiting, Xi Jinping, just days after the ruler reappeared in public after a two-week absence.

Panetta's stay in China was extended in recent days so he could visit Qingdao, a key naval base where he will see a Chinese submarine and frigate.

China and the U.S. also faced off over trade issues this week. China filed a World Trade Organization case Monday challenging U.S. anti-dumping measures on billions of dollars of kitchen appliances, paper and other goods, adding to worsening trade strains as global demand weakens.

Beijing's move came shortly before the Obama administration filed its own WTO case accusing China of improperly subsidizing exports of automobiles and auto parts.

Associated Press

Japan businesses in China hit as protests rage

TOKYO (AP) — Scores of Japanese-owned factories and stores in China were shuttered Tuesday as anti-Japan demonstrations erupted in dozens of cities.

 In this Sept. 15, 2012 file photo, residents look at an over-turned Toyota car during an anti-Japan protest in Xi'an in northwest China's Shaanxi province. Scores of Japanese-owned factories and stores in China were shuttered Tuesday, Sept. 18 as anti-Japanese demonstrations raged in dozens of cities. At stake are billions of dollars in investments and far more in sales and trade between Japan and China, the world's third- and second-largest economies. The two are so closely entwined, though, that both would suffer from any long-term disruptions. (AP Photo/File)

At stake are billions of dollars in investments and far more in sales and trade between Japan and China, the world's third- and second-largest economies. The two are so closely entwined that both would suffer from any long-term disruptions.

While Chinese authorities appeared to be moving to clamp down on the protests, the Japanese government has been urging Beijing to do more to protect Japanese businesses from trespassing, looting and other damage, Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura told reporters.

"Japanese companies play an important role in the Chinese economy and employment. We believe we should be calm and make rational judgments from a broad perspective," Fujimura said. Some private and government-level meetings and events have been postponed or cancelled, he said.

Big name brands and retailers appeared to be suffering the brunt of the latest mass outburst of anti-Japanese sentiment, with companies in lower profile sectors less affected.

Many companies said they closed Tuesday as the 81st anniversary of a Japanese invasion brought a fresh wave of protests venting anger over the colonial past and a current dispute involving contested islands in the East China Sea.

Pain from the protests was being felt in Tokyo, too, where business has slowed for the many shopkeepers catering to Chinese tourists.

"It makes me wonder how Japan will emerge from this," 20-year-old Yui Watanabe said of the protests. "We just really need to be level-headed," she said.

In Shanghai, many of the Japanese-owned or oriented shops and restaurants in the western part of the city where the Japanese consulate is located had either closed or covered any Japan-brand signs.

Uniqlo, Asia's biggest clothing retailer, had closed some of its outlets but opened its huge flagship store on Shanghai's main Nanjing Rd. shopping street by the early afternoon. Amid calls for a boycott of Japanese products, the popular store was busy with shoppers.

Despite rancor over the territorial dispute, trade between the two countries has been thriving. Total trade rose 14 percent to $344.9 billion in 2011, setting a record, according to the Japan External Trade Organization, or JETRO. Japanese help run China's high-speed train lines and aid from Tokyo helped build much of the country's modern infrastructure, including its Pudong international airport in Shanghai.

Still, many employees of Japanese retailers, automakers and other companies were staying home Tuesday as thousands of anti-Japanese protesters marched in Beijing. The Japanese school in Beijing was closed on Monday, a Japanese public holiday, and on Tuesday. Staff said they were uncertain what would happen on Wednesday.

Many companies were wary of speaking in too much detail about the situation.

Toyota Motor Corp. would not reveal which or how many of its factories were closed, saying it was up to each affiliate or subsidiary to decide. Employee safety was the priority, it said in a company statement.

A Toyota dealership in Qingdao was burned and others had display models damaged, though there were no reports of injuries at the company's factories or dealerships.

Honda Motor Corp. said all five of its assembly plants in China were closed Tuesday and Wednesday, mainly to adjust production due to the impact of the anti-Japanese backlash on sales. Honda dealerships also have been damaged in recent protests, the company said.

Honda's China sales account for about one-fifth of its global total, with Toyota's accounting for about 10 percent and Nissan Motor Co.'s for over one-quarter. Until recently, all three were outperforming their domestic rivals, despite a cooling in demand over the past two years.

Kobe Steel shut four of its various steel, aluminum and construction machinery plants in China from yesterday or today, said spokesman Gary Tsuchida.

"As a precautionary measure, we decided it would be better to cool things," he said.

Sharp. Corp., which gets about a fifth of its sales from China, said its various factories are operating as usual, with no impact so far on their production. However, spokesman Yuta Oga said the company was taking precautions in having employees avoid unnecessary travel or excursions.

Kawasaki Heavy Industries, which has a big shipbuilding joint venture in the Yangtze River city of Nantong, near Shanghai, has likewise continued business as usual.

Sony Corp. said it had suspended production at two factories out of the seven it operates in China, to protect its employees.

Although Chinese manufacturers are upgrading their technology and equipment as they close the gap with their global rivals, many rely heavily on advanced robotic machinery and other Japanese technology, as well as state-of-the-art materials and components.

Halts to production caused by the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in northeastern Japan had an especially heavy impact on automakers. But the ripple effects of any major disruptions would be felt in many industries, from heavy manufacturing to clothing and cosmetics.

Associated Press

Panetta Targets Two Pacific Disputes

YOKOTA, Japan—On U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's agenda as he arrived in Japan on Sunday was the goal of helping to defuse a pair of growing disputes, one between Japan and China, and the other between Japan and the U.S.

The U.S. is increasingly worried that territorial disputes in the Pacific could inadvertently erupt into a conflict and is also hoping to disentangle snares in its own relationship with Japan that could threaten to derail the deployment of a new Marine troop-transport aircraft.

With tensions already high between Japan and China over disputed islands in the East China Sea, protests by Chinese citizens surged Saturday over Tokyo's decision last week to buy three islands it doesn't own from their private owner.

Mr. Panetta, who heads to Beijing after his Tokyo visit, said the U.S. hopes territorial disputes in both the East China and South China seas can be settled peacefully. Tensions have flared in the South China Sea in recent months between China and the Philippines over control of the Scarborough Shoals.

"What we don't want is any kind of provocative behavior on the part of China or anybody else, resulting in conflict," Mr. Panetta said at a news conference aboard his plane en route to Japan. Provocations, he said, could lead to the possibility of misjudgments and eventually violence. "And that conflict would have the potential of expanding," he warned.

Mr. Panetta is to meet with Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto on Monday, and the two men are scheduled to hold a news conference.

Mr. Panetta will also have to navigate the shoals of a conflict in which the U.S. is more directly involved. Protests have grown in recent weeks in Okinawa over deployment of the Marine Corps tilt-rotor V-22 Osprey. Japanese officials have raised concerns about its safety and flight record and have succeeded in blocking deployment of as many as 24 of the aircraft on Okinawa. The first 12 V-22 are grounded at the U.S. base in Iwakuni, and haven't been allowed on to Okinawa.Mr. Panetta didn't address the disagreement over the Ospreys directly over the weekend. But he emphasized the importance the U.S. places on its alliance with Japan, and Japan's role in hosting U.S. forces in the region.

Japanese officials have focused on recent accidents with the aircraft, which can take off and land like a helicopter but flies like a plane. Okinawans are hoping to restrict the altitudes at which the Ospreys can fly, but Marines object to the restrictions.

In a briefing in Washington on Friday, a senior U.S. defense official said that the U.S. "looked forward" to making progress on the Osprey issue and that Tokyo and Washington were in a good dialogue over the deployment. "This entire process has been about reconfirming the safety," of the Osprey, the official said. "We have had a lengthy, robust, collaborative, constructive process that has basically led to a great deal of understanding, transparency and helped us make progress on this issue."

Despite the collaboration and transparency, there is little doubt that concerns remain in Okinawa over the continued presence of the Marines and their plans to deploy the tilt-rotor Osprey.

"That alliance provides us with a great deal of support with the deployment we make to the Pacific," he said. He also noted that the U.S. has made progress in the past year in reaching agreements over the future of the Marine force in Okinawa. Despite the new agreement, some of the stickiest issues—such as moving the main military base to a more rural part of the island—remain unresolved.

Indonesia will try to rally Southeast Asian nations meeting at the United Nations this week behind a new attempt at talks with China to manage territorial disputes in the South China Sea. "We see this as a very serious problem and one that is demanding a solution by all of us,'' Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said Friday.

Indonesia's effort appears aimed primarily at restoring a semblance of unity among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations at a time when the Philippines, in particular, is seeking stronger backing from its partners. Indonesia has sought to revive long-stalled negotiations over a code of conduct to act as a framework for disputes pending a negotiated resolution.

Julian Barnes

Japan and China on a conflicting course

Months after Tokyo governor, Shintaro Ishihara's island purchase plan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial spat has shown no signs of abating from both Tokyo and Beijing. Worst still, the likelihood that the islands row would escalate into a full blown political crisis has significantly increased after the Japanese Cabinet decided to wrap up the purchase deal with the islands' owner.

Unlike previous cases, the latest handling of the crisis has shown obvious misperceptions between the two nations. In so far as China's repeated claim on the disputed islands is not recognized by Tokyo, Japan's handling of the issue is also not seen as a conflict resolution gesture to Beijing but rather, a serious encroachment of its interest and territorial integrity. 

The fear of diplomatic backlash with China if the issue is played up by the right-wing Ishihara required the Japanese central government's swift response to nationalize the islands before spiraling out of its control. What the Yoshihiko Noda administration hoped to achieve out of this is to preserve the islands' status quo where the issue is kept from affecting the overall Sino-Japanese relations. Politically too, Noda is using the issue to garner more public and internal support after the passing of its unpopular sales tax hike bill in August and the coming Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) presidential election. 

The Chinese government, meanwhile, thinks otherwise. As part of its territories which is currently administered by Tokyo due to historical reasons, there existed a dispute between the two nations and any unilateral attempt by Tokyo is a direct violation against Beijing's national interest and recognition. 

The latest islands bid, be it symbolic or "legal", is viewed by the Chinese leadership as an effort to "wrest control" over the islands against China's interests and thereby, alter the present status quo of the islands. Moreover, the purchase has also shown Tokyo's unwillingness to bend on the dispute, something which the Chinese authorities had hoped for in the past. 

The road ahead

Unlike the September 2010 trawler collision near the contented islands, Beijing seemed to have learnt a valuable lesson not to over-play its card as a means of forcing the Japanese government to back down. So far, Beijing has remained reactive to Tokyo's move, preferring to observe as to how far the unusually assertive Noda administration would pursue on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands case before taking stern measures to stake its claim on the islands. 

In fact, recent discourses by Chinese leaders have hinted that Beijing may have reached its acceptable limits following the Japanese government's unusual assertiveness in ramming ahead the purchase plan of the disputed islands. 

As demonstrated during Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in early September, Chinese President Hu Jintao's outright rejection of any official sideline meeting with Prime Minister Noda had signaled that another round of frozen Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties reminiscent of the Koizumi years may be well ahead of us. Even the 15-minute informal conservation with his Japanese counterpart was marred with Hu's serious warning on the repercussions that the islands purchase would inflict to the overall bilateral relations coupled with his reiteration of China's will to defend its sovereignty at all costs. 

A day later, on September 10, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, also reaffirmed China's unwavering stand to stake its claim on the islands and pledged against making any concession with Japan regarding its islands' sovereignty. By far, these two statements are the strongest ever been by members of the top leadership ever since the islands purchase proposal was mooted by Ishihara in April. 

At the same time, there is also news that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is stepping up its military preparedness in the middle of the crisis. On September 6, the Jinan Military Region held a military operation in which it focused on a marine group landing and taking control of an island near the Yellow Sea. It seemed to indicate that the PLA is seriously contemplating similar operation if there is a need for military action on the Diaoyu Islands issue. Apart from that, Beijing may choose to employ its economic pressure once again against Japan after its successful attempt following the Chinese trawler collision incident in September 2010.

For Japan, it is highly questionable on whether the Noda administration is prepared or able to confront the prospect of temporary or small-scale skirmish with Beijing. While the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) already had an operation plan to defend the Senkaku Islands, the weak central government mired with a myriad of problems, from internal party bickering to domestic economic woes, meant there is no guarantee that Tokyo is ready for full mobilization of all its resources in response against Beijing's armed and economic reprisals. Also, the whole situation would become extremely dangerous and complicated if Japan seeks cooperation from its close ally, the United States in order to respond to China's retaliatory measures at an advantage. 

With all these developments in sight, it is highly skeptical to concur to any view that China would take more conciliatory approach as evident in the South China Sea dispute. The central leadership transition later this year, strong anti-Japanese sentiment in China and grave public outcry to what is perceived as Beijing's passive take on the islands issue, meant that the same instance of Beijing's diplomacy of restraint toward Japan may not apply this time around. 

It is crystal clear that the Noda administration's nationalization drive of the islands has failed in alleviating concern from the Chinese top leadership and defusing the Sino-Japanese territorial tension. On the contrary, it heightened political apprehension with Beijing as the latter viewed the move as changing the status quo of the islands. That China's reprisals against Japan may begin with the signing of a purchase agreement between Tokyo and the islands' private owner, has shown that we are braving for a political storm ahead of us. 

Karl C L Lee

China-U.S. power play at core of East Asian island disputes

At first glance, it seems to make little sense that China and U.S. allies in the Western Pacific would dredge up old fights over uninhabitable islands, provoking nationalist protests, diplomatic rifts and a threat of violent confrontation in a strategic maritime corridor.

Chinese nationalists in Chengdu, in the southern province of Sichuan, protest last month against Japanese claims to disputed islands in the East China Sea. Rival claims to tiny constellations of islands from the cold North Pacific to the tropical South China Sea have stirred old tensions and resentments throughout East Asia. Credit: Associated Press

The South China Sea and coastal passages from Malaysia to Russia are of vital economic interest to all who ply the shipping lanes used to ferry more than $1.2 trillion in goods annually between the United States and its Far East trading partners.

But for the past decade the U.S. has been distracted with wars in faraway Iraq and Afghanistan, leaving allies like Japan, South Korea and the Philippines on their own to face an increasingly assertive China staking claims to the islands and the natural resources around them.

As the United States recalibrates its foreign policy to recover its standing in East Asia, analysts say Washington must execute a delicate balancing act to nurture relations with China while preventing it from bullying weaker countries.

In the South China Sea, Beijing last month deployed a military garrison and administrative staff to bolster its claim to Scarborough Reef, a triangular atoll framed by China, Vietnam and the Philippines. Vietnamese officials complain that China last year sabotaged its oil exploration by cutting undersea cables. In April, Manila accused Beijing of blockading a key fishing ground to prevent the arrest of Chinese poachers. Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei also assert sovereignty over some islets.

Since mid-August, Japan, China and South Korea have been ratcheting up tensions over less resource-rich islands in the East China Sea. All three nations are gearing up for elections and leadership changes this fall, encouraging politicians to posture as fierce defenders of national sovereignty.

The Japanese government said Monday that it will buy the privately owned islands it calls Senkaku, prompting China to send two patrol ships to safeguard the outcroppings known in China as Diaoyu. South Korea has also indulged in provocation, with President Lee Myung-bak staging a lightning visit to the islets in early August.

South Korea and Japan also dispute sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks in the Sea of Japan, and Tokyo has a long-running conflict with Russia over two islands of the Kuril chain.

While the rock piles themselves are of little value, any nation that can establish sovereignty has exclusive rights to the resources within a 200-mile radius, notes Bonnie Glaser, senior fellow for China studies at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Glaser sees the main risks to regional security coming from "accident and miscalculation," like the 2010 ramming of two Japanese coast guard vessels by a drunken Chinese fishing boat captain that set off the most tense standoff between the Asian rivals in years. She also pointed to China's attempts to intimidate smaller neighbors by frustrating trade, as when Beijing cut off exports of rare earths to Japan two years ago and quarantined Philippine fruit imports.

"With the challenges facing the United States and the rise of China, there is a sense that some new system is emerging," said Jamie Metzl, a senior fellow at the Asia Society think tank. "Many of these conflicts that had been on ice are defrosting, and countries are pushing claims to test and explore the contours of the new power structure. When China challenges Japan, it is also challenging the U.S.-Japan alliance."

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta have said during recent visits to East Asia that Washington won't take sides in territorial spats between longtime allies and the economic powerhouse of China. Instead, U.S. officials have urged the nations to work through Asian diplomatic alliances or the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. There have also been calls for plans for mutually exploring, extracting and protecting the coveted resources.

"The fishing reserves grow more valuable as other fish stocks along the coast are depleted. There's plenty of reason to have a region-wide regime" for coordinating fishing seasons and sharing in the take, said Douglas Paal, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The United States can play an important role in helping the parties with technical assistance in resource management, but Washington is unlikely to be accepted as an impartial mediator because of statements by officials that appear to put the United States "on the side of everybody but China," Paal said.

He envisions a multilateral forum emerging under the guidance of a government far removed from the disputes, perhaps Australia or Norway, with expertise in good management of natural resources.

"The best that can be hoped for is a temporary solution," Paal said. "Nobody's going to be happy with that, but no agreements on sovereignty are going to be reached in such a turbulent era."

Los Angeles Times

Whose Islands Are Those? The Infographic That Has So Many Chinese Netizens Angry

In China’s blogosphere, the hottest topic remains the ongoing conflict between China and Japan over what Chinese call the Diaoyu Islands, referred to in Japanese as the Senkaku Islands. The matter has only heated up after Beijing deployed two patrol ships to the disputed islands after Japan’s government purchased them from a family that Japanese officials maintain was their rightful owner.

Feelings on Sina Weibo, China’s Twitter, have run high for months. Just days ago, the not-so-subtle term “F*** Japan” (which also happens to have been the name of one student with particularly, er, patriotic parents) went viral. Would a slightly more subtle post find the same success?

User @DDM大王 recently found out. He managed to incite a great deal of interest–but also ire–when he authored and shared the below image along with this explanation: “This [graphic] is the whole Diaoyu situation; no matter who you support, everyone should understand the historical truth; why [the islands] are China’s, why they are Japan’s, why they are Taiwan’s. Otherwise, what is the difference from the simple aggression of an angry youth? The history behind #The Diaoyu Belong to China# [trending hashtag] does not have any absolute villains or absolute innocents.”^[Chinese]

The image garnered over 62,000 retweets and over 24,000 comments since its posting less than 24 hours ago. It wasn’t long before @DDM大王 found himself on the defensive after many netizens called him a “reactionary” and worse, demanded that he take down the post, and asked him rhetorically if he were Japanese. To be fair, many commenters expressed support and found the graphic helpful. But things were bad enough that @DDM大王 felt compelled to aver in his latest post, “I will not delete the [graphic].” Tea Leaf Nation translates the controversial image series below.

David Wertime