As Regional Tensions Rise, China Lands Jet on First Carrier

China has landed a fighter jet on its first aircraft carrier, in a symbolic development watched warily by its Asian neighbours fretting about the military ambitions of the world’s most populous country.

A carrier-borne J-15 fighter jet on China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning Photo: AP/XINHUA

The home-built J-15 fighter jet took off from and landed on the Liaoning, a reconditioned Soviet-era vessel from Ukraine which only came into service in September this year.

China ushered in a new generation of leaders this month at the 18th Communist Party Congress in Beijing, with outgoing President Hu Jintao making a pointed reference to strengthening China’s naval forces, protecting maritime interests and the need to “win local war”.

China is embroiled in disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam over South China Sea islands believed to be surrounded by waters rich in natural gas. It has a similar dispute with Japan over islands in the East China Sea.

It has also warned the United States, with President Barack Obama’s “pivot” to Asia, not to get involved.

“We should make active planning for the use of military forces in peacetime, expand and intensify military preparedness, and enhance the capability to accomplish a wide range of military tasks, the most important of which is to win local war in an information age,” Mr Hu said.

China has advertised its long-term military ambitions with shows of new hardware, including its first test flight of a stealth fighter jet in early 2011, an elite helicopter unit and the launch of the aircraft carrier.

China is boosting military spending by 11.2 percent this year, bringing official outlays on the People’s Liberation Army to 670.3 billion yuan ($100 billion) for 2012, after a 12.7 percent increase last year and a near-unbroken string of double-digit rises across two decades.

Beijing’s public budget is widely thought by foreign experts to undercount its real spending on military modernisation, which has drawn repeated calls from the United States for China to share more about its intentions.

China’s state-run Xinhua news portal said the J-15 – which can carry multi-type anti-ship, air-to-air, and air-to-ground missiles – is comparable to the Russian Su-33 jet and the U.S. F-18. It did not say when the landing on the carrier took place.

China lands jet on first aircraft carrier

Reuters

War By Other Means: China’s Political Uses of Seapower

China’s development and use of naval and non-naval, non-military sea power has become a cause for concern – one that could alter the regional balance.

China’s recent assertiveness in the South China Seas is a harbinger of things to come.  Beijing’s seapower project and the enormous resources it has enjoyed have opened up new strategic vistas for Chinese leaders and military commanders.  With larger and more capable seagoing forces at its disposal, Beijing is well positioned to fashion sophisticated strategies that will be more effective and equally difficult to counter.  While such strategies do not—yet—portend the fundamental reordering of maritime Southeast Asia, they will likely yield incremental dividends that advance China’s larger aims at sea.

Comprehensive Chinese Seapower

China’s naval and maritime buildup is providing Beijing with the wherewithal to pursue its ambitions.  The rate and scale of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) modernization process have defied many predictions in the West, reversing sanguine and even condescending conclusions about China’s aptitude at sea.  But, seapower is more than just the navy.  Rather, it is a continuum that gives Beijing a range of options.  Non-naval and non-military platforms and systems account for a significant portion of Chinese seapower.

Long-range, precision-strike weaponry deployed on the mainland can influence events, perhaps decisively, at sea.  The anti-ship ballistic missile—a maneuverable ballistic missile capable of hitting moving targets at sea—is just one member of a large family of missiles in China’s arsenal that could perform maritime-strike missions.  Indeed, the PLA boasts large numbers of shore-based fighters, bombers, and cruise missile units that can launch salvos of anti-ship missiles.

The growth of China’s maritime surveillance and law-enforcement services has been equally impressive.  The civilian arm of Chinese seapower has enabled Beijing to dispatch nonmilitary ships to confront the Philippines in the South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea.  Even civilian vessels could form maritime militias to serve China’s nautical aims.  In short, Beijing possesses diverse elements of seapower to defend its prerogatives in the nautical domain.

Political Uses of Military and Non-Military Forces

Beijing’s burgeoning seapower has positioned it to employ strategies that involve the political uses of military and non-military implements of seapower against weaker opponents in the South China Sea.  These strategies deftly combine warfighting capabilities with calibrated shows of force.  They enhance China’s leverage in protracted politico-military struggles by chipping away at the will of the opponent.

In the event of peacetime maritime crises between China and relatively weak Southeast Asian powers, innovative combinations of PLA forces could be used to compel the will of Beijing’s southern neighbors.  Consider the aforementioned anti-ship ballistic missile.  If it performs as advertised, the missile would help compensate for current shortcomings in China’s maritime inventory.  The reach of such shore fire support over the entire South China Sea would ease the burdens on the Chinese fleet while applying constant pressure on challengers to Beijing’s interests in peacetime.

Under the protective umbrella of anti-ship ballistic missiles, even lesser warships would be ideal for intimating weaker parties.  For example, small flotillas of missile-armed fast-attack craft operating in the Spratlys under missile cover could hold most Southeast Asian surface fleets at bay.  Occasional sorties of such units would signal Chinese resolve, compelling opponents to back down or acquiesce to Beijing’s wishes.  This type of gunboat diplomacy with Chinese characteristics is conceivable in future crises.

China’s ability to exercise the non-military elements of its seapower was on full display at Scarborough Shoal this past spring.  The standoff with the Philippines involved coast-guard-like noncombat vessels under the control of China Marine Surveillance (CMS), an agency entrusted with protecting Beijing’s exclusive economic zones.  In an unprecedented demonstration of resolve, CMS vessels entered Japanese territorial waters near the Senkakus following Tokyo’s decision to nationalize the disputed islands in September 2012.

Employing non-navy assets in clashes over territory reveals a sophisticated, methodical strategy for securing China’s maritime claims.  The use of non-military means eschews escalation while ensuring that disputes remain localized.  Specifically, it deprives the United States and other outside powers the rationales to step in on behalf of embattled capitals in the region.

At the same time, noncombat ships empower Beijing to exert low-grade but unremitting pressure on rival claimants to South China Sea islands and waters. Constant patrols can probe weaknesses in coastal states’ maritime-surveillance capacity while testing their political resolve. Keeping disputes at a low simmer, moreover, grants China the diplomatic initiative to turn up or down the heat as strategic circumstances warrant.

And if all else fails, Beijing can still employ its navy and shore-based assets as a backstop to the civilian agencies. That China—unlike its weaker rivals—has the option of climbing the escalation ladder only amplifies the intimidation factor in places like Scarborough Shoal or the Spratly Islands. As noted above, the mere possibility of naval coercion may induce an opponent to back down in a crisis.  Indeed, the larger the naval balance tilts in China’s favor, the more likely it becomes that a long shadow casts over Southeast Asian capitals as they contemplate their options.

Innocuous in themselves, peacetime patrols carry significant weight when backed by real firepower.  The interplay between Chinese military and non-military forces thus augments Beijing’s strategic leverage.

A Strategy of Exhaustion at Sea?

Sporadic acts of coercion and intimidation may not produce outcomes as visible or decisive as a battlefield victory.  A series of showdowns may pass without an end in sight or any tangible gain for China.  But, the cumulative effects of a continuing stalemate could induce strategic fatigue that in turn advances China’s aims.  Short of a shooting war, Chinese provocations are too slight for the United States to intervene militarily.  Staying below the escalation threshold adds maneuver room to test U.S. steadfastness while solidifying its own claims.

As China pushes and probes, regional expectations that Washington should do something would inevitably mount even as weaker nations look for signs of wavering U.S. resolve.  The prospects of recurring confrontations with little hope of direct U.S. intervention could weigh heavily on Southeast Asian capitals.  Applied with patience and discipline, such a strategy of exhaustion could gradually erode regional confidence and undermine the political will to resist.

But this attritional approach is only a snapshot of Chinese seapower today.  It is possible that Beijing’s application of graduated pressure is merely a stopgap measure, buying China time to build up the capacity to dictate events at sea.  Recent trends suggest that both the military and non-military services will continue to bulk up on a steady diet of new hardware and manpower.

Twenty years of virtually uninterrupted double-digit hikes in the defense budget have afforded China the resources to develop options beyond those dedicated to a Taiwan contingency, an all-consuming preoccupation until recently.  Analysts have detected military buildups in staging areas assigned to the Southeast Asian theater of operations.  Beijing also appears to be pushing naval construction along multiple axes simultaneously, laying down hulls for warships of every type.

Similarly, the maritime-enforcement services are recruiting new manpower while taking delivery of decommissioned naval vessels. Furthermore, Chinese shipyards are turning out state-of-the-art cutters like sausages. Many are capable of sustained patrols in the farthest reaches of the China seas, assuring that Beijing can maintain a visible presence in waters where it asserts sovereign jurisdiction. Indeed, Haijian 84, one of China’s most modern law-enforcement vessels, occupied the epicenter of the Scarborough Shoal imbroglio.

To be sure, China still lacks adequate military means to make the South China Sea a Chinese lake. Sea control that more or less permanently excludes rival navies from these waters remains beyond its reach, if indeed that is the goal.

Nevertheless, even a modest increase in Chinese seapower could perceptibly tip the regional balance of power in Beijing’s favor in peacetime contingencies not involving the U.S. Navy.  Some local players, notably Vietnam, have embarked on naval modernization programs, but they are unlikely to keep pace with China.  Over time, left unopposed by powerful outsiders such as the United States, Japan, or Australia, even small-scale shows of Chinese maritime power over Southeast Asian fleets might start to win grudging acquiescence to Beijing’s foreign policy preferences.  Such consent, however reluctant, would deliver a severe blow to the foundations of regional order.

Implications for the U.S. “Rebalancing” to Asia

The foregoing analysis underscores the predicament of many Southeast Asian states if they faced China on their own.  Not surprisingly, many regional capitals look to the United States as a bulwark against Chinese advances.  They recognize that American primacy in maritime Asia will be the crucial arbiter of Chinese ambitions.  Washington, for its part, has delivered very public pronouncements about its own stake in Asian waters.  The Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia sought to reassure audiences in the region that the United States will not abdicate the stabilizing role it has long played.

Fortunately, there is still time to maximize this convergence of interests and organize an effective response.  China is at least a decade away from amassing the type of preponderant seapower that can keep the United States out of the South China Sea while running roughshod over Southeast Asian states.  In the meantime, Washington can adopt measures to ensure that regional submission to China’s wishes is not a foregone conclusion.

First, Washington and its allies should actively help Southeast Asian states help themselves. Local actors must possess some indigenous capability to cope with Chinese encroachments at sea.  The U.S. transfer of 1960s’ vintage coast guard cutters to the Philippines is a modest step in the right direction.  The timing of the deliveries turned out to be fortuitous: the first Philippine vessel to respond off Scarborough Shoal was flagship BRP Gregorio del Pilar, the former USCGCHamilton. But, hand-me-downs are not enough to meet Manila’s needs.  More modern and capable platforms are necessary to match China’s vessels.  Japan’s recent offer of twelve brand new patrol boats to the Philippines is another encouraging sign that outside powers are seeking to right the regional balance of power.

Second, the United States should encourage the development of a region-wide effort to keep track of China’s maritime forces.  Unmanned aerial systems, for instance, could furnish a common picture of the nautical domain on a more-or-less permanent basis to coastal states surrounding the South China Sea.  By tapping into such technologies, an information sharing arrangement that make Asian waters both figuratively and literally more transparent would go a long way to shore up regional confidence and deterrence.  It is worth noting that Tokyo has been doing a signal service on behalf of the region by publicly reporting detailed accounts of Chinese naval transits through international straits and other activities near Japanese waters.

Third, the United States should draw up plans that would enable the U.S. military to rapidly deploy units armed with maritime-strike capability, such as anti-ship cruise missile batteries, on friendly or allied soil.  Possessing the option to surge defensive forces onto allied territory at short notice would reassure U.S. allies in peacetime while substantially bolstering the U.S. capacity to act effectively in times of crisis. American reinforcements would steady nerves while stiffening the resolve of local defenders.  The United States should also encourage allies and friends to develop or strengthen their own maritime-strike options.

Finally, the U.S. Navy should revisit prevailing assumptions about its ability to command the global commons.  Years of post-Cold War permissiveness induced an airy confidence that made it seductively easy to take sea control for granted.  Arguably, the last time that the U.S. Navy fought a serious foe was at Leyte Gulf in 1944.  As China marches to the seas, a far more lethal nautical environment lies in store.  For a service long accustomed to uncontested waters, coming to terms with risk to the fleet will be an ever urgent priority.

Networking the Region

These steps would help construct a layered and inter-connected defense posture that begins with the local actors themselves.  As frontline states, they must be empowered to perform as first responders to Chinese moves at sea.  Information sharing among the coastal states would underscore the shared stakes in the maritime commons while promoting collective action.  A network of players alert to Beijing’s maneuvers stands a far better chance of deterring, and, failing that, reacting more quickly to Chinese actions.  The United States, for its part, would provide a strategic backstop to Southeast Asian partners with low-profile, small-footprint military assets that pack a punch and serve as potent symbols of American commitment to the region.

Raising the costs of—and risks to—Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea would complicate Beijing’s calculus while inclining Chinese leaders to think twice before they act.  Inducing Chinese caution, moreover, would apply a brake to Beijing’s momentum at sea, brightening the prospects for restoring equilibrium to the region and for retaking the strategic initiative.

Toshi Yoshihara

China Aircraft Carrier Passes Landmark

BEIJING—China has passed a landmark in the development of its first fully functional aircraft carrier with the first successful landing of a jet fighter on the newly launched vessel while it was at sea, according to state media and the Defense Ministry.

State-run China Central Television showed a domestically produced J-15 “Flying Shark” fighter jet touching down on the deck, catching hold of a cable with a hook on its rear, and slowing to a standstill shortly before the other end of the runway.

CCTV also showed one of the twin-engine fighters taking off from the carrier—which is called the Liaoning—and the Defense Ministry’s website showed photographs of the aircraft landing on the vessel and taking off from it.

It was the first official confirmation that China has mastered the complex technology and technical skills needed to operate fighters from a carrier at sea—a capability it has been seeking for decades as part of its quest to become a global military power.

The Liaoning, which officially entered service in September, is a potent symbol of China’s long-term strategic ambition to project air power far from its shores and challenge U.S. military dominance of the Asia Pacific region.

China has said the vessel will be used only for training, but many military experts say that it could be deployed in a crisis near Chinese shores, such as a clash over disputed islands in the East China Sea or the South China Sea.

Military experts say it will take several more years of training before the vessel, based on a hull bought from Ukraine, is combat ready. China also has to develop all the support vessel and associated technologies before it can use a carrier group the way the U.S. does, to extend its military influence abroad.

Still, many of those experts had expected it to take longer for China to train its pilots to land on the carrier.

Last month, a state-run Chinese newspaper published photographs that appeared to show a J-15 fighter flying just above the deck of the carrier, suggesting that it was performing a “touch and go” maneuver in preparation for an attempted landing.

The state-run Xinhua news agency said the successful landing had been completed during a recent exercise, but didn’t specify precisely where or when.

“Capabilities of the carrier platform and the J-15 have been tested, meeting all requirements and achieving good compatibility,” Xinhua said.

Xinhua didn’t say how many fighters had landed, but a separate article on the Defense Ministry website said that four more pilots had successfully landed and taken off from the vessel.

Xinhua also said the successful landing marked the debut of the J-15 as “China’s first generation multipurpose carrier-borne fighter jet.”

Military aviation experts say the J-15 is closely modeled on Russia’s carrier-borne Su-33 fighter, and is still equipped with engines imported from Russia as Chinese engines, while improving, don’t have sufficient thrust or durability.

Xinhua said the J-15 was “designed by and made in” China, and was able to carry “multi-type antiship, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, as well as precision-guided bombs.”

The J-15 had capabilities comparable to those of the Su-33 and the U.S. F-18, Xinhua said. The F-18, also known as the “Super Hornet,” is used on U.S. carriers.

An article posted on the Defense Ministry website quoted Sr. Col. Zhang Junshe, deputy director of the Naval Military Studies Research Institute, saying the J-15 had a range of about 3,000 kilometers without refueling.

Col. Zhang was also quoted as saying that China’s carrier-borne aircraft would be fully combat ready within about two years, and its first carrier group would be fully operational in four to five years.

In its annual report to Congress on Chinese military developments, the Pentagon said China might have already begun construction of components for its first fully indigenous aircraft carrier, although that vessel wasn’t likely to be completed until after 2015.

China’s military ambitions are now aided by the landing of its first fighter jet on an aircraft carrier. The WSJ’s Jeremy Page discusses what this means for the country’s defense strategy.

WSJ

How the US and oil majors should view China-Japan tensions

Television pictures of rioting Chinese citizens are a startling demonstration of the seemingly spontaneous civic anger over Japan’s territorial claims to five uninhabited islands and three rocks known to Japanese as the Senkaku Islands and to the Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands.

At stake in the East China Sea (and in a separate row in the South China Sea) are not the barren rocks themselves but the oil and gas that might be found under surrounding waters. Oil majors contemplating investment need a primer in international law as well as an appreciation of the historical and political background before they venture into this region.

The Spratly Archipelago and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea
The South China Sea dispute, faintly grumbling along for some thirty years, appeared to mainstream media to suddenly rise in tempo for political and economic reasons in 2009. In fact, it grew noisier for a very concrete legal reason: 13 May 2009 was the deadline for States to make claims to extend the stretch of their rights to exploit seabed for hydrocarbons under article 76(8) of the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).

In very broad brush terms, what needs to be understood about the UNCLOS regime to appreciate the background to these events is as follows:-

1) Standard issue for coastal states is 12 nautical miles (“nm”) of territorial water projecting from their low tide baselines, stretching out to 200 nm of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in which they must permit some international activities – such as laying submarine cables, maritime passage and over-flight – but can bag the hydrocarbon and mineral wealth, as well as fisheries.

2) If you can lay claim to an island (naturally-formed and above water at high tide ), you get twelve miles around that and, if it can sustain habitation, you get the 200 nm EEZ around it, too (Article 121 UNCLOS).

3) If you can persuade the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that your continental shelf goes out beyond 200 nm into undisputed seabed, you could get some extra EEZ. If there is a dispute between states, the Commission lacks jurisdiction, and nor can it rule on Article 121 issues.

4) If States do not like what they see in submissions to the CLCS and want to beef about it, they put in to the UN Secretary General a document known by the somewhat oxymoronic French title “Note Verbale.”

5) States can opt out of binding UNCLOS dispute resolution, and China did.

6) If it is a sovereignty dispute over land, then UNCLOS is the wrong set of rules anyway; one is into customary international law and the heavy hand of history.

The UNCLOS template significantly favours Japan’s archipelagic geography over China’s continental coastline – because more islands generate more EEZs. Also UNCLOS requires states to be noisy in asserting their claims in a way that sits ill with Deng Xiaoping’s famous approach “Keep a cool head and maintain a low profile. Never take the lead – but aim to do something big.”

The states with a dog in the fight over a cluster of a hundred-odd geographic features scattered over 400,000 plus sq km of the central South China Sea are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, China and Taiwan.

When Malaysia and Vietnam put in their continental shelf submissions in 2009, what particularly exercised world opinion as evidencing expansionist territorial ambitions of China in the resulting flurry of exchanges of Notes Verbales (which continued into 2011), was what has become known as China’s nine dash (or dot as some prefer) map, appended to one Note Verbale.

This was taken by some as implying that China (encompassing Taiwan) may claim sovereignty of the whole of the South China Seas. China has managed to maintain a suitably inscrutable ambiguity (sometimes by resort to Latin maxims) in clarifying/obfuscating what the nine dots or dashes should be taken to mean in legal Morse Code.

The Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea
Japan formally annexed the islands in 1895. After the Second World War, they were administered by the US until 1972, when they were returned to Japan. Around this time oil was discovered in the region and China advanced its claim to the islands. It deployed historical arguments going back to the 15th century and used Taiwan’s separate claim to the territory by subsuming it into the ‘One China’ argument.

A striking contrast between the South China Sea and the East China Sea disputes is that the former (in which the potential for hydrocarbon producton is believed to be much greater) has not generated the political heat sparked by the latter.

The North East Asian dispute is laced with the lingering resentment of South Korea and China towards Japan as their former coloniser and wartime master.

The recent re-engagement of the USA with East Asia after a decade of obsession with the Middle East somewhat brings to mind the couple who nearly had their colour TV stolen while they were upstairs watching the jewellery.

What underlies America’s reawakening to the region is a growing concern with the massively increased economic gravitational pull of China, which has played a canny diplomatic game in ASEAN while Japan has tended to default to isolationist arrogance.

The worry then becomes whether China’s growing confidence and economic power, with the west hobbled by the depredations of its Great Recession, may lead it to greater aggression. The hope must be that Deng Xiaoping’s axiom that what China needs is stability at home and peace in the world will not be destabilised by some combination of US tub-thumping and miscalculation and resurgent Japanese militarism.

A 2010 survey by the Pew Research Centre placed China top (at 91 per cent) in a satisfaction survey of 22 diverse nations polled on their governments’ handling of the economy. Ranked bottom (at 15 per cent) was the notoriously-obedient Japanese citizenry’s satisfaction with their democratically-elected government.

One front-runner in Japanese politics, as elections loom, is Nobu Ishihara. His father Shintaro Ishihara (described in the Economist as a “crusty China-baiting nationalist”) led a campaign for the Tokyo metropolitan government to purchase the Senkakus from their private Japanese owners. The national government has intervened and disclosed that it is itself close to buying them.

A second emerging force is the populist mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto, who is reinvigorating Japanese politics with the launch of the Japan Restoration Party (JRP) and wants to rewrite Japan’s pacifist constitution.

While China’s president Hu Jintao and prime minister Wen Jiabao (and their anticipated successors Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang) are not subject to any type of Western-style democracy, they do need the acclamation of their population for what pre-communist dynasties saw as the Mandate of Heaven.

Being sensitive to their people’s enduring wish to redeem the shame of Japanese domination may be equivalent in the perception of China’s leaders to the impulse to grandstand to American voters, which causes Mitt Romney and his running mate to bray about what they will do to punish China as a currency manipulator if they get elected.

The right response from Washington
A sage US president would do well to bear in mind three things.

First, do not underestimate the importance and legitimacy that China accords to history and the unity of the Han Chinese civilisation. This is why the sovereignty of Taiwan and return of Hong Kong were always non-negotiable, and why Beijing cleaves to historical arguments to support territorial claims based on ancient dominion rather than following formal laws.

Secondly, recognise the high degree of pragmatism which has allowed China to take the one country, two systems approach in Hong Kong and makes it keen to adopt the joint development approach without prejudice to territorial and sovereignty claims that can be parked indefinitely if a workable solution can be found.

Thirdly, appreciate that the Confucian argument that rejects binding dispute resolution as a disharmonious way to go is virtually bound to win in these cases, where there is no compulsory dispute resolution mechanism and the question of whose legal arguments are right is theoretical.

Faced with reasonable pragmatic alternatives, which US leader in his right mind would risk testing his military muscle as the ultimate disharmonious form of practical dispute resolution? Hopefully, neither Barack Obama nor Mitt Romney.

What business should do
On the other hand the astute chief executive of an oil and gas major should get his legal department to seek some creative advice on how to structure investments through special purpose vehicles able to take advantage of Bilateral Investment Treaties engaged by China and Japan that may give some leverage to seek compensation from an international arbitration tribunal if investments become expropriated through state action contrary to international law.

Tim Taylor

Time for a new ASEAN way

If the recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) conference in Phnom Penh will be remembered for anything, it will be for what went wrong rather than what was accomplished. For the first time in ASEAN's 45-year history, the 10-nation grouping failed to deliver a joint statement, underscoring deep internal divisions behind the façade of unified consensus.

At the heart of the problem is the South China Sea, where certain member states have simmering territorial conflicts with China. In particular, this has pitted Vietnam and the Philippines, proponents of a multilateral resolution to the disputes, against Cambodia, a close China ally whose position has been to keep the conflict from going international.

But rather than despairing over ASEAN's future, the crisis of consensus should be looked upon as an important opportunity for change. Currently ASEAN summits and forums allow only for member states to air their concerns, which are often as varied as the reasons for why they are ultimately not jointly addressed. Because member states are not bound to honor any proposed or passed resolution, these assemblies lack the power to force action.

After the breakdown in Phnom Penh, it is clearly time to change all of that. Established in 1967 as a six-nation bulwark against the spread of communism, ASEAN continues operates on the principles of respect for each member's national sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Over the years, this arrangement has helped to avoid the creation of internal power blocs, where the biggest and most powerful states could have tried to dictate the affairs of smaller members. The absence of any binding force, however, has rendered ASEAN essentially ineffective in leading the region or resolving crises.

The future of ASEAN depends on how much its members are willing to give in order to take. If ASEAN is to become an effective force for change in Southeast Asia, it must have the ability to bind its members to resolutions. To be sure, consensus rather than majority rule will still serve the grouping. At the same time, ASEAN would be more effective if member states were willing to surrender a measure of sovereignty over certain international affairs. A supranational organization whose authority is legally binding would provide the teeth necessary for ASEAN to act when parties are in general agreement.

Much like a court of justice, a new binding arrangement would allow member states to opine and rule in favor or against certain group decisions. Dissension would necessarily be encouraged and protected, allowing for opposition voices to state countervailing views and opinions. To maintain a unified front, however, all member states would be required to honor and uphold any final resolution.

Consensus rule is far from perfect, as there will undoubtedly be times when member states believe certain resolutions work against their national interests. But the recent breakdown of unanimity in Phnom Penh represents a valuable opportunity to weigh ASEAN's strengths and weaknesses, and make the necessary adjustments to improve its credibility as an effective organization.

Non-committal values
ASEAN's motto, "One Vision, One Identity, One Community", is a lofty ideal that to date has little basis in reality across the region of 600 million people. Many now hope that the ASEAN Economic Community planned for 2015 will through more regional trade, travel and transfers prompt faster economic growth and regional coherence.

Yet ASEAN states differ in almost every measurable way, ranging from levels of economic development to technological advancement to basic governing structures and principles. These differences have made it difficult to establish an agreed set of core values - nominally human rights, democracy, and the rule of law - to which all members sincerely subscribe and uphold.

ASEAN has not been completely negligent in protecting these values, seen in the recent creation of a dedicated, though non-binding, ASEAN human rights body. But with its complex mix of authoritarian, semi-democratic and democratic regimes, it would be naïve to assume that all ASEAN member states subscribe to these values in equal degrees.

Indeed, these divergent political outlooks are arguably the biggest stumbling block to transforming ASEAN from a talking shop into an effective regional and global player.

Independent research shows that countries whose values mirror or nearly mirror one another are more likely to resolve differences than with countries whose values do not align. While basic values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law are respected to varying degrees among ASEAN states, is it any wonder that related issues have so frequently failed to result in concrete, unified action?

Take, for example, Vietnam, which has recently experienced a significant deterioration of its human rights situation and continues to resist any move towards democratic rule. Vietnamese citizens enjoy certain basic civil liberties, but are strictly barred from voicing their opinions against the government lest they be charged and potentially jailed on anti-state charges.

Although Vietnam may share the Philippines' position on the need to internationalize its South China Sea disputes with China, these two countries are no more alike than Singapore and Cambodia.

The Vietnamese government has proven unwilling to compromise on even marginal matters of political and constitutional reform, while the Philippines accommodates a lively, if not unruly, democracy.

This is not a criticism strictly reserved for Vietnam. ASEAN members Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar all maintain various anti-democratic laws and measures aimed specifically at stifling dissent. Yet for ASEAN to move forward in a unified direction, all ten members must reach a common stance on these basic values.

An organization divided over basic questions of rights and freedoms cannot lay claim to having "One Vision, One Identity, One Community", let alone reach a unified stance on more complex matters such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Every effective group needs a strong leader, ideally a person or state who possesses qualities others seek to emulate. In ASEAN's context, such a leader would need to embody the wealth and technological prowess of Singapore, the economic power of Indonesia, the openness of Thailand and the bold rhetoric of the Philippines. Such a person or state, of course, is strictly hypothetical in ASEAN's current context.

Through not without flaws and not a clear beacon of democracy, human rights and rule of law, Indonesia nonetheless would provide a compelling face for a new and improved ASEAN. Indonesia has stayed above the fray of South China Sea tensions and recently played a behind-the-scenes mediating role to keep internal divisions from becoming full-blown fissures over the issue.

With its strong bilateral ties with China and the United States, Indonesia is also well-positioned to navigate ASEAN the growing superpower rivalry for influence and advantage in the region. As this rivalry intensifies and the risk of divide and rule tactics rise, a unified ASEAN will be crucial to maintaining regional peace and stability.

Whether ASEAN can serve that role will remain doubtful without substantial and prompt changes in the grouping's culture, rules and leadership.

Khanh Vu Duc

Clinton Plays Up 'Frank' Talks With Beijing

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put a positive spin on meetings with Chinese leaders earlier this week that yielded little visible progress on diplomatic disputes, saying the relationship between the two superpowers is mature enough to withstand differences.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton with the sultan of Brunei on Thursday.

Nearing the final leg of her 11-day Asia-Pacific tour with Thursday stops in East Timor and Brunei, Mrs. Clinton also sought to dial back speculation that she was visiting the smaller nations in an effort to counter Chinese influence in the region.

"We are not here against any other country," she said. "We happen to believe that Asia and the Pacific are quite big enough for many countries to participate in the activities of the region."

Her stops, which included a tour of a coffee plantation in Connecticut-sized East Timor, followed her visit to Beijing, where she and Chinese leaders appeared far apart on key issues such as how to end Syria's civil war and resolve territorial disputes in the resource-rich South China Sea. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi dismissed the idea that there was a serious problem in the South China Sea, saying the historical record supported its claims there, and said solutions to the Syrian crisis shouldn't be imposed by outside countries.

Mrs. Clinton was also greeted skeptically by Chinese state media, which questioned whether U.S. officials were trying to drive a wedge between Beijing and other countries across the region.

"As was evident yesterday, there is a huge amount going on where the United States and China need to consult," Mrs. Clinton said, also mentioning issues including Iran, North Korea and the global economic recovery. "Even when we disagree, believe me, we can talk very frankly now. We can explore the toughest issues without imperiling the whole relationship," she said.

"The United States, certainly I, am not going to shy away from standing up for our strategic interests, and in expressing clearly where we differ," she added.Mr. Yang called the talks "constructive and fruitful," state media said.

Analysts widely believe Mrs. Clinton's trip is partly intended to rally leaders in other Asian nations to forge a common position on issues such as how to settle disputes in the South China Sea, which is claimed in whole by China and in part by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and others. The U.S. says it doesn't take sides in territorial disputes, but says it has an interest in maintaining freedom of navigation in the sea, which is home to some of the world's most critical shipping lanes.

Mrs. Clinton's trip comes two months ahead of a major regional summit in Phnom Penh in November where U.S. leaders are expected to continue pressing for a code of conduct to govern conflicts in the sea. China has opposed efforts to settle disagreements at multilateral forums and says it prefers to handle them on a bilateral basis.

Her stop in Brunei, meanwhile, took her to a tiny petrostate of only about 400,000 people that nevertheless will carry more weight next year when it is slated to host a series of major meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, an increasingly important regional bloc which U.S. officials hope can serve as a check on growing Chinese diplomatic sway. Brunei also has claims in the South China Sea, as well as experience in hammering out joint-development agreements for oil and gas in contested waters, which could be applied to disputes in the sea.

A senior U.S. State Department official traveling with Mrs. Clinton from East Timor to Brunei acknowledged it was likely tensions would remain high for the foreseeable future. "I do think we have to be prepared for more tension on some of these matters," the official said. "I think this is the new normal."

But U.S. officials played down the strategic imperative of visiting East Timor, instead arguing Mrs. Clinton's stop there was intended mainly to recognize the country's significant progress since it gained independence from Indonesia a decade ago, capped with a democratic election this year. Even so, U.S. officials have supported the idea of admitting East Timor into the 10-member Asean bloc, which could enhance its strategic significance.

Mrs. Clinton heads next to Vladivostok, Russia, where she will attend an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit this weekend.

Patrick Barta

Is China Losing the Diplomatic Plot?

SINGAPORE – In 2016, China’s share of the global economy will be larger than America’s in purchasing-price-parity terms. This is an earth-shaking development; in 1980, when the United States accounted for 25% of world output, China’s share of the global economy was only 2.2%. And yet, after 30 years of geopolitical competence, the Chinese seem to be on the verge of losing it just when they need it most.

China’s leaders would be naïve and foolish to bank on their country’s peaceful and quiet rise to global preeminence. At some point, America will awaken from its geopolitical slumber; there are already signs that it has opened one eye.

But China has begun to make serious mistakes. After Japan acceded to Chinese pressure and released a captured Chinese trawler in September 2010, China went overboard and demanded an apology from Japan, rattling the Japanese establishment.

Similarly, after North Korean shells killed innocent South Korean civilians in November 2010, China remained essentially silent. In a carefully calibrated response, South Korea sent its ambassador to attend the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for the imprisoned Chinese human-rights activist Liu Xiaobo in December 2010.

China has also ruffled many Indian feathers by arbitrarily denying visas to senior officials. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao subsequently calmed the waters in meetings with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, but such unnecessary provocations left a residue of mistrust in India.

But all of these mistakes pale in comparison with what China did to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in July. For the first time in 45 years, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) failed to agree to a joint communiqué, ostensibly because ASEAN’s current chair, Cambodia, did not want the communiqué to refer to bilateral disputes in the South China Sea. But the whole world, including most ASEAN countries, perceived Cambodia’s stance as the result of enormous Chinese pressure.

China’s victory proved to be Pyrrhic. It won the battle of the comminiqué, but it may have lost 20 years of painstakingly accumulated goodwill, the result of efforts such as the ASEAN-China free-trade agreement, signed in November 2002. More importantly, China’s previous leaders had calculated that a strong and unified ASEAN provided a valuable buffer against any possible US containment strategy. Now, by dividing ASEAN, China has provided America with its best possible geopolitical opportunity in the region. If Deng Xiaoping were alive, he would be deeply concerned.

It may be unfair to blame China’s leaders for the ASEAN debacle. More likely than not, over-zealous junior officials pushed a hard line on the South China Sea, whereas no Chinese leader, if given the choice, would have opted to wreck the AMM Communiqué. But the fact that it happened reveals the scope of China’s recent poor decision-making.

The “nine-dotted line” that China has drawn over the South China Sea may prove to be nothing but a big geopolitical millstone around China’s neck. It was unwise to attach the map in a note verbale responding to a joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in May 2009. This was the first time that China had included the map in an official communication to the UN, and it caused great concern among some ASEAN members.

The geopolitical opportunity implied by inclusion of the map has not been lost on America, which is why the US, somewhat unusually, has made another effort to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention. Having tabled the nine-dotted line at the UN, China walked into a no-win situation, owing to the difficulty of defending the map under international law. Indeed, as the eminent historian Wang Gungwu has pointed out, the first maps to claim the South China Sea were Japanese, and were inherited by Nationalist China.

Domestically, too, the nine-dotted line may cause problems for the government by presenting critics with a useful weapon. Any hint of compromise will expose officials politically. In other words, a few rocks in the South China Sea have put China between a rock and a hard place.

There is no doubt that China will have to find a way to compromise over the nine-dotted line. In private, it has begun to do so. Even though the line covers the waters northeast of the Indonesian-owned Natuna Islands, the Chinese government has given Indonesia categorical assurances that China does not claim the Natuna Islands or their Exclusive Economic Zone.

These private assurances calmed relations with Indonesia. So why not make similar overtures to other ASEAN states?

The legacies of Deng and his predecessor, Mao Zedong, are very different. But the People’s Republic’s two most important leaders did agree in one area: both bent over backwards to make territorial concessions to resolve border disputes. This explains why China was so generous to Russia, for example, in its border settlements.

Mao and Deng could do this because both provided China with strong leadership. The challenge for the world now is that China has become politically pluralistic: no leader is strong enough to make wise unilateral concessions.

Nothing will happen in China until the leadership transition is completed in November. The new administration of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang will need some time to settle in. But America is waking up. So, too, will the rest of the world in 2016. The big question then will be: Is China as geopolitically competent as number one as it was when it was number two?

Kishore Mahbubani

South China Sea Dispute: Clinton Visit Brings U.S. Neutrality Doubts

BEIJING — U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton sat down Wednesday with Chinese President Hu Jintao to press Beijing to agree to peacefully resolve territorial disputes with its smaller neighbors over the South China Sea. But as she began her meetings here, China questioned the stated neutrality of the United States.

At the start of the talks with Hu, Clinton said the U.S.-China relationship is strong. "We are able to explore areas of agreement and disagreement in a very open manner, which I think demonstrates the maturity of the relationship and the chance to take it further in the future," she said.

There was no immediate comment on the talks, but a scheduled meeting with Vice President Xi Jinping for later Wednesday morning had been canceled by China "for unexpected scheduling reasons," said a senior State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Xi, who takes over as China's top leader later this year, also had a meeting canceled with the visiting prime minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong. No reasons for the cancellations have been given.

Clinton met late Tuesday with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi after arriving in China from Indonesia, where she urged Southeast Asian nations to present a unified front in dealing with China in attempts to ease rising tensions in the South China Sea.

The U.S. wants China and the other claimants to adopt a binding code of conduct for the region, along with a process to resolve maritime disputes without coercion, intimidation or the use of force. Clinton wants the Chinese to drop their insistence on settling conflicting claims with individual nations and instead embrace a multilateral mechanism that will give the smaller members of the Association of South East Asian Nations greater clout in negotiations.

She urged all parties to make "meaningful progress" by a November summit of East Asian leaders that President Barack Obama plans to attend in Cambodia.

In Jakarta, Indonesia's capital, Clinton offered strong U.S. support for a regionally endorsed plan to ease rising tensions by implementing the code of conduct. Jakarta is the headquarters of ASEAN, and Clinton pressed the group to insist that China agree to deal with them as a bloc.

The stance puts the U.S. squarely at odds with China, which has become more aggressive in pressing its territorial claims with its smaller neighbors and wants the disputes to be resolved with each country, giving it greater leverage.

Clinton made her case in Jakarta on Tuesday in meetings with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and ASEAN secretary general Surin Pitsuwan. Indonesia has played a leading role in putting the six-point plan together after ASEAN was unable to reach consensus on the matter in July.

Clinton said the U.S. is "encouraged" by the plan but wants it acted on – particularly implementation and enforcement of the code of conduct, which has languished since a preliminary framework for it was first agreed upon in 2002.

"The United States does not take a position on competing territorial claims ... but we believe the nations of the region should work collaboratively to resolve disputes without coercion, without intimidation and certainly without the use of force," Clinton told reporters at a news conference with Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa.

Yet China on Tuesday expressed skepticism that the U.S. is neutral in the disputes.

"The U.S. has many times said it does not take a position," Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei said Tuesday. "I hope they will keep their promise and do more to help stability and not the opposite. The South China Sea dispute is a complicated thing. To China, the South China Sea dispute is about the sovereignty of some of the islands there. China, like other countries in the world, has the obligation to safeguard its territories."

For the second day in a row Clinton was criticized Wednesday in editorials in Chinese newspapers. The Global Times said the United States was behind the disputes in the South China Sea and accused Clinton of seeking "unilateral compromise by China."

It said "China should not let the U.S. have any doubt or other misjudgments regarding its determination."

China and a host of Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei, have overlapping claims to several small, but potentially energy-rich areas of the South China Sea.

In July, China angered the United States, as well as Vietnam and the Philippines, by creating a city and military garrison on a remote island 220 miles (350 kilometers) from its southernmost province intended to administer hundreds of thousands of square miles of water where China wants to strengthen its control over disputed islands. China, which also has disputes with Japan in the East China Sea, rejected the criticism.

In addition to the South China Sea, Clinton will be discussing the situation in Syria as well as the efforts to deal with Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs while she is in the Chinese capital.

Clinton is in China at the midpoint of an 11-day, six-nation tour of the Asia-Pacific region that started in the Cook Islands and Indonesia. After she leaves China, she will visit East Timor and Brunei before heading to Russia's Far East to represent the United States at the annual meeting of leaders from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Vladivostock.

Huffington Post

China questions U.S. neutrality over its territorial claims

Beijing expresses doubts as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrives on regional tour to persuade authorities to resolve disputes over competing claims in South China Sea.

Clinton is pressing China to agree to peacefully resolve territorial disputes with their smaller neighbors (Feng Li, Associated Press)

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton is in Beijing to press Chinese authorities to agree to peacefully resolve disputes with their smaller neighbours over competing territorial claims in the South China Sea. But as she began her meetings, China questioned the stated neutrality of the United States.

Clinton met late Tuesday with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi after arriving in China from Indonesia, where she urged Southeast Asian nations to present a unified front in dealing with China in attempts to ease rising tensions in the South China Sea. Clinton will meet on Wednesday with other top Chinese officials, including President Hu Jintao and State Councillor Dai Bingguo.

The U.S. wants China and the other claimants to adopt a binding code of conduct for the region, along with a process to resolve maritime disputes without coercion, intimidation or the use of force. Clinton wants the Chinese to drop their insistence on settling conflicting claims with individual nations and instead embrace a multilateral mechanism that will give the smaller members of the Association of South East Asian Nations greater clout in negotiations.

She urged all parties to make "meaningful progress" by a November summit of East Asian leaders that President Barack Obama plans to attend in Cambodia.

Dispute over South China Sea
In Indonesia's capital before heading to China, Clinton offered strong U.S. support for a regionally endorsed plan to ease rising tensions by implementing the code of conduct. Jakarta is the headquarters of ASEAN, and Clinton pressed the group to insist that China agree to deal with them as a bloc.

The stance puts the U.S. squarely at odds with China, which has become more aggressive in pressing its territorial claims with its smaller neighbours and wants the disputes to be resolved with each country, giving it greater leverage.

Clinton made her case in Jakarta on Tuesday in meetings with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and ASEAN secretary general Surin Pitsuwan, a day after she delivered the same message to Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa. Indonesia has played a leading role in putting the six-point plan together after ASEAN was unable to reach consensus on the matter in July.

Clinton said the U.S. is "encouraged" by the plan but wants it acted on — particularly implementation and enforcement of the code of conduct, which has languished since a preliminary framework for it was first agreed upon in 2002. .

"The United States has a national interest, as every country does, in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, freedom of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce in the South China Sea," Clinton told reporters at a news conference with Natalegawa.

Chinese boats sail in the lagoon of Meiji reef off the island of Hainan, which is also claimed by Vietnam (Associated Press

"The United States does not take a position on competing territorial claims ... but we believe the nations of the region should work collaboratively to resolve disputes without coercion, without intimidation and certainly without the use of force," she said. "That is why we encourage ASEAN and China to make meaningful progress toward finalizing a comprehensive code of conduct in order to establish rules of the road and clear procedures for peacefully addressing disagreements."

Yet China on Tuesday expressed skepticism that the U.S. is neutral in the disputes.

"The U.S. has many times said it does not take a position," Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei said on Tuesday. "I hope they will keep their promise and do more to help stability and not the opposite. The South China Sea dispute is a complicated thing. To China, the South China Sea dispute is about the sovereignty of some of the islands there. China, like other countries in the world, has the obligation to safeguard its territories."

China and a host of Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei, have overlapping claims to several small, but potentially energy-rich areas of the South China Sea.

In July, China angered the United States, as well as Vietnam and the Philippines, by creating a city and military garrison on a remote island 220 miles from its southernmost province intended to administer hundreds of thousands of square miles of water where China wants to strengthen its control over disputed islands. China, which also has disputes with Japan in the East China Sea, rejected the criticism.

Associated Press