Contradictions in Sino -US relations

The relations between the world’s only super power the United States and rising great world power

China would certainly influence the course of socio-political development of the world.

Hence the world community shows great interest towards them.These relations are full of contradiction, for contradiction is a way of life.

According to philosophers the motive force of development is the struggle and unity of opposites.

Opposites are at the both ends of a contradiction, just like the poles of a magnet.

As a super power the United States wants to maintain its hegemony and domination in the world. China, on the other hand, is opposed to hegemony and domination. The United States wants the status quo to remain whereas china wants a new world order. The United States is a state whose power is on the wane. China in contrast is a rising world power.

Contradictions are many. Yet they are natural. The existence of contradictions is not the problem. It is the way they are resolved that could become a problem. In international relations there are two well-known and time-tested methods of resolving contradictions. One is through dialogue or diplomatic means. The other is through confrontation or war. Just like the means their outcomes are also different.

Prima facie both states have expressed their desire to solve all issues and differences through dialogue. Yet there are enough issues that could undermine this desire and lead to confrontation. Examples are US support to the renegade province of Taiwan and the latter’s militarization by the US, the stand-off between North and South Korea, the dispute over maritime territories in the South China sea etc. Even a military conflict elsewhere in the world such as the Middle East could undermine the relations between the US and China. It is a fragile peace that exists in the world.

The belligerence of the United States is growing in inverse proportion to the diminution of its power as is witnessed in the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. China, on the other hand, needs peace for its development and growth. It has consistently followed a policy of consolidating unity and friendship with all, including the United States. It has demonstrated that it does not have hegemonic intentions toward other nations. It has peacefully accomplished the re-union of Hongkong to the mainland and is ready to wait for the re-union of Taiwan.

During the recent visit of US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta to China the latter proposed to the United States to promote a new type of military relations between the two countries. Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie at a press conference in the presence of Leon Panetta said: “The two sides should, within the framework of building a China – United States cooperative partnership, promote a new type of military relations featuring equality, reciprocity and win-win cooperation in an active and pragmatic way.” Liang encouraged the two militaries to develop substantial cooperation in areas of non-traditional security such as humanitarian rescues, anti-piracy efforts and medical assistance. Obviously he was pragmatic enough to exclude traditional military areas. Panetta reciprocated saying that they want to begin what the Chinese have called anew model of relationship between the militaries of the two countries.

Reasons for Panetta’s pragmatism are not hard to find. It was in July this year that China increased its US debt holdings by $ 2.6 billion bringing the total to $ 1149.66.

However, the outcome of the US Presidential election on November 6 will have a definite impact on Sino-US relations. The Republican candidate Mitt Romney has openly campaigned on an anti-Chinese platform and if elected could be a setback for developing relations with China. At present his chances of victory are less than that of President Obama. Even in the unlikely event of a Romney victory he would not be able to reverse the gains of former years and will be forced by economic and political realities to improve Sino-US relations.

The growing stature of China in the international arena and the rise of new powers Russia, Brazil, India and South Africa, which together with China comprise the BRICS would act as a deterrent against US belligerency toward China. China has built extensive and deep relations with Asian, African, Latin American and European nations that the United States would find itself isolated in any hostility with China. Therefore, the US strategy at present seems to provoke confrontations in China’s neighborhood to weaken China. This seems to be its strategy with regard to South China maritime area.

Jayatilleke de Silva

How the US and oil majors should view China-Japan tensions

Television pictures of rioting Chinese citizens are a startling demonstration of the seemingly spontaneous civic anger over Japan’s territorial claims to five uninhabited islands and three rocks known to Japanese as the Senkaku Islands and to the Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands.

At stake in the East China Sea (and in a separate row in the South China Sea) are not the barren rocks themselves but the oil and gas that might be found under surrounding waters. Oil majors contemplating investment need a primer in international law as well as an appreciation of the historical and political background before they venture into this region.

The Spratly Archipelago and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea
The South China Sea dispute, faintly grumbling along for some thirty years, appeared to mainstream media to suddenly rise in tempo for political and economic reasons in 2009. In fact, it grew noisier for a very concrete legal reason: 13 May 2009 was the deadline for States to make claims to extend the stretch of their rights to exploit seabed for hydrocarbons under article 76(8) of the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).

In very broad brush terms, what needs to be understood about the UNCLOS regime to appreciate the background to these events is as follows:-

1) Standard issue for coastal states is 12 nautical miles (“nm”) of territorial water projecting from their low tide baselines, stretching out to 200 nm of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in which they must permit some international activities – such as laying submarine cables, maritime passage and over-flight – but can bag the hydrocarbon and mineral wealth, as well as fisheries.

2) If you can lay claim to an island (naturally-formed and above water at high tide ), you get twelve miles around that and, if it can sustain habitation, you get the 200 nm EEZ around it, too (Article 121 UNCLOS).

3) If you can persuade the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that your continental shelf goes out beyond 200 nm into undisputed seabed, you could get some extra EEZ. If there is a dispute between states, the Commission lacks jurisdiction, and nor can it rule on Article 121 issues.

4) If States do not like what they see in submissions to the CLCS and want to beef about it, they put in to the UN Secretary General a document known by the somewhat oxymoronic French title “Note Verbale.”

5) States can opt out of binding UNCLOS dispute resolution, and China did.

6) If it is a sovereignty dispute over land, then UNCLOS is the wrong set of rules anyway; one is into customary international law and the heavy hand of history.

The UNCLOS template significantly favours Japan’s archipelagic geography over China’s continental coastline – because more islands generate more EEZs. Also UNCLOS requires states to be noisy in asserting their claims in a way that sits ill with Deng Xiaoping’s famous approach “Keep a cool head and maintain a low profile. Never take the lead – but aim to do something big.”

The states with a dog in the fight over a cluster of a hundred-odd geographic features scattered over 400,000 plus sq km of the central South China Sea are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, China and Taiwan.

When Malaysia and Vietnam put in their continental shelf submissions in 2009, what particularly exercised world opinion as evidencing expansionist territorial ambitions of China in the resulting flurry of exchanges of Notes Verbales (which continued into 2011), was what has become known as China’s nine dash (or dot as some prefer) map, appended to one Note Verbale.

This was taken by some as implying that China (encompassing Taiwan) may claim sovereignty of the whole of the South China Seas. China has managed to maintain a suitably inscrutable ambiguity (sometimes by resort to Latin maxims) in clarifying/obfuscating what the nine dots or dashes should be taken to mean in legal Morse Code.

The Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea
Japan formally annexed the islands in 1895. After the Second World War, they were administered by the US until 1972, when they were returned to Japan. Around this time oil was discovered in the region and China advanced its claim to the islands. It deployed historical arguments going back to the 15th century and used Taiwan’s separate claim to the territory by subsuming it into the ‘One China’ argument.

A striking contrast between the South China Sea and the East China Sea disputes is that the former (in which the potential for hydrocarbon producton is believed to be much greater) has not generated the political heat sparked by the latter.

The North East Asian dispute is laced with the lingering resentment of South Korea and China towards Japan as their former coloniser and wartime master.

The recent re-engagement of the USA with East Asia after a decade of obsession with the Middle East somewhat brings to mind the couple who nearly had their colour TV stolen while they were upstairs watching the jewellery.

What underlies America’s reawakening to the region is a growing concern with the massively increased economic gravitational pull of China, which has played a canny diplomatic game in ASEAN while Japan has tended to default to isolationist arrogance.

The worry then becomes whether China’s growing confidence and economic power, with the west hobbled by the depredations of its Great Recession, may lead it to greater aggression. The hope must be that Deng Xiaoping’s axiom that what China needs is stability at home and peace in the world will not be destabilised by some combination of US tub-thumping and miscalculation and resurgent Japanese militarism.

A 2010 survey by the Pew Research Centre placed China top (at 91 per cent) in a satisfaction survey of 22 diverse nations polled on their governments’ handling of the economy. Ranked bottom (at 15 per cent) was the notoriously-obedient Japanese citizenry’s satisfaction with their democratically-elected government.

One front-runner in Japanese politics, as elections loom, is Nobu Ishihara. His father Shintaro Ishihara (described in the Economist as a “crusty China-baiting nationalist”) led a campaign for the Tokyo metropolitan government to purchase the Senkakus from their private Japanese owners. The national government has intervened and disclosed that it is itself close to buying them.

A second emerging force is the populist mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto, who is reinvigorating Japanese politics with the launch of the Japan Restoration Party (JRP) and wants to rewrite Japan’s pacifist constitution.

While China’s president Hu Jintao and prime minister Wen Jiabao (and their anticipated successors Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang) are not subject to any type of Western-style democracy, they do need the acclamation of their population for what pre-communist dynasties saw as the Mandate of Heaven.

Being sensitive to their people’s enduring wish to redeem the shame of Japanese domination may be equivalent in the perception of China’s leaders to the impulse to grandstand to American voters, which causes Mitt Romney and his running mate to bray about what they will do to punish China as a currency manipulator if they get elected.

The right response from Washington
A sage US president would do well to bear in mind three things.

First, do not underestimate the importance and legitimacy that China accords to history and the unity of the Han Chinese civilisation. This is why the sovereignty of Taiwan and return of Hong Kong were always non-negotiable, and why Beijing cleaves to historical arguments to support territorial claims based on ancient dominion rather than following formal laws.

Secondly, recognise the high degree of pragmatism which has allowed China to take the one country, two systems approach in Hong Kong and makes it keen to adopt the joint development approach without prejudice to territorial and sovereignty claims that can be parked indefinitely if a workable solution can be found.

Thirdly, appreciate that the Confucian argument that rejects binding dispute resolution as a disharmonious way to go is virtually bound to win in these cases, where there is no compulsory dispute resolution mechanism and the question of whose legal arguments are right is theoretical.

Faced with reasonable pragmatic alternatives, which US leader in his right mind would risk testing his military muscle as the ultimate disharmonious form of practical dispute resolution? Hopefully, neither Barack Obama nor Mitt Romney.

What business should do
On the other hand the astute chief executive of an oil and gas major should get his legal department to seek some creative advice on how to structure investments through special purpose vehicles able to take advantage of Bilateral Investment Treaties engaged by China and Japan that may give some leverage to seek compensation from an international arbitration tribunal if investments become expropriated through state action contrary to international law.

Tim Taylor

Will Asia Pacific be torn between the two tigers?

As reported by the Associated Press, during the APEC summit in Vladivostok, the US Secretary of State welcomed Russia's more active Russian role in the Asia-Pacific. Citing an unnamed senior US official traveling with Ms. Clinton, the agency states that the State Secretary is eager to hear what Russian President Vladimir Putin's "goals and ambitions" in the region are and how they might complement US efforts.

The report might seem trivial at first sight – in fact, a "more active role" in the Asia Pacific is one of the core aims of today's Russian foreign policy. But it should be looked upon in a much broader context – that is within the framework of the US strategic shift to the region overtly announced about a year ago.

Dotted red line shows vast area claimed by China. The PHL, which is claiming some islands, has begun calling the region the West Philippine Sea. GMA News

Indeed, the Asia Pacific, and especially the South China Sea, is becoming a center stage for all global politics. While in other areas the dominant confrontation defining the balance of powers in the world might seem subdued and, to a certain extent, peripheral, the Asia Pacific region demonstrates it unequivocally. This is an area where the US and its allies are balancing on the brink of an open confrontation with China and are actively building muscles and trying to forge as strong an alliance as possible with countries of the region with the sole purpose of containing China.

Sometimes, though, cracks appear within what the US would like to see as an unmarried alliance. Territorial disputes do not happen between "China and all others" (although most cases fall within the formula), but between US staunchest allies in the region – like Japan – South Korea row over Dokdo Islands as they are called in Korean, or Takeshima in Japanese.

It should be noted that the US is not a littoral country iwithn regard to any of the seas where the territorial disputes take place. Still, it is obviously striving to establish its strategic presence there clearly fearing that otherwise the frontline of its standoff with China will shift much farther eastward, up to its own Pacific coast.

Well, now what lies behind Ms. Clinton's call for Russia to take a more proactive role in the regional affairs and even to "complement" the US efforts?

One of the reasons may be the fact that in shifting its attention to the Asia Pacific, the US has tried to consume a much bigger lump than it can swallow and digest.

Another lies in the fact that Washington is definitely unhappy with the state of Russian – Chinese affairs, which despite the strains in the not so distant history, have reached a level of full-scale strategic partnership.

Clearly, by urging Russia to take more active role in the affairs of the region, the US Secretary of State implies that the regional issues should be raised from the bilateral level between the countries involved to a multilateral level, and that, in turn means weakening China's stance and increasing the role of the US, with all others playing a subordinate and secondary role.

This kind of US strategy has borne certain fruit in the recent past. It has managed not only to renovate its strategic cooperation with old-time allies like Singapore, Australia or the Philippines by increasing its military presence in respective countries, but also to bring into the orbit of its policies in the region countries like Vietnam which, not really having too warm of an attitude towards the US, at present face no other option as to rely on it in order to get rid of China's dominance.

And this brings us to the most crucial question – are the countries of the region doomed to side with one of the two major players, or is there a third alternative?

Obviously, some of the problems of Russia's participation in the Asia Pacific affairs are rooted in the failures of Russia's foreign policy of the 1990s, which, among other things, resulted in a certain cooling of relations with its traditional allies in Asia, including primarily Vietnam, India and Mongolia.

But the present framework of the global US – Chinese standoff opens a possibility of a "third way" in global politics, including (and probably, primarily) in the Asia Pacific.

So, one answer that Ms. Clinton must have gotten from her appeal to Russia is the following. Russia WILL play an increasingly more active role, but it remains highly doubtful that this role will "complement" the US efforts. Rather, it is going to be a truly independent policy that would enable Russia as well as other countries not willing to be torn between the two tigers to find a real alternative.

Boris Volkhonsky

Too small an ocean

A proposal for a middle path for America, between confronting China and giving way to it.

“THE Pacific is big enough for all of us,” declared Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state, on August 31st. Or is it? Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, countered this week that the ocean is also “small enough to create conflicts that can threaten peace in the region and the world at large”. Certainly, America and China have recently been bumping heads in the western Pacific. And a visit by Mrs Clinton to Beijing this week served only to underscore the difficulty in managing their rivalry.

The two sides disagree about the cause of the problem. For America it is China’s increasingly assertive stance on territorial disputes: with South-East Asian countries in the South China Sea, and, farther north, with Japan. To China it is American meddling, which, as Xinhua put it, “has apparently emboldened certain relevant parties to make provocations against China”. The competition is more fundamental, however, than either of these finger-pointing explanations allows. It is the inevitable rivalry between an incumbent superpower and a rapidly rising one.

“The China Choice”, a new book by Hugh White, an Australian writer on strategic affairs, elaborates on this rivalry without the usual fuzzy coating of diplomatic obfuscation. America is the pre-eminent military power in the western Pacific and wants to stay that way. That is the message of the Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia, and its commitment to keep most of its naval forces in the Pacific. China, newly confident in its wealth and military muscle, wants to challenge this American primacy so close to home.

Hence the “choice” for America: to try to resist China’s challenge (as it does now) and maintain primacy; to yield to Chinese regional dominance, which would be repugnant to many Americans and would scare its Asian allies; or, as Mr White favours, to negotiate “a new order in which China’s authority and influence grow enough to satisfy the Chinese, and America’s role remains large enough to ensure that China’s power is not misused”.

To many Americans, this will seem as unnecessary and defeatist as withdrawal itself. American primacy has worked well not just for America but for the entire Asia-Pacific, creating the peaceful backdrop for economic miracles—most spectacularly in China itself. And America’s economy is still the world’s largest, with a defence budget that dwarfs China’s and an edge in military technology that China is years away from overtaking.

Mr White argues these advantages are, if not wholly illusory, then at least deceptive. American power is constrained by the danger of escalation. Its ability to defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion, say, or even to back up the Philippines or Vietnam in a clash with China over a contentious rock in the South China Sea relies on its willingness to see these conflicts become wars involving the superpowers or even nuclear confrontations. A compelling passage in the book spells out just how a minor maritime tiff could swiftly get out of hand.

Another argument against an accommodation with China is that its rise cannot continue at the pace seen in the past 33 years, and that, once its economy falters, its political system could also look shaky. Mr White calls this “Micawberesque”—hoping something will turn up, or China will turn down. Even if it does, barring a cataclysm such as a Soviet-style collapse, it will still, in a few years, have a bigger economy than America’s. And any new regime in a post-fall China would probably be weaker than the present one and perhaps more prone to populist nationalism.

America’s other big strength in the Asia-Pacific region is its network of alliances and friendships with other countries that welcome its reassuring presence. Indeed, American pronouncements in the past couple of years over the importance of the South China Sea might have been designed to provoke China into fierce responses that alarm its neighbours and push them closer to America. But if they should ever find themselves asked to take sides in a war between America and China, almost every Asian country would try to find a seat on the sidelines.

One reason is that China is now the biggest single trading partner of most of them. America’s economy, too, is tightly bound up with China’s. Some argue that this economic integration—in sharp contrast to the days of America’s cold war with the Soviet Union—makes the risks of conflict too high. Others point out that a similar period in history of surging globalisation ended not in universal peace but the first world war.

Still others argue that America and China are in fact rather adept at defusing rows. After her talks in Beijing, Mrs Clinton praised the “strength and resilience” of a relationship, where it is possible “to talk about anything”. Certainly, the showdown in May over the fate of Chen Guangcheng, a blind Chinese dissident, soon blew over. Mr White finds it hardly reassuring that one man can still raise such basic questions about the world’s most important bilateral relationship.

No lead guitar

Mr White’s solution is for a “concert” of Asia’s great powers—America, China, India and Japan—in which they agree not to seek primacy, and to gang up on any member that tries. This would involve conceding to China a “sphere of influence” (in Indochina, for example). The proposal seems far-fetched, if only because of the political obstacles in all four countries—not to mention those denied an instrument in the concert.

Mr White’s views are controversial but he is not quite alone in contemplating Sino-American power-sharing. A decade ago Bill Clinton suggested America could use its unprecedented power to create a world in which it would be comfortable living when it was “no longer top dog on the global block”. But it would take a very brave serving president to advocate a negotiated end to American leadership in the Pacific; and perhaps an even braver Chinese leader to agree to limit his country’s rise.

The Economist

South China Sea: More than Just 'Free Navigation'

Is this a necessary irritant between the US and China?

The South China Sea territorial dispute increasingly looks like a point of strategic friction between the United States and China after a recent nasty exchange between the two governments. The US Department of State criticized China for its plan to base a new military garrison in the Paracel Islands, saying this would increase international tensions. Beijing shot back that the United States should mind its own business.

Watching for them Chinese

Many observers wonder why Washington and Beijing are allowing a new irritant to emerge in the incalculably important US-China relationship. Unfortunately, there is widespread misunderstanding about the US rationale for America’s diplomatic intervention in a territorial dispute to which the United States is not a party.

Although US officials have named several specific US concerns about China’s policies and activities in the South China Sea, the US concern most widely understood and repeated is the potential threat to “freedom of navigation”: the PRC might be moving toward imposing restrictions on foreign ships sailing in the South China Sea. This, however, is not the real issue. It is really about bullying.

To be sure, the United States is a strong proponent of freedom of navigation in international waters. This stance reflects not only America’s commitment to the general principle of liberty but also the interests of a trading nation with the world’s most capable navy. There should be no doubt that if freedom of navigation was in jeopardy in the South China Sea, the United States would spring to its defense. At present, however, freedom of navigation is not at issue.

The Chinese say they do not interfere with international navigation in the South China Sea and do not intend to in the future. Their position has some merit.

China has a particular beef with surveillance by US ships and aircraft near the Chinese coast. This has resulted in Chinese harassment, with several incidents reported in the press. The UN Law of the Sea Treaty allows for spying in the region between a country’s internal waters limit—12 nautical miles—and its exclusive economic zone limit which is usually 200 nautical miles.

The Chinese argue that spying is not “innocent passage” and should not be allowed within the EEZ. It is not an unreasonable argument. So this situation has resulted in some interference with the “free navigation” of the US Navy, but this is a very limited and special case.

The other circumstance in which Chinese vessels have interfered with non-Chinese ships is when the latter are engaged in activities that involve taking resources—fishing or preparing to drill for hydrocarbons—or when foreigners are attempting to arrest Chinese fishermen. These as well are special cases. Otherwise, the Chinese have not interfered with the passage of cargo ships of any flag or of US Navy vessels passing through the waterway.

Consequently, the Chinese assert that the freedom of navigation argument is bogus, an assertion that is persuasive to many neutral onlookers. From here the Chinese charge that the Americans are using freedom of the seas as a pretext to extend the alleged “containment” strategy to Southeast Asia, limiting Chinese influence and recruiting new allies to join in the military encirclement of China.

Instead of providing fodder for Chinese rhetoric, the freedom of navigation argument should remain in the background. Rather, what the US government should be talking about is making the world safe from unlawful international coercion. Ironically, the Chinese have begun practicing what Beijing’s diplomats have for decades condemned as “hegemonism” or “power politics”—strong countries forcing their self-interested preferences onto smaller countries.

Six governments claim ownership of parts of the South China Sea. None has a slam-dunk case. China is not the only claimant that has moved unilaterally to strengthen its control over South China Sea territory and resources in recent years. China, however, has distinguished itself in two important and negative ways.

First, China’s claims are both unusually expansive and intentionally vague. Beijing has stubbornly refused to clarify its claims based on the guidelines in the international Law of the Sea treaty, to which the PRC is a signatory. This is part of a strategy of ambiguity by which the PRC tries to minimize global concern and to avoid being constrained by the Law of the Sea guidelines while taking actions aimed at intimidating individual rival claimants.

Second, the actions China has taken to assert ownership over the South China Sea and its tiny “islands” are stronger than those taken by the other claimants. These acts include threatening and damaging foreign ships, declaring a fishing ban for part of the year in half of the South China Sea and arresting foreign fisherman who do not comply. There is also the recent announcement of increased Chinese militarization of the region—not only the new garrison, but the statement by military spokesman Geng Yansheng in June that China has begun “regular, combat-ready patrols” in the South China Sea.

China’s actions are threatening because China is big. No other state in Southeast Asia can match the military power China is able to project into the South China Sea. China’s massive economic weight, rapid growth rate, and commitment to strengthening its military forces ensure that the gap will only grow larger in the future. To make the contest even more lopsided, the Chinese government recently announced plans to greatly increase the number of quasi-military patrol ships—operated by the PRC Coast Guard and other agencies—it will deploy in the South China Sea.

In effect, this is a struggle between two visions of international order for Asia. The US vision includes a system of norms and international laws that ensure, among other things, that small states are protected from predation by larger states and that dispute resolution procedures should be fair. China, on the other hand, appears to favor restoring a Chinese sphere of influence in East and Southeast Asia such as the Middle Kingdom enjoyed anciently.

Under this arrangement, the rules of international interaction would reflect basic Chinese interests. Beijing would expect regional governments not to take major decisions that run contrary to Chinese preferences. Beijing’s current unwillingness to base Chinese claims in the Law of the Sea treaty may reflect the sentiment that this mostly Western-written body of law will not be needed when China resumes its historical position of regional dominance.

Some observers see the China-US contention over the South China Sea as simply a squabble between two great powers that are both seeking regional domination, with each acting in its respective hegemonic self-interest rather than in defense of some higher principle. In this case, however, US intervention is clearly aligned with the interests of the Southeast Asian countries, which seek to avoid domination by China or any other great power. China is trying to implement a might-makes-right order, while the United States is trying to ensure that smaller countries do not get steamrolled. This is the real issue, and US officials should make it clear.

Denny Roy

No Movement on Major Disputes as Clinton Meets With Chinese Leaders

BEIJING — The United States and China clashed openly on Wednesday over two of the most contentious issues riling their relationship, the violence in Syria and growing tensions over territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

After hours of meetings with other top leaders that began Tuesday night and continued Wednesday, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton failed to narrow the gaps over international crises involving Iran and North Korea and the competition for dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. China also rebuffed Mrs. Clinton’s appeals to soften its support for the government of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria. Adding to the bumps on what is likely to be Mrs. Clinton’s last visit to China as secretary of state, one of her most important appointments, a session with Vice President Xi Jinping, the likely next leader of China, was canceled.

Most important, the Chinese leadership showed no signs of buckling after months of efforts by Mrs. Clinton and her senior aides to persuade the country to be more flexible on maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

“China has sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea and the adjacent waters,” the foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, declared flatly during a lengthy appearance with Mrs. Clinton in the Great Hall of the People on Tiananmen Square. “There is plentiful historical and jurisprudential evidence for that.”

When asked about the deepening of American military engagement in Australia and the Philippines, Mr. Yang pointedly added that the United States should reconsider its own strategy in Asia in light of “the trends of our current era and the general wish of countries in the region.”

Mrs. Clinton and her senior aides did not come to Beijing with high expectations of resolving major differences, given China’s once-in-a-decade leadership transition beginning this fall. The highly scripted transition has been jolted by a political scandal that led to the downfall of a major party official, Bo Xilai, that revealed some of the maneuvering among the political elite. As Mrs. Clinton was wrapping up her trip, a central figure in the scandal, Wang Lijun, wascharged with “bending the law for selfish ends, defection, abuse of power and bribetaking,” according to the official Xinhua news agency.

American officials said that Mrs. Clinton was not told of the looming charges against Mr. Wang during her talks on Tuesday and Wednesday, but, they said, the United States had expected that Mr. Wang would be charged at some point amid the churning internal maneuvering ahead of the transition.

At the news conference with Mr. Yang, there was little effort to paper over the two countries’ differences on Syria and the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. In July, China established a military garrison and a legislative assembly on the tiny Paracel Islands, which Vietnam also claims, exacerbating the tensions there.

Mrs. Clinton, who is in the middle of a 10-day trip through Asia, has repeatedly called on China to discuss with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations a code of conduct to address disputes in the region. The Chinese have firmly resisted that idea, with Mr. Yang insisting on direct negotiations with individual countries.

The State Department has said that China would be more likely to get its way by bargaining with individual nations than with the entire regional bloc.

In the last few months, for example, China has effectively blocked the Philippines, an ally of the United States, from gaining access to the Scarborough Shoal, known as Huangyan Island by China. The Chinese placed a rope across the entrance to the island lagoon and have kept patrol boats in the adjacent waters.

After days of hostile articles in the official Chinese news media about American interference in the region, Mr. Yang said any settlement over the South China Sea disputes should only involve those “directly concerned,” in other words, not the United States.

The foreign minister repeated China’s oft-stated policy that China would assure “the freedom and safety of navigation in the South China Sea.”

On the conflict in Syria, Mrs. Clinton reiterated American criticism of China’s veto, with Russia, of three United Nations Security Council resolutions intended to press Mr. Assad to end the violent crackdown in his country, which has claimed an estimated 20,000 lives and created a rising flood of more than 240,000 refugees, 100,000 in the last month.

“We believe that the situation in Syria is a threat to peace and stability in the entire region,” Mrs. Clinton said. “And the longer the conflict goes on, the greater the risk that it spills over borders and destabilizes neighboring countries.”

The foreign minister, Mr. Yang, countered that China opposed international interference in any other country’s internal affairs, though he expressed support for the peace proposal of the former United Nations envoy, Kofi Annan, which American and most other diplomats consider to be moot at this point. He suggested that China’s policy, not the United States’, would ultimately prove successful. “I think history will judge that China’s position on the Syrian question is a promotion of the appropriate handling and resolution” of the violence there, he said.

The Foreign Ministry said at its regular briefing that the cancellation of Mrs. Clinton’s meeting with Mr. Xi was a “normal adjustment of the itinerary.” Mr. Xi also canceled his scheduled meeting Wednesday with Singapore’s prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong. “We have reached consensus with the United States and Singapore” on the cancellations, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, said.

Diplomats in Beijing said they were told that Mr. Xi had hurt his back and said there was no reason not to believe that explanation, even though there was speculation about whether the cancellation of the meeting with Mrs. Clinton was connected to the once-in-a-decade transition, or whether it was intended as a snub.

Instead of Mr. Xi, Mrs. Clinton met with the vice premier, Li Keqiang, who is expected to become the premier early next year. Earlier Wednesday, she met with President Hu Jintao, whose term ends next year, at the Great Hall of the People. Despite the differences, Mrs. Clinton and her aides appeared satisfied with the Obama administration’s efforts to build greater openness between the two countries by creating regular consultations that allow them to endure disagreements like those on display here. She noted that President Obama and Mr. Hu have met 12 times, while she has visited Beijing five times, joking at one point that she had lost count.

N.Y. Times

India and America’s Growing Partnership

Although differences remain, an increasingly powerful and assertive China is pushing New Delhi and Washington closer together.

The possibility of a looming new cold war was on most attendees’ minds at the recent Asia-Pacific Roundtable on Asian Security Governance and Order in Kuala Lumpur. 

Hanging over the meeting was the reality of an increasingly influential and assertive China, and the anxiety this has created in the United States.

What was striking, however, was that, at least among some of the regional states in attendance, the perception is that China’s growing power in the region is wholly benign. 

Malaysian Prime Minister Razak, for instance, said that he would not belittle “the positive transformational effects China’s ascendancy has and will continue to have on Asia and beyond.” Mahathir Mohammed, the elder statesman of Malaysia, went even further by suggesting that because China has never colonized Asian countries in the way Europe once did, Malaysia might have more reason to fear modern Europe than modern China.

China’s own perceptions about security in Asia and the Pacific called this logic into question. The Chinese Ambassador to ASEAN spelled out the Chinese position on the South China Sea, making light of the repercussions of Chinese assertiveness on this matter. Other Chinese scholars openly admitted that confrontation with the U.S. was inevitable, as the U.S. rebalance towards Asia was aimed squarely at China and posed a direct threat to it, even well admitting that the two countries shared an interest in proceeding with cautious pragmatism. This is likely to generate greater cooperation between the two.

By China’s own admission, moreover, its impressive rise in the region was forcing weaker countries to perform the feat of “putting legs on two boats.” Many ASEAN nations seemed to more or less agree with this assessment. For example, the Indonesian Foreign Minister said that each country in the region is “worried” about having to choose between two competing sides. “We do not want to be put into that position,” FM Marty Natalegawa said. 

“The Pacific is sufficiently accommodating to provide not only the role of China and the U.S., but of emerging powers too.” An ASEAN spokesperson later added that ASEAN would not like to dictate the roles of different powers in the region. Instead, it would rather act like a flight controller at a busy airport, making sure that all planes arrive and depart without collision.

But sooner or later, countries in the region will have to develop a cohesive Asian strategy to deal with the challenge of Chinese assertiveness. In contrast to many of the ASEAN powers, India and the U.S. seem to understand this reality. This is pushing them towards greater cooperation.

The U.S., for example, has decided to reorient its foreign policy to give greater attention to the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. President Obama was candid about Washington’s’ strategic objectives in the region when he stated, “I am determined that we meet the challenges of the moment responsibly and that we emerge even stronger in a manner that preserves American global leadership and maintains our military superiority.” The real debate in America today is not about the importance of Asia, but rather over what the best methods are for the U.S. to engage the region.  

India too understands what’s at stake. To be sure, like the U.S., India has an interest in working with the U.S., China, and other countries in revamping the regional security system in a way that is compatible with India’s own interests. Furthermore, India has tried to smooth over tensions with China by identifying the issues- particularly multilateral ones like international trade, the global financial system, and the environment, in which cooperation with China can be enhanced.

Nonetheless, New Delhi is under no illusions about the potential challenges a rising China creates. At least two of these stretch back decades, and yet, because of their intractable nature, continue to animate Sino-Indian relations. These include: the unsettled border between the two countries and Beijing’s continued support of Pakistan. In addition, China’s military modernization, focusing as it does on the PLA Navy, has also raised the possibility of Beijing coming to dominate the sea-lanes of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This would simply be unacceptable for India.

India-U.S. relations have undoubtedly benefitted from the changing dynamics of the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, both sides were all smiles when External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met in June for the third round of their bilateral strategic dialogue. That is not to say that the issuesthat have bedeviled the bilateral relationship over the last two years had disappeared. They hadn’t. Nonetheless, they had been sidelined in favor of focusing on the larger, long-term objectives in which U.S. and Indian interests happily coincide.

The impetus for focusing on these larger issues, of course, was the growing tensions between China and some of the ASEAN nations over the South China Sea, which coincided with the strategic dialogue. Even as the disputes in the South China Sea have continued throughout the summer, new tensions have emerged between China, South Korea, and Japan over maritime sovereignty issues in the East China Sea.

As these developments have unfolded the U.S. has largely cast aside its initial doubts about India and begun to embrace it as the “lynchpin” of its new security architecture. This was made evident by Secretary Leon Panetta during his trip to India immediately prior to the strategic dialogue, when he sought to enlist India as a partner in Asia-Pacific, whatever may have been the irritants in the past.

The elaborate Joint Statement issued at the end of the strategic dialogue makes the context very clear. “The U.S. and India have a shared vision of peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia, the Indian Ocean region, and the Pacific region and are committed to work together, and with others in the region, for the evolution of an open, balanced and inclusive architecture.”  It’s rare for Indo-U.S. statements to express the unified role of the two countries in the region in such stark terms.

Nor were these just empty words. Indeed, real changes are already being seen. For instance, the U.S., once wary of upsetting Pakistan by encouraging India to take an active role in Afghanistan, now seeks out new opportunities to intensify the efforts of the two countries for consultation, coordination, and cooperation in promoting a stable, democratic, sovereign and prosperous Afghanistan. This has gone so far as Washington putting aside its decades-long opposition to regional projects that involve the Islamic Republic of Iran. For example, even as U.S.-Iranian relations deteriorate, Washington has suggested it would support a proposal for India and Afghanistan to help develop Iran’s Chabahar Port in order to facilitate greater trade among these three countries.

The references to defense relations in the joint statement are of particular importance. Instead of continuing dwell on India’s fighter aircraft contract not going to a U.S. company, the statement celebrated the fact that India had awarded defense contracts worth $9 billion USD in recent years to U.S. companies. It noted the many joint military exercises and exchanges that have been held over the last six years, and reaffirmed both sides desire to strengthen defense cooperation through increased technology transfers. 

None of this is to say that an intense strategic rivalry between India and the U.S. on the one hand, and China on the other is inevitable. Indeed, New Delhi is likely to continue seeking ways to ameliorate tensions with China by cooperating on issues where both countries’ have similar interests.

Some also hope that India and China will find ways to dampen their running disputes. Kishore Mahbubani of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore, together with an Indian and a Chinese scholar, has suggested an India-China diplomatic structure to monitor these issues and to find temporary, if not permanent solutions.

Nonetheless, given China’s present assertiveness, these solutions are likely to prove unworkable. As they do, India will have to search for ways to provide for its own security in the larger context of the evolving regional environment, rather than bilaterally with China. In this sense, greater U.S. involvement may be an important factor.

Ambassador T.P.Sreenivasan is the Vice-Chairman and Executive Head of the Kerala State Higher Education Council with the rank of Vice-Chancellor. In his 37-year career with the Indian Foreign Service, he served in many distinguished positions including Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, Vienna, Governor for India at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, and Ambassador to Austria and Slovenia (2000-2004), among many other positions.